Rebecca,
you address the core of the argument quite well, but it is exactly the
rejection of Foucault's rejection of the repressive hypothesis which I
want.
Rebecca writes:
>Jeff writes:
>"I think we have to have some real or true aspect of ourselves which power
>subverts in order for their to be any punch, meaning or use to the notion
>of power."
>
>At this point I am not prepared to respond to this claim directly, but I would
>like to suggest that taking this position amounts to much more than a
>modification of Foucault's arguments (or even a rejection of some of his
>claims
>coupled with an acceptance of others). To assume that there must exist some
>true aspect of ourselves that power subverts is to completely diverge with
>Foucualt's claims with respect to discourse, power, and sexuality. Moreover,
>this move simultaneously buys into precisely the liberal conception of power
>from which Foucault repeatedly attempted to distance himself, indeed overturn
>entirely. By assuming that power subverts some inner truth, one also assumes
>that power functions negatively and restrictively and that some part of
>ourselves stands exterior to power relations and the web of discursive
>practices.
1) I admit that I am not simply modifying Foucault and that I am diverging
>from many of his claims concerning discourse, power and sexuality.
However, I do not completely diverge: I find his analysis of discourse and
power very powerful. But I think he makes too much of the rejection of the
repressive hypothesis.
2) I deny that by assuming that power subverts some inner truth I must
beleive that power functions negatively. I thinkl Foucault either misread
or did not understand Marcuse and others on this point. Marcuse and Steve
Lukes both discuss the productive aspects of repression. Foucault's whole
analuysis of the repressive hypothesis misses this aspect and is thus
faulty. I can, on request, provide citations from Marcuse and Lukes
regarding the productive aspects of power. But think, what better way to
repress the Truth than to produce a different "truth." The real question,
I think, comes down to whether we can ever really know the true self.
Rebecca continues citing Foucault:
>"For me what must be produced is not the man identical with himself, such as
>nature has designated him, or according to his essence...It is a question,
>rather, of the destruction of what we are, and of the creation of something
>totally other--a total innovation" ("Remarks on Marx," pp121-122).
>
What is the destuction of what we are. I find this very difficult to
understand in Foucault. From what I have read, which is not near enough
admittedly, he says these things but he does not explain what he means by
them. How do I destroy what I am and create something totally different.
This seems very Sartrean, BTW.
But the more important point is why should I destroy what I am and becomes
something totally other? This si just to fall into another power
configuration. If all we have are power configuratioons and there is no
true self, then I can only go from one power configuration to another.
Even to fight the prodiuctive aspects of one power configuration with
another, which is what F suggetss, is to fall (unkowingly) into another
power configuration. Why should I do this? Why would I want to? Moving
>from one p[ower configuration to another really devalues the term "power."
What I mean by this is that power is no longer something I want to resist.
Still citing F:
>"The relationships that we have to ourselves are not ones of identity, rather
>they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To
>be the same is really boring" (Interview in "The Advocate," August 1984,
>p. 28).
I am perfectly happy with this. We can be creative even though there is
some true self that we are. I am not sure why having a true self means
that we cannot be creative in the expression of that self. Indeed,
Foucault seems to be falling into some trap by holding thast the only way
we can be creative and innovative is to deny that we have true selves.
What better way to subvert a true self, if we had one?
>
>Finally, with respect to sexuality more specifically, I think that
>Butler's work
>has attempted to reveal the inadequacy of holding onto a social constructivist
>view of gender while retaining some originary truth about the sexual body that
>comes "before the law." In short, by refusing to allow that sexuality
>could be
>discursively produced (both "an instrument and effect of power," as
>Darlene puts
>it) one still holds onto a binary view of sexuality that retains a
>heterosexist
>conception of desire.
