Jeff writes:
"it's interesting that you say repression here, because repression is
clearly what Foucault denies (194). I think that he can't really deny it.
What jhe wants to deny overall is that we have real selves. If we don't
have real selves, then we cannot be repressed. QED. But then why make any
critique of power relations. There is no real interest in the name of which
to make that critique. This is what bothers me, and I think where Foucault
goes wrong. Yes, I think we have real interests. It's how they have been
specified throughout history that's the problem."
Perhaps for Foucault repression, and the subsequent liberation of what is
repressed, is ideologically-laden. Repression is part of the formation of
certain types of subjects within a certain historical period and according to
certain power relations (i.e., Freud, Marx, phenomenology). The question of
whether there are "real selves" or not is not Foucault's, but he is
interested in how the notion of "real selves" function in particular
historical contexts and how that same notion is understood at various times
by those who identify with it. I think it is in "The Subject and Power"
that he clarifies his understanding of subjectivisation, that he does not
reject subjectivity, but certain types of subjective formations which cause
people to think of themselves in particular ways as essential. For
repression assumes there is something essential which needs releasing from
its dark confinements: towards liberation. Foucault rejects this as an
ideological tool used in the formation of the repressed subject. His
critique of power relations then makes sense for it would be one example of
a movement towards new subjectivities from the rejection of the old ones.
Unfortunately, _Discpline and Punish_ only deals with how subjects are
formed through the treatment of others as objects. And in an earlier
interview he gives Nietzsche as one example of self-(re)formed subjectivity:
"And when Nietzsche announced the coming of the superman, what he announced
was not the coming of a man who would resemble a god more than a man, but
rather the coming of a man who would no longer have any relation with this
god whose image he continued to bear." (Foucault Live, p.38)
Sean Hill
"it's interesting that you say repression here, because repression is
clearly what Foucault denies (194). I think that he can't really deny it.
What jhe wants to deny overall is that we have real selves. If we don't
have real selves, then we cannot be repressed. QED. But then why make any
critique of power relations. There is no real interest in the name of which
to make that critique. This is what bothers me, and I think where Foucault
goes wrong. Yes, I think we have real interests. It's how they have been
specified throughout history that's the problem."
Perhaps for Foucault repression, and the subsequent liberation of what is
repressed, is ideologically-laden. Repression is part of the formation of
certain types of subjects within a certain historical period and according to
certain power relations (i.e., Freud, Marx, phenomenology). The question of
whether there are "real selves" or not is not Foucault's, but he is
interested in how the notion of "real selves" function in particular
historical contexts and how that same notion is understood at various times
by those who identify with it. I think it is in "The Subject and Power"
that he clarifies his understanding of subjectivisation, that he does not
reject subjectivity, but certain types of subjective formations which cause
people to think of themselves in particular ways as essential. For
repression assumes there is something essential which needs releasing from
its dark confinements: towards liberation. Foucault rejects this as an
ideological tool used in the formation of the repressed subject. His
critique of power relations then makes sense for it would be one example of
a movement towards new subjectivities from the rejection of the old ones.
Unfortunately, _Discpline and Punish_ only deals with how subjects are
formed through the treatment of others as objects. And in an earlier
interview he gives Nietzsche as one example of self-(re)formed subjectivity:
"And when Nietzsche announced the coming of the superman, what he announced
was not the coming of a man who would resemble a god more than a man, but
rather the coming of a man who would no longer have any relation with this
god whose image he continued to bear." (Foucault Live, p.38)
Sean Hill