On to the altogether more sensible, IMHO, replies of Malcolm and Quetzil.
Malcolm, said,
]
>One more thing before I extricate myself from this thread. Vis-a-vis the
>supposed linguistic idealism of my posts and quetzil's posts, I think the
>notion of construction articulated by Judith Butler in _Bodies that
>Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"_ is pertinent. What I am
>suggesting (and what I think quetzil is arguing) is not linguistic
>idealism - rather, it is a poststructuralist speech-act theory (of sorts
>- I'm reducing things here of course). As Butler says:
A refutation of the charge of linguistic idealism, will require more than
its mere statement. Consider Butler's machinations in the quote provided,
but which are laid bare in the book 'Gender Trouble'. (BTW has ANYBODY out
there read Somer Brodribbs book, 'Nothing Matters'). Malcolm supplies the quote:
>
>"To claim that the materiality of sex is constructed through a ritualized
>repetition of norms is hardly a self-evident claim.
Is it not? What does she mean by the 'materiality of sex'. What for that
matter does she mean by sex? The act, or the biologicality of certain forms
of being? Is there any need for a sex gender distinction? It's all a little
vague I'm afraid.
Indeed, our customary
>notions of "construction" seem to get in the way of understanding such a
>claim. For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain,
>pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these "facts," one might
>skeptically claim, cannot be dismissed as mere construction.
So she is claiming not be be a 'linguistic idealist'.
Surely there
>must be some kind of necessity that accompanies these primary and
>irrefutable experiences. And surely there is.
Ah!
But there irrefutability in
>no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what
>discursive means.
This is the linguistic idealist moment. Hence, if this is a
poststructuralist speech-act theory. I think the charge of linguistic
idealism stands. Since Butler, having accepted 'real' limits on sex then
wants to concern herself with their 'meaning' in human terms. Thus again we
reach the logical positivist position where what is must be ameanable to
some aspect of human experience.
However, since Butler has accepted the necessity of some of our irrefutable
experiences then it is legitimate to raise the uestion of what is necesary
and what is constructed, and I don't deny that large parts are constructed.
This also relates to Butler's last sentence.
>Moreover, why is it that what is constructed is
>understood as an artificial and dispensible character?"
Well who does this? The constructed is not artificial it is real and whether
it is dispensible or not can't be answered a priori. The point is that what
has been constructed CAN possibly be deconstructed, in a non Derridian
sense, but what is necessary, or not constructed, unless one believes in
God, may be ameanable to intervention but then again may not. Even the arch
sceptic himself, Hume, realised that walking out of the seminar door was a
better idea than attempting to leave by the window.
>
>Thus, to postulate an actual past is a discursive act articulated towards
>and within the present set of discursive regularities - and thus acquires
>whatever meaning it acquires not from its nominal object (the past) but
>from its function within a discursive regime.
Well of course it is a discursive act, but it is not only this. The
acknowledgement of an actual history is a practical presupposition of our
present. One presumes of course that one's parents are real and existed
prior to and independent of one's self, that is were not constructed by the
present. Also, since Malcolm has in previous postings accepted the existence
of an 'actual past', and since he then seems to go on to say that although
existing we can say nothing about it, his position clearly is a form of
Kantian transendental idealism; that is there is a 'real' but we can no
nothing about it. I notice also the use of the word 'nominal' here.
Nominalism is one of the four major principles of positivism, and things are
getting clearer for me. But of course the 'actual past' couldn't be nominal,
it would be actual and would have occurred even if part of the actual past
had destroyed the conditions of possibility for the present. That is, the
actual past is not dependent upon the present in the same way as the present
of the actual past. Moreover, insofar as our present stories do not emerge
ex nihilo then they are stories of the actual past. this establishes the
ontological conditions of possibility for some stories being better than
others. There are still major epistemolgical problems of how we might tell
which are the better ones. But these should not lead to the denial of the
role that the actual past plays, both in constructing those stories and why
some get accepted and not others.
When one wants to
>understand the function and tactical efficacy of a given history, the
>reality or unreality of its object is totally irrelevant.
