Jeff writes:
"I think we have to have some real or true aspect of ourselves which power
subverts in order for their to be any punch, meaning or use to the notion
of power."
At this point I am not prepared to respond to this claim directly, but I would
like to suggest that taking this position amounts to much more than a
modification of Foucault's arguments (or even a rejection of some of his claims
coupled with an acceptance of others). To assume that there must exist some
true aspect of ourselves that power subverts is to completely diverge with
Foucualt's claims with respect to discourse, power, and sexuality. Moreover,
this move simultaneously buys into precisely the liberal conception of power
>from which Foucault repeatedly attempted to distance himself, indeed overturn
entirely. By assuming that power subverts some inner truth, one also assumes
that power functions negatively and restrictively and that some part of
ourselves stands exterior to power relations and the web of discursive
practices. In fact, in my reading of HoS Vol. I, I see this truth of the self
at the core of "the repressive hypothesis." The repressive hypothesis assumes
that liberation of repression will entail an outward expression and celebration
of this very truth. A couple of brief passages from Foucault contrast starkly
with the above quote from Jeff:
"For me what must be produced is not the man identical with himself, such as
nature has designated him, or according to his essence...It is a question,
rather, of the destruction of what we are, and of the creation of something
totally other--a total innovation" ("Remarks on Marx," pp121-122).
"The relationships that we have to ourselves are not ones of identity, rather
they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To
be the same is really boring" (Interview in "The Advocate," August 1984, p. 28).
Finally, with respect to sexuality more specifically, I think that Butler's work
has attempted to reveal the inadequacy of holding onto a social constructivist
view of gender while retaining some originary truth about the sexual body that
comes "before the law." In short, by refusing to allow that sexuality could be
discursively produced (both "an instrument and effect of power," as Darlene puts
it) one still holds onto a binary view of sexuality that retains a heterosexist
conception of desire.
Rebecca M. Brown
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Art History
University of Minnesota
"I think we have to have some real or true aspect of ourselves which power
subverts in order for their to be any punch, meaning or use to the notion
of power."
At this point I am not prepared to respond to this claim directly, but I would
like to suggest that taking this position amounts to much more than a
modification of Foucault's arguments (or even a rejection of some of his claims
coupled with an acceptance of others). To assume that there must exist some
true aspect of ourselves that power subverts is to completely diverge with
Foucualt's claims with respect to discourse, power, and sexuality. Moreover,
this move simultaneously buys into precisely the liberal conception of power
>from which Foucault repeatedly attempted to distance himself, indeed overturn
entirely. By assuming that power subverts some inner truth, one also assumes
that power functions negatively and restrictively and that some part of
ourselves stands exterior to power relations and the web of discursive
practices. In fact, in my reading of HoS Vol. I, I see this truth of the self
at the core of "the repressive hypothesis." The repressive hypothesis assumes
that liberation of repression will entail an outward expression and celebration
of this very truth. A couple of brief passages from Foucault contrast starkly
with the above quote from Jeff:
"For me what must be produced is not the man identical with himself, such as
nature has designated him, or according to his essence...It is a question,
rather, of the destruction of what we are, and of the creation of something
totally other--a total innovation" ("Remarks on Marx," pp121-122).
"The relationships that we have to ourselves are not ones of identity, rather
they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To
be the same is really boring" (Interview in "The Advocate," August 1984, p. 28).
Finally, with respect to sexuality more specifically, I think that Butler's work
has attempted to reveal the inadequacy of holding onto a social constructivist
view of gender while retaining some originary truth about the sexual body that
comes "before the law." In short, by refusing to allow that sexuality could be
discursively produced (both "an instrument and effect of power," as Darlene puts
it) one still holds onto a binary view of sexuality that retains a heterosexist
conception of desire.
Rebecca M. Brown
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Art History
University of Minnesota