Re: Power v Domination



> Gregory - if all power is equally dominative, then how do you explain "On
> the Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom"? Some forms of
> power operate in the service of freedom ("freedom is precisely what must
> be exercised - the only guarantee of freedom is the practice of freedom"
> is how I think the quote goes). Other operate in the service of
> domination. Power and domination are *NOT* the same thing at all. Not all
> forms of subjectivation are dominative - or, if you insist on calling it
> dominative, then not all forms of domination are bad.

Malcom

I think the conneciton between power and freedom i Foucault is not
one of some forms of power serving freedom, others domination; this
would combine quite well with the descending model of power, which
Foucault attempts to - not overcome, but show that is only one (not
primary, not dominant) way in which power is exercised.
The point lies in the notion of power as "action directed toward
action", that is: the ability to modify the action of others. Now,
this gives sense only if the other is capable of actions, that is if
the one affected is capable of freedom. Thus "power is exercised
over us only insofar as we are free " and thus as far as we are
capable of resistance. Slavery, for instance, is not
a relation of power, but of violence.
Actually, as the analysis of Foucault's show, power is execised
through the points of resistance; the very praxis of power creates
resistance towards itself. This is one of the hard points to break,
but Deleuzes highlightning of Bichats definition of "life" in The
Birth of the Clinic as "the sum of forces that resist death", might
be illuminating. This brings forth a coextensiveness of life and
death, that similarly might prove fruitful concerning freedom and
power.

Further, Foucaults notion of power is microscopic, local, unstable, multiple,
etc. - the problem of domination is the stability and totalizing
tendency of certain power-relations; a stability obtained through
forces of social reproductions (not least epistemological) which
tolerates resistance within certain limits so as better to exercise
power on the whole. Domination is reproductive, whereas power
relations "as such" are productive. (No matter what the product is;
though this highly matters in another sense.) The pulse of freedom is
their repetition, domination is their fixation.

Knut A. Boeckman
Knut Anton Bcckman
Universitetsparken 2, 1., v.63
DK-8000 Arhus C, Denmark

Tel: (+45) 8613 6668
e-mail: idekab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


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