To Michael DonnellY:
I see your point, and I'm sorry I used terms that you don't,
however I didnt have the texts i had in mind at my disposal
when I brought up the last question. Nevertheless, who says
that the "grey meticulous" work of genealogy has to stay at
the level of particularity? In "The Eye of Power," Foucault
claims that he stumbled uponm Bentham while researching
early-mid nineteenth century architecture manuals;
references to Bentham's Panopticon are found almost
universally in those texts, and they all refelct a similar,
utilitarian, or as Foucault calls it throughout Discipline
and Punish, an "economistic" rationality. The disciplines
develop out of this rationality - they produce signs which
achieve a maximum of representation with a minimum of cost.
In other words, in accounting for the development of the
disciplines, one must also account for the fact that they
developed in response to a growing conception of the social
whole. It's true that Bentham's device was not universally
implemented, but it appears that(Foucault holdsthat)his
rationality was. This kind of analysis is not new for him,
of course. For instance, in his earlier work (The Order of
Things especially) he claims that what makes evolutionary
biology so fundamentally different from the "life sciences"
of the eighteenth century was the use of "historical
development" as part of the argument for how a species
achives its design. History has an ontological presence in
the principle of natural selection. In adddition to the use
of history, Darwin used certain principles from political
economy, such as overproduction, and the principle of
scarcity, to voercome the argument from design, which rests
on an exteranl prinicple to explain the design of a species;
"Design" for Darwin is an effect of natural selection. The
basic poiont is that a certain kind of rationality was in
place before this sceicne developed; so why can't teh same
kind of analysis be applied to the human sciences?
You may claim that genelaogy is fundamentally different
from, or even opposed to, archeology; I persoanlly don't
think it has to be - in fact, Foucault claims in a number of
places that one cannot study power relations without a prior
analysis of the rationalities of the mechanisms through
which power achieves its effects. (eg. in "Two Lectures")
This "prior analysis" is archeological. What, then, is
unique about genealogy? First of all, "genelaogy" does not
represent a method, but a critical stance. In Nietzsche's
case, a geenalogy is a waging of war against Western
religion, sceicne, rationality, and language (any quest for
"being" in general). EvenNietzsche conducts his
genealogical work on a braod level, seeking to root out the
moral impulse which lies beneath Western science and
rationality. The thrust of Nietzschean genealogy is to
throw off certain consumptive mechanisms of power. what is
the critical bent of Foucautldian genealogy? It's certainly
not Nietzschean, because Nietzsche was a romantic
naturalist, searching for a primordial "return to Life,"
where life can only be defined as the Romantiocs defined it
- as immediacy, as aesthesis, as raw experience that is not
mediated by "modern" rationality, thought, language,
"truth," culture, morality, etc. It seeks to "throw off"
certain schemes. In Foucault's case, in his writings on the
"specific intellectual," which Barry Smart discusses, the
critical aim is not directed toward a global conception or
theory, but his "genealogies" of the discipliens are
tactics which can only be deployed on a general level, by
"the masses" themselves. Marx, in fact, makes teh saem
types of claims - only the proletariat can "presribe
history's task," it is not the work of the "intellectual to
"presribe," but to describe.
The "jump" that you find problematic is so only if you have
a nominalist reading of Foucault. The "jump" is warrantedd
if one seeks to understand a geneal phenomena from the
outset - such as the "Western" conception of madness, or of
the state as "rational," or as "rationality embodied," as
Foucault claims in Remarks on Marx.
Perhaps I missed your point entirely, and I will go back
this weekend and re-read your articles, but I would be
intrerested in your commentary on what I just said.
__Joe Cronin
I see your point, and I'm sorry I used terms that you don't,
however I didnt have the texts i had in mind at my disposal
when I brought up the last question. Nevertheless, who says
that the "grey meticulous" work of genealogy has to stay at
the level of particularity? In "The Eye of Power," Foucault
claims that he stumbled uponm Bentham while researching
early-mid nineteenth century architecture manuals;
references to Bentham's Panopticon are found almost
universally in those texts, and they all refelct a similar,
utilitarian, or as Foucault calls it throughout Discipline
and Punish, an "economistic" rationality. The disciplines
develop out of this rationality - they produce signs which
achieve a maximum of representation with a minimum of cost.
In other words, in accounting for the development of the
disciplines, one must also account for the fact that they
developed in response to a growing conception of the social
whole. It's true that Bentham's device was not universally
implemented, but it appears that(Foucault holdsthat)his
rationality was. This kind of analysis is not new for him,
of course. For instance, in his earlier work (The Order of
Things especially) he claims that what makes evolutionary
biology so fundamentally different from the "life sciences"
of the eighteenth century was the use of "historical
development" as part of the argument for how a species
achives its design. History has an ontological presence in
the principle of natural selection. In adddition to the use
of history, Darwin used certain principles from political
economy, such as overproduction, and the principle of
scarcity, to voercome the argument from design, which rests
on an exteranl prinicple to explain the design of a species;
"Design" for Darwin is an effect of natural selection. The
basic poiont is that a certain kind of rationality was in
place before this sceicne developed; so why can't teh same
kind of analysis be applied to the human sciences?
You may claim that genelaogy is fundamentally different
from, or even opposed to, archeology; I persoanlly don't
think it has to be - in fact, Foucault claims in a number of
places that one cannot study power relations without a prior
analysis of the rationalities of the mechanisms through
which power achieves its effects. (eg. in "Two Lectures")
This "prior analysis" is archeological. What, then, is
unique about genealogy? First of all, "genelaogy" does not
represent a method, but a critical stance. In Nietzsche's
case, a geenalogy is a waging of war against Western
religion, sceicne, rationality, and language (any quest for
"being" in general). EvenNietzsche conducts his
genealogical work on a braod level, seeking to root out the
moral impulse which lies beneath Western science and
rationality. The thrust of Nietzschean genealogy is to
throw off certain consumptive mechanisms of power. what is
the critical bent of Foucautldian genealogy? It's certainly
not Nietzschean, because Nietzsche was a romantic
naturalist, searching for a primordial "return to Life,"
where life can only be defined as the Romantiocs defined it
- as immediacy, as aesthesis, as raw experience that is not
mediated by "modern" rationality, thought, language,
"truth," culture, morality, etc. It seeks to "throw off"
certain schemes. In Foucault's case, in his writings on the
"specific intellectual," which Barry Smart discusses, the
critical aim is not directed toward a global conception or
theory, but his "genealogies" of the discipliens are
tactics which can only be deployed on a general level, by
"the masses" themselves. Marx, in fact, makes teh saem
types of claims - only the proletariat can "presribe
history's task," it is not the work of the "intellectual to
"presribe," but to describe.
The "jump" that you find problematic is so only if you have
a nominalist reading of Foucault. The "jump" is warrantedd
if one seeks to understand a geneal phenomena from the
outset - such as the "Western" conception of madness, or of
the state as "rational," or as "rationality embodied," as
Foucault claims in Remarks on Marx.
Perhaps I missed your point entirely, and I will go back
this weekend and re-read your articles, but I would be
intrerested in your commentary on what I just said.
__Joe Cronin