An old reply to Taylor is William E. Connolly’s “Taylor, Foucault and Otherness,” Political Theory, 13.3 (1985).

 

Best wishes,

 

Nathan

 

Prof. Nathan Widder

Professor of Political Theory

Department of Politics and International Relations

Royal Holloway, University of London

Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX

United Kingdom
Staff webpage<http://pure.rhul.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/nathan-widder_2dbed1de-b1f5-4a4b-a6a9-6758b1677469.html>
Genealogies of Difference<http://www.press.uillinois.edu/s02/widder.html>
Reflections on Time and Politics<http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-03394-5.html>
Political Theory after Deleuze<http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/political-theory-after-deleuze-9781441150882/>

 

 


-----Original Message-----
From: foucault-l-bounces@foucault.info [mailto:foucault-l-bounces@foucault.info] On Behalf Of Mark Kelly
Sent: 27 January 2015 10:35
To: Mailing-list; Nathaniel Roberts
Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] Taylor/Habermas vs. Foucault

 

Dear Nate,

 

I'm not sure if it's the source you're thinking of, but I do run an argument of this type in Chapter 6 of *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault*.

 

Best,

Mark

 

Dr Mark Kelly

 

Senior Lecturer and ARC Future Fellow

 

School of Humanities and Communication Arts University of Western Sydney

 

https://uws.academia.edu/Kelly

 

On 27 January 2015 at 21:14, Nathaniel Roberts <npr4@columbia.edu<mailto:npr4@columbia.edu>> wrote:

 

Dear List,



Both Charles Taylor and J. Habermas have criticized Foucault. They


allege that F's critical analyses of modern forms of power are flawed


because he does not provide a positive alternative, or a normative


foundation, in relation to which these forms of power are found


wanting. Charles Taylor (if I am recalling his argument correctly)


makes the further claim that Foucault *does* in fact have an


unacknowledged normative framework, but that he does not make it


explicit, and that if he did he'd find that F's critical analyses are


contradictory, because they depend as premises on the very set-up he is criticizing.



I have always seen these criticisms of Foucault as misplaced. One does


not need to specify a positive alternative to say one finds something


"intolerable," as F says of popular initiatives by prisoner and others


who resist power (in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, p. 216). F


claims his own analyses are guided, in part, by actually existing


instances of resistance, but it would be equally coherent, I argue,


for him simply to say that "I find this intolerable." (I believe he


actually speaks in the first person like this somewhere, but I can't


find the quote---I thought it was in D&P.)



Anyway, coming to my question: does anyone know of a secondary work


that discusses this issue, and contests Taylor's/Habermas' claim that


criticism must be premised on some normative framework or positive


conception of the good? I feel sure I've seen such an argument


developed somewhere, but I can't recall where.



The closest thing I've found is Raymond Geuss' essay "Must Criticism


Be Constructive?" (in "A World without Why"). But this does not


specifically mention the Foucault or the Taylor/Habermas criticism.



Best,


Nate



--


Dr. Nathaniel Roberts


<


http://www.mmg.mpg.de/departments/religious-diversity/scientific-staff


/dr-nathaniel-roberts/



Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity


Herman-Föge-Weg 11


37073 Göttingen


Germany


+49 (0) 551-4956-0



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