I totally disagree. Only social scientists and philsophers deny the world,
and in our/their Nietzschian arrogance know only too well that the common
people, those unenlightened fools just don't know any better. We of course
know the TRUTH of the matter, whilst at the same time denying the existence
of such naive things as TRUTH. Everything is just a narrative. The reality
and or unreality of any given object, is fundamental in any discourse. The
camps which contained holocaust suffers play a major role in our present day
narratives. And perform a function which can be utilised tactically and
efficiently to diffuse the arguments of neo-nazis. And the question of
whether they 'actually were sites' of the said horrors is a question of
vital concern.
Now, this is
>not to deny the reality of an actual past. It is only to state that,
>within a Foucauldian project (analysing the function and tactical
>efficacy of discourses), such an object is beside the point.
This is probably unproblematic to me. But it is perhaps a more measured
reading os what Foucault was trying to do, one I might add I can agree with.
It's when his project is extended into areas that it patently can't play a
role is when I object.
Under what
>conditions, and in whose interests, can a specific history be produced?
>How does it circulate? What criteria of evidence and truth does it rely
>on and construct anew?
Ah but, the foucault project has now moved again, since the latter sentence
will necessarily involve claims to be in possession of evidence, and
evidence of the 'actual past' at that. Given that Malcolm accepts it, the
'actual past', and given that all parties to a discourse will make appeals
to it, 'IT'
seems crucial, and its dismissal perhaps a little naive.
>
>Also, Derrida knows (why don't his disciples, or at least his quoters?)
>that his project is always already doomed to failure, in that every
>attempt to reach beyond language only circumscribes the other within it.
Some of his quoters know that to say that 'we can only know the world
through certain descriptions of it' does not mean that 'language only
circumscribes the other within it'. The other may remain inaccesible to
language, despite our attempts to enclose it so.
>Linguistic idealism or lingusitic monism is a silly charge to level at
>quetzil and myself. Try actually *reading* our posts.
I have, and I still make the charge. But your own words do it so much better
than my own feeble attempts.
Thanks.
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
Malcolm, said,
]
>One more thing before I extricate myself from this thread. Vis-a-vis the
>supposed linguistic idealism of my posts and quetzil's posts, I think the
>notion of construction articulated by Judith Butler in _Bodies that
>Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"_ is pertinent. What I am
>suggesting (and what I think quetzil is arguing) is not linguistic
>idealism - rather, it is a poststructuralist speech-act theory (of sorts
>- I'm reducing things here of course). As Butler says:
A refutation of the charge of linguistic idealism, will require more than
its mere statement. Consider Butler's machinations in the quote provided,
but which are laid bare in the book 'Gender Trouble'. (BTW has ANYBODY out
there read Somer Brodribbs book, 'Nothing Matters'). Malcolm supplies the quote:
>
>"To claim that the materiality of sex is constructed through a ritualized
>repetition of norms is hardly a self-evident claim.
Is it not? What does she mean by the 'materiality of sex'. What for that
matter does she mean by sex? The act, or the biologicality of certain forms
of being? Is there any need for a sex gender distinction? It's all a little
vague I'm afraid.
Indeed, our customary
>notions of "construction" seem to get in the way of understanding such a
>claim. For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain,
>pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these "facts," one might
>skeptically claim, cannot be dismissed as mere construction.
So she is claiming not be be a 'linguistic idealist'.
Surely there
>must be some kind of necessity that accompanies these primary and
>irrefutable experiences. And surely there is.
Ah!
But there irrefutability in
>no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what
>discursive means.
This is the linguistic idealist moment. Hence, if this is a
poststructuralist speech-act theory. I think the charge of linguistic
idealism stands. Since Butler, having accepted 'real' limits on sex then
wants to concern herself with their 'meaning' in human terms. Thus again we
reach the logical positivist position where what is must be ameanable to
some aspect of human experience.
However, since Butler has accepted the necessity of some of our irrefutable
experiences then it is legitimate to raise the uestion of what is necesary
and what is constructed, and I don't deny that large parts are constructed.
