>> But don't claim that Quetzil is causing a practice
>>about which he knows little and which he is not involved in.
>I didn't claim that he was 'causing' it, but that by his inaction was
>acting. Much the same that if i fail to stop my partner killing one of our,
>the only one actually, children, I have let it happen. Using a
>cultural/nationalist/statist card does not get anyone off the hook.
I'm a bit perturbed by the absolutism of this view of moral responsibility.
I feel like I'm reading a tract by one of the Enlightenment radicals -
William Godwin, perhaps. Isn't this the same view of the individual's
relationship to society which is going to produce the Panopticon? An ethical
universalism is part and parcel of the totalitarianism of knowledge/power
which demands absolute visibility: that which is hidden is that which
escapes from control. Godwin, indeed, argues from our universal moral
responsibility to a utopian future society regulated by neighbourly
surveillance.
Of course, I share Colin's impulse not to let people hide behind a
"cultural/nationalist/statist card" to justify political inactivity, but I
think his vision of absolute and universal ethical responsibility is not
only undesirable, but unworkable. If I am "responsible" for everything that
happens which I could, conceivably, have prevented, then the concept of
"responsibility" becomes so empty that I need no longer feel "responsible"
for anything. Every murder that will happen in the world next week is my
"responsibility", according to Colin's system, because I could, conceivably,
sell everything I own and buy a ticket to wherever I think a murder might be
likely to take place and have a go at trying to stop it. If I fail to do
that - and, of course, in 99.99% of cases I must fail - I am, according to
this theory, *just* as responsible as Colin would be if he stood by while
his wife murdered their only child, knowing full well that he was capable of
stopping her: I have failed to do everything within my power to stop a
murder that is just as much my responsibility to stop as any other. (You can
instantly see where the Panopticon comes in here, can't you? If only I could
*know* everything that was going on in the world then I might be able to
live up to this universal ethical burden . . .).
I doubt it is wise to define "living well" in such a way that nobody could
possibly achieve it, Colin. I think the end product will probably be apathy
rather than a global commitment to change.
Cheers
Hugh Roberts
hugh.roberts@xxxxxxxxx
>>about which he knows little and which he is not involved in.
>I didn't claim that he was 'causing' it, but that by his inaction was
>acting. Much the same that if i fail to stop my partner killing one of our,
>the only one actually, children, I have let it happen. Using a
>cultural/nationalist/statist card does not get anyone off the hook.
I'm a bit perturbed by the absolutism of this view of moral responsibility.
I feel like I'm reading a tract by one of the Enlightenment radicals -
William Godwin, perhaps. Isn't this the same view of the individual's
relationship to society which is going to produce the Panopticon? An ethical
universalism is part and parcel of the totalitarianism of knowledge/power
which demands absolute visibility: that which is hidden is that which
escapes from control. Godwin, indeed, argues from our universal moral
responsibility to a utopian future society regulated by neighbourly
surveillance.
Of course, I share Colin's impulse not to let people hide behind a
"cultural/nationalist/statist card" to justify political inactivity, but I
think his vision of absolute and universal ethical responsibility is not
only undesirable, but unworkable. If I am "responsible" for everything that
happens which I could, conceivably, have prevented, then the concept of
"responsibility" becomes so empty that I need no longer feel "responsible"
for anything. Every murder that will happen in the world next week is my
"responsibility", according to Colin's system, because I could, conceivably,
sell everything I own and buy a ticket to wherever I think a murder might be
likely to take place and have a go at trying to stop it. If I fail to do
that - and, of course, in 99.99% of cases I must fail - I am, according to
this theory, *just* as responsible as Colin would be if he stood by while
his wife murdered their only child, knowing full well that he was capable of
stopping her: I have failed to do everything within my power to stop a
murder that is just as much my responsibility to stop as any other. (You can
instantly see where the Panopticon comes in here, can't you? If only I could
*know* everything that was going on in the world then I might be able to
live up to this universal ethical burden . . .).
I doubt it is wise to define "living well" in such a way that nobody could
possibly achieve it, Colin. I think the end product will probably be apathy
rather than a global commitment to change.
Cheers
Hugh Roberts
hugh.roberts@xxxxxxxxx