I have not read Butler on this, but I have to deny just the argument that
Rebecca gives voice to here. Again, Butler seems to be falling into some
false dichotomy. Why must I limit muyself to a heterosexist conceptioon of
desire (whatever that means, buyt I am sure it is negatively intended) by
holding that we have actual bodies with actual sexes. Again, I think
sexuality is discursively produced, but I think we have sexed bodies also.
Maybe I am missing something here and should read Butler (when I get the
time, HAHA!)
Sfelma writes:
"I would like to express my agreement with Rebecca Brown's argument. I joined
this group rather late so perhaps I've missed something - but I'm extremely
surprised by the fact that during all these sex "talks" no one has mentioned
(let alone read) any of Foucault's text from the ethical period -
specifically, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. As everyone
knows, in these two texts, Foucault rewrote, revised a good bit of his
theory of Power as expressed in Discipline and HoS vol. 1."
I am very interested in reading these, but I know nothing of them yet. I
am particularly interested in how Foucault uses the concept of aesthetics
in this later work becuase I want to see how it compares to the use made by
Marcuse and other of the Frankfurt School.
I should note, that I am not completely happy with the position I take at
this moment. But it is one from which I question certain postmodern
thematics. I am currently reading Rorty's COntingency, Irony and
Solidarity in which he denies emphatically the existence of a true self.
THe arguments I find in him and in Foucault just do not make sense to me,
and so I am searching for anwswers to these questions. It seems to me that
there is a lot of leeway between beleiving in some Kantian true self and
denying any true self at all and this is the dichotomy which the postmodern
debate draws. I ewould like to find something in between which I think the
postmoderns miss. If it were simply between Kant and Foucault or Kant and
anyone else, I would probably side against Kant (but note that this does
not mean for someone else).
In any case,.....
Jeff
JLN "The architectonic structure of the Kantian
jlnich1@xxxxxxxxxxx system, like the gymnastic pyramids of
Sade's orgies and the schematized
principles of the early bourgeois
freemasonry reveals an organization of
life as a whole which is deprived of
any substantial goal."
from _The Dialectic of Enlightenment_
you address the core of the argument quite well, but it is exactly the
rejection of Foucault's rejection of the repressive hypothesis which I
want.
Rebecca writes:
>Jeff writes:
>"I think we have to have some real or true aspect of ourselves which power
>subverts in order for their to be any punch, meaning or use to the notion
>of power."
>
>At this point I am not prepared to respond to this claim directly, but I would
>like to suggest that taking this position amounts to much more than a
>modification of Foucault's arguments (or even a rejection of some of his
>claims
>coupled with an acceptance of others). To assume that there must exist some
>true aspect of ourselves that power subverts is to completely diverge with
>Foucualt's claims with respect to discourse, power, and sexuality. Moreover,
>this move simultaneously buys into precisely the liberal conception of power
>from which Foucault repeatedly attempted to distance himself, indeed overturn
>entirely. By assuming that power subverts some inner truth, one also assumes
>that power functions negatively and restrictively and that some part of
>ourselves stands exterior to power relations and the web of discursive
>practices.
1) I admit that I am not simply modifying Foucault and that I am diverging
>from many of his claims concerning discourse, power and sexuality.
However, I do not completely diverge: I find his analysis of discourse and
power very powerful. But I think he makes too much of the rejection of the
repressive hypothesis.
2) I deny that by assuming that power subverts some inner truth I must
beleive that power functions negatively. I thinkl Foucault either misread
or did not understand Marcuse and others on this point. Marcuse and Steve
Lukes both discuss the productive aspects of repression. Foucault's whole
analuysis of the repressive hypothesis misses this aspect and is thus
faulty. I can, on request, provide citations from Marcuse and Lukes
regarding the productive aspects of power. But think, what better way to
repress the Truth than to produce a different "truth." The real question,
I think, comes down to whether we can ever really know the true self.
Rebecca continues citing Foucault:
>"For me what must be produced is not the man identical with himself, such as
>nature has designated him, or according to his essence...It is a question,
>rather, of the destruction of what we are, and of the creation of something
>totally other--a total innovation" ("Remarks on Marx," pp121-122).