This also relates to Butler's last sentence.
>Moreover, why is it that what is constructed is
>understood as an artificial and dispensible character?"
Well who does this? The constructed is not artificial it is real and whether
it is dispensible or not can't be answered a priori. The point is that what
has been constructed CAN possibly be deconstructed, in a non Derridian
sense, but what is necessary, or not constructed, unless one believes in
God, may be ameanable to intervention but then again may not. Even the arch
sceptic himself, Hume, realised that walking out of the seminar door was a
better idea than attempting to leave by the window.
>
>Thus, to postulate an actual past is a discursive act articulated towards
>and within the present set of discursive regularities - and thus acquires
>whatever meaning it acquires not from its nominal object (the past) but
>from its function within a discursive regime.
Well of course it is a discursive act, but it is not only this. The
acknowledgement of an actual history is a practical presupposition of our
present. One presumes of course that one's parents are real and existed
prior to and independent of one's self, that is were not constructed by the
present. Also, since Malcolm has in previous postings accepted the existence
of an 'actual past', and since he then seems to go on to say that although
existing we can say nothing about it, his position clearly is a form of
Kantian transendental idealism; that is there is a 'real' but we can no
nothing about it. I notice also the use of the word 'nominal' here.
Nominalism is one of the four major principles of positivism, and things are
getting clearer for me. But of course the 'actual past' couldn't be nominal,
it would be actual and would have occurred even if part of the actual past
had destroyed the conditions of possibility for the present. That is, the
actual past is not dependent upon the present in the same way as the present
of the actual past. Moreover, insofar as our present stories do not emerge
ex nihilo then they are stories of the actual past. this establishes the
ontological conditions of possibility for some stories being better than
others. There are still major epistemolgical problems of how we might tell
which are the better ones. But these should not lead to the denial of the
role that the actual past plays, both in constructing those stories and why
some get accepted and not others.
When one wants to
>understand the function and tactical efficacy of a given history, the
>reality or unreality of its object is totally irrelevant.
I totally disagree. Only social scientists and philsophers deny the world,
and in our/their Nietzschian arrogance know only too well that the common
people, those unenlightened fools just don't know any better. We of course
know the TRUTH of the matter, whilst at the same time denying the existence
of such naive things as TRUTH. Everything is just a narrative. The reality
and or unreality of any given object, is fundamental in any discourse. The
camps which contained holocaust suffers play a major role in our present day
narratives. And perform a function which can be utilised tactically and
efficiently to diffuse the arguments of neo-nazis. And the question of
whether they 'actually were sites' of the said horrors is a question of
vital concern.
Now, this is
>not to deny the reality of an actual past. It is only to state that,
>within a Foucauldian project (analysing the function and tactical
>efficacy of discourses), such an object is beside the point.
This is probably unproblematic to me. But it is perhaps a more measured
reading os what Foucault was trying to do, one I might add I can agree with.
It's when his project is extended into areas that it patently can't play a
role is when I object.
Under what
>conditions, and in whose interests, can a specific history be produced?
>How does it circulate? What criteria of evidence and truth does it rely
>on and construct anew?
Ah but, the foucault project has now moved again, since the latter sentence
will necessarily involve claims to be in possession of evidence, and
evidence of the 'actual past' at that. Given that Malcolm accepts it, the
'actual past', and given that all parties to a discourse will make appeals
to it, 'IT'
seems crucial, and its dismissal perhaps a little naive.
>
>Also, Derrida knows (why don't his disciples, or at least his quoters?)
>that his project is always already doomed to failure, in that every
>attempt to reach beyond language only circumscribes the other within it.
Some of his quoters know that to say that 'we can only know the world
through certain descriptions of it' does not mean that 'language only
circumscribes the other within it'. The other may remain inaccesible to
language, despite our attempts to enclose it so.
>Linguistic idealism or lingusitic monism is a silly charge to level at
>quetzil and myself. Try actually *reading* our posts.
I have, and I still make the charge. But your own words do it so much better
than my own feeble attempts.
Thanks.
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------