On Wed, 8 May 1996, Quetzil Castaneda wrote:
>
> but if you distinguish between the biological and the discursive you are
> distinguishing one discourse from all other discourses. that is
> distinguishing a discourse from discourse not a discourse from a nondiscourse.
Well, I was referring to 'biology' not to 'the discourse of biology', and
to 'the discursive' not to 'the discourse of the discursive'. As some
anglo-saxon philosopher put it (roughly):
'''London''' contains the word London and two sets of inverted commas;
''London'' contains the word London and one set of inverted commas;
'London' contains the word London; and London contains about 6 million
people.
>
> Ask the Pathan, the !Kung, the ancient greeks, the Maya, the whomever that
> is not western -- take a poll among the New Guineans, for example! -- and
> see if they also distinguish between the discursive and the biological?
Well, the !Kung for example call anyone with the same name as their
mother 'mother', and call her brothers 'uncles' and enter the same joking
or avoidance relations with them as they would with their biological
mother. This doesn't stop them knowing who gave birth to them.
> I imagine that few use the discourse of biology (or chromosomes, christian
> ethics of normal sex, or...) to talk about what you (and many others from a
> specific sociohistorical cultural frame) TALK about as "biology" as a
> reality outside and beyond/separate from these other nonbiological discourses.
I doubt if many of them have access to any of these discourses. However,
I am sure that the !Kung talk about giving birth, having sexual
relations, trial marriages, hunting animals etc. in quite different ways
>from the way they talk about talking. I would imagine very few people
believe that only discourse exists.
> the "problem" (i have with) with your argument is that you rely on a
> presupposed distinction to prove the truthfulness of that distinction as
> well also rely upon interlocuter's acceptance of such a "real" versus
> "linguistic" distinction. its circular. and a question of faith. there is
> something different than discourse, and thus discourse is not this which is
> already assumed to be different from it.
Well I do suppose that most people accept the existence of a reality
beyond the linguistic. If they do, as I do, then we have common ground to
argue from; and as I take a pragmatic view of argument as existing within
a particular speech community (loosely speaking), I don't feel the need
to go farther than that unless someone challenges the basic premise. If
someone were a total nihilist and didn't believe anything existed I would
not find it useful to argue with them about the ethics of genetic
engineering; though I might want to argue with them about the meaning of
the word 'exist'.
> that reproduction happens is not "proof" enough of biology as the ultimate
> real of sex. or that sex is biological. to assume that sex is a
> biological-natural _____(fill in the blank) is to make a specific kind of
> cultural-social assertion. sex itself is a cultural-discursive formation.
This is true. However, that reproduction happens is proof that
reproduction happens. Put another way, reproduction is a non-linguistic
reality that may or may not be constrained by the way people talk about
it (squirrels don't talk about it but people do); while 'reproduction' is
a word (not surrounded by quotation marks!) in a cultural-discursive
formation.
> its not the existence of trees that makes wooden tables. nor houses made of
> wood.
Well, we might be hard pressed to make _wooden_ tables were there no wood
around.
> I will stop this argument/example and await the backlash response...
Aaaaahhhhh.
<prrrppthph>
Dave Hugh-Jones
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
'Yes, that's my mother all right, but my mother's the Virgin Mary, you know.'
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
dash2@xxxxxxxxx
>
> but if you distinguish between the biological and the discursive you are
> distinguishing one discourse from all other discourses. that is
> distinguishing a discourse from discourse not a discourse from a nondiscourse.
Well, I was referring to 'biology' not to 'the discourse of biology', and
to 'the discursive' not to 'the discourse of the discursive'. As some
anglo-saxon philosopher put it (roughly):
'''London''' contains the word London and two sets of inverted commas;
''London'' contains the word London and one set of inverted commas;
'London' contains the word London; and London contains about 6 million
people.
>
> Ask the Pathan, the !Kung, the ancient greeks, the Maya, the whomever that
> is not western -- take a poll among the New Guineans, for example! -- and
> see if they also distinguish between the discursive and the biological?
Well, the !Kung for example call anyone with the same name as their
mother 'mother', and call her brothers 'uncles' and enter the same joking
or avoidance relations with them as they would with their biological
mother. This doesn't stop them knowing who gave birth to them.
> I imagine that few use the discourse of biology (or chromosomes, christian
> ethics of normal sex, or...) to talk about what you (and many others from a
> specific sociohistorical cultural frame) TALK about as "biology" as a
> reality outside and beyond/separate from these other nonbiological discourses.
I doubt if many of them have access to any of these discourses. However,
I am sure that the !Kung talk about giving birth, having sexual
relations, trial marriages, hunting animals etc. in quite different ways
>from the way they talk about talking. I would imagine very few people
believe that only discourse exists.
> the "problem" (i have with) with your argument is that you rely on a
> presupposed distinction to prove the truthfulness of that distinction as
> well also rely upon interlocuter's acceptance of such a "real" versus
> "linguistic" distinction. its circular. and a question of faith. there is
> something different than discourse, and thus discourse is not this which is
> already assumed to be different from it.
Well I do suppose that most people accept the existence of a reality
beyond the linguistic. If they do, as I do, then we have common ground to
argue from; and as I take a pragmatic view of argument as existing within
a particular speech community (loosely speaking), I don't feel the need
to go farther than that unless someone challenges the basic premise. If
someone were a total nihilist and didn't believe anything existed I would
not find it useful to argue with them about the ethics of genetic
engineering; though I might want to argue with them about the meaning of
the word 'exist'.
> that reproduction happens is not "proof" enough of biology as the ultimate
> real of sex. or that sex is biological. to assume that sex is a
> biological-natural _____(fill in the blank) is to make a specific kind of
> cultural-social assertion. sex itself is a cultural-discursive formation.
This is true. However, that reproduction happens is proof that
reproduction happens. Put another way, reproduction is a non-linguistic
reality that may or may not be constrained by the way people talk about
it (squirrels don't talk about it but people do); while 'reproduction' is
a word (not surrounded by quotation marks!) in a cultural-discursive
formation.
> its not the existence of trees that makes wooden tables. nor houses made of
> wood.
Well, we might be hard pressed to make _wooden_ tables were there no wood
around.
> I will stop this argument/example and await the backlash response...
Aaaaahhhhh.
<prrrppthph>
Dave Hugh-Jones
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
'Yes, that's my mother all right, but my mother's the Virgin Mary, you know.'
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
dash2@xxxxxxxxx