>
What is the destuction of what we are. I find this very difficult to
understand in Foucault. From what I have read, which is not near enough
admittedly, he says these things but he does not explain what he means by
them. How do I destroy what I am and create something totally different.
This seems very Sartrean, BTW.
But the more important point is why should I destroy what I am and becomes
something totally other? This si just to fall into another power
configuration. If all we have are power configuratioons and there is no
true self, then I can only go from one power configuration to another.
Even to fight the prodiuctive aspects of one power configuration with
another, which is what F suggetss, is to fall (unkowingly) into another
power configuration. Why should I do this? Why would I want to? Moving
>from one p[ower configuration to another really devalues the term "power."
What I mean by this is that power is no longer something I want to resist.
Still citing F:
>"The relationships that we have to ourselves are not ones of identity, rather
>they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To
>be the same is really boring" (Interview in "The Advocate," August 1984,
>p. 28).
I am perfectly happy with this. We can be creative even though there is
some true self that we are. I am not sure why having a true self means
that we cannot be creative in the expression of that self. Indeed,
Foucault seems to be falling into some trap by holding thast the only way
we can be creative and innovative is to deny that we have true selves.
What better way to subvert a true self, if we had one?
>
>Finally, with respect to sexuality more specifically, I think that
>Butler's work
>has attempted to reveal the inadequacy of holding onto a social constructivist
>view of gender while retaining some originary truth about the sexual body that
>comes "before the law." In short, by refusing to allow that sexuality
>could be
>discursively produced (both "an instrument and effect of power," as
>Darlene puts
>it) one still holds onto a binary view of sexuality that retains a
>heterosexist
>conception of desire.
I have not read Butler on this, but I have to deny just the argument that
Rebecca gives voice to here. Again, Butler seems to be falling into some
false dichotomy. Why must I limit muyself to a heterosexist conceptioon of
desire (whatever that means, buyt I am sure it is negatively intended) by
holding that we have actual bodies with actual sexes. Again, I think
sexuality is discursively produced, but I think we have sexed bodies also.
Maybe I am missing something here and should read Butler (when I get the
time, HAHA!)
Sfelma writes:
"I would like to express my agreement with Rebecca Brown's argument. I joined
this group rather late so perhaps I've missed something - but I'm extremely
surprised by the fact that during all these sex "talks" no one has mentioned
(let alone read) any of Foucault's text from the ethical period -
specifically, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. As everyone
knows, in these two texts, Foucault rewrote, revised a good bit of his
theory of Power as expressed in Discipline and HoS vol. 1."
I am very interested in reading these, but I know nothing of them yet. I
am particularly interested in how Foucault uses the concept of aesthetics
in this later work becuase I want to see how it compares to the use made by
Marcuse and other of the Frankfurt School.
I should note, that I am not completely happy with the position I take at
this moment. But it is one from which I question certain postmodern
thematics. I am currently reading Rorty's COntingency, Irony and
Solidarity in which he denies emphatically the existence of a true self.
THe arguments I find in him and in Foucault just do not make sense to me,
and so I am searching for anwswers to these questions. It seems to me that
there is a lot of leeway between beleiving in some Kantian true self and
denying any true self at all and this is the dichotomy which the postmodern
debate draws. I ewould like to find something in between which I think the
postmoderns miss. If it were simply between Kant and Foucault or Kant and
anyone else, I would probably side against Kant (but note that this does
not mean for someone else).
In any case,.....
Jeff
JLN "The architectonic structure of the Kantian
jlnich1@xxxxxxxxxxx system, like the gymnastic pyramids of
Sade's orgies and the schematized
principles of the early bourgeois
freemasonry reveals an organization of
life as a whole which is deprived of
any substantial goal."
from _The Dialectic of Enlightenment_