Garton, wrote:>
"Problematisation means neither the represantation of a preexisting object,
nor >the creation by discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It is the
sum total of >discursive and non discursive practices which causes something
to enter the game>of the true and the false and constitutes it as an object
of thought..."
>
Again, Garton, this is fine, but it refers, at least to me, to a process of
'problematisation' and not to that which preceded it, nor that to which it
is about. What I am trying to say is that here Foucault is stuck-fast on the
epistemological axis, whereas in some of his later stuff he became more
aware of the ontological conditions of possibility for truth claims. Also,
of course, I think it is encumbent upon those of us _interested_ in F to be
critical of his work, and in this respect, the quote you use seems to be
self-contradictory, since he wants to deny that this is a process that
either preexists its symbolisation in thought or that it is created in
thought. I personally find this formulation vacuous. Equally of course, the
whole tenor of his argument tends to get undercut by his last phrase wherein
he declares that it 'constitutes it as an object of thought', because this
leaves underdetermined the issue of its existence outside of thought, which
is at the very least an issue of truth that he alludes to in the much
discussed truth quote, that is the distinction between truth and the
thought of truth. So I find this whole quote problematic.
but the object is still constituted by
>"the sum total of discursive and non discursive practices",
The object in thought I take you to mean. At least I hope so. You aren't
trying to tell me that you really think we make the world are you?
and ascription of truth
>and falsehood continue to be concieved as a game, even as the whole
question of truth
>ceases to be the focus of interest.
Well I agree they are a game. But whether the choice between two statements
both claiming truth status, can be reduced to nothing other than the power
rythmics of the games is a different matter. I think earlier Foucault did
subscribe to this view, but later he came to recognise the paradoxes
involved: For instance, the flatness of the earth would become a matter of
just such rythmics and not a truth in itself distinct from its thought.
>formulates a conception of truth borrowed from Nietzche:
>"Truth is itself part of of the history of discourse and is like an
internal effect of>a discourse or a practice" (Dits et Ecrits 4:54)
OK. you raise Nietzsche, so I will deal with Nietzsche. Never has a
philosopher been so used and abused. Now insofar as his 'perspectivism' has
been appropriated by all manner of postism's I just think they have got him
wrong. In the much quoted section in the third essay from the genealogy of
morals he puts "knowing" and "objectivity" in scare quotes, but never the thing.
>I would like to offer a number of objections to this reading. First, that
would
>suggest that interrelations
>between truth and power that F. analysed apply only to some forms of truth
>while others are exempt,
No, since truth talk always emanates from some source then it will always be
implicated in power. However, not every truth is equally implicted, the
scale is differentiated. My claim that I like computers, which is basically
truth calim, that is I could be lying, differs from my claim that this is a
computer.
but it is precisely in order to work outside of this
>dichotomy that F. expressed dislike towards the concept of "ideology":
Foucault set up a straw figure of ideology, Marx was never so vulgar on this
issue as F portrayed him.
I also think it is clear that Foucault means a differeing thing in using the
word truth in the quote you supplied than he did later.
>
>"by truth I don't mean the 'ensemble of truths which are to be discovered
and accepted' but rather
>'the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are
separated and specific effects
>of power attached to the true'", (loc cit, p. 132)
>and again
>"'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the
production, regulation, distribution,
>circulation and operation of statements" (loc. cit. 133)
In effect he is talking here about epistemolgy, about the procedures for the
establishement of truth as opposed to truth.
>
>The problem, however, is what makes one such system of ordered procedures
preferable over another.
Example: I claim that you can't walk on water. You claim that you can. Try
it and see.
Thanks,
--------------------------------------------------------
"What I try to achieve is the history of the relations which
thought maintains with truth; the history of thought insofar as it is the
thought of truth. All those who say truth does not exist for me are
simple minded."
(Foucault)
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
"Problematisation means neither the represantation of a preexisting object,
nor >the creation by discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It is the
sum total of >discursive and non discursive practices which causes something
to enter the game>of the true and the false and constitutes it as an object
of thought..."
>
Again, Garton, this is fine, but it refers, at least to me, to a process of
'problematisation' and not to that which preceded it, nor that to which it
is about. What I am trying to say is that here Foucault is stuck-fast on the
epistemological axis, whereas in some of his later stuff he became more
aware of the ontological conditions of possibility for truth claims. Also,
of course, I think it is encumbent upon those of us _interested_ in F to be
critical of his work, and in this respect, the quote you use seems to be
self-contradictory, since he wants to deny that this is a process that
either preexists its symbolisation in thought or that it is created in
thought. I personally find this formulation vacuous. Equally of course, the
whole tenor of his argument tends to get undercut by his last phrase wherein
he declares that it 'constitutes it as an object of thought', because this
leaves underdetermined the issue of its existence outside of thought, which
is at the very least an issue of truth that he alludes to in the much
discussed truth quote, that is the distinction between truth and the
thought of truth. So I find this whole quote problematic.
but the object is still constituted by
>"the sum total of discursive and non discursive practices",
The object in thought I take you to mean. At least I hope so. You aren't
trying to tell me that you really think we make the world are you?
and ascription of truth
>and falsehood continue to be concieved as a game, even as the whole
question of truth
>ceases to be the focus of interest.
Well I agree they are a game. But whether the choice between two statements
both claiming truth status, can be reduced to nothing other than the power
rythmics of the games is a different matter. I think earlier Foucault did
subscribe to this view, but later he came to recognise the paradoxes
involved: For instance, the flatness of the earth would become a matter of
just such rythmics and not a truth in itself distinct from its thought.
>formulates a conception of truth borrowed from Nietzche:
>"Truth is itself part of of the history of discourse and is like an
internal effect of>a discourse or a practice" (Dits et Ecrits 4:54)
OK. you raise Nietzsche, so I will deal with Nietzsche. Never has a
philosopher been so used and abused. Now insofar as his 'perspectivism' has
been appropriated by all manner of postism's I just think they have got him
wrong. In the much quoted section in the third essay from the genealogy of
morals he puts "knowing" and "objectivity" in scare quotes, but never the thing.
>I would like to offer a number of objections to this reading. First, that
would
>suggest that interrelations
>between truth and power that F. analysed apply only to some forms of truth
>while others are exempt,
No, since truth talk always emanates from some source then it will always be
implicated in power. However, not every truth is equally implicted, the
scale is differentiated. My claim that I like computers, which is basically
truth calim, that is I could be lying, differs from my claim that this is a
computer.
but it is precisely in order to work outside of this
>dichotomy that F. expressed dislike towards the concept of "ideology":
Foucault set up a straw figure of ideology, Marx was never so vulgar on this
issue as F portrayed him.
I also think it is clear that Foucault means a differeing thing in using the
word truth in the quote you supplied than he did later.
>
>"by truth I don't mean the 'ensemble of truths which are to be discovered
and accepted' but rather
>'the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are
separated and specific effects
>of power attached to the true'", (loc cit, p. 132)
>and again
>"'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the
production, regulation, distribution,
>circulation and operation of statements" (loc. cit. 133)
In effect he is talking here about epistemolgy, about the procedures for the
establishement of truth as opposed to truth.
>
>The problem, however, is what makes one such system of ordered procedures
preferable over another.
Example: I claim that you can't walk on water. You claim that you can. Try
it and see.
Thanks,
--------------------------------------------------------
"What I try to achieve is the history of the relations which
thought maintains with truth; the history of thought insofar as it is the
thought of truth. All those who say truth does not exist for me are
simple minded."
(Foucault)
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------