To Michael Donnelly:
I agree, we have been talking past each other, but I'm not
quite satisfied with yoyur response. In your article "On
Foucault's Use of the Notion of 'Biopower'" (cited from
Michel Foucault: Philosopher), you make a distinction
between the genealogical level of analysis, and what you
call an 'epochal' analysis:
To put the distinction in other terms: certaqin formulations
in Foucault's texts refer to PARTICULAR (my emphasis)
targets of biopower in delimited time periods; these can be
called 'genealogical'. Other formulations summarise long
periods and refer to effects of biopower on 'society' -
to orderly, enduring, 'programmed' consequences which follow
from the application, according to strategic calculations,
of biopower; these can be called 'epochal'.
What is unwarranted, according to the article, is a kind of
inference from the 'genalogical' (defined as a kind of
particularity, I still hold), and the 'epochal' - an example
of which is the 'carceral society' in D&P. Follwing form
this unwarranted inference, is an 'elision' of the two
descriptions - one genealogical, and one epochal. The
virtue of genealogy, you argue, is its particularism: "as a
result the accounts are burdened with historical detail and
necessarily localised in character." The unwarranted
aspect, ("the contrast,") is his general desiptions: "the
disciplinary techniques whose historical constitution he has
tried to document are formalised into a general 'diagram'
('panopticism'), emptied of specific contents or contexts."
You then claim that "What is striking here is the
suspension of those patient and nominalist procedures..."
According to your account, there are two histories Foucault
is writing, mixing them together at certain points: the
first is "particular" "Localised" and "nominalist," the
se4cond is "general" "programmtic," and "formalised."
Here is where the problems begin. First of all, where does
Foucault ever give a "grey, meticulous, patiently
documentary" account? As early as Madness and Civ., he
chose "pivotal" figures such as Tuke and Pinel, Freud,
Bentham, etc. - all of whom exerted a "general" influence.
In Discipline and Punish, the description of Damiens is
quoted out of a few manuals, as are the timetables from the
1830's. Foucault cites these texts to demonstrate a
"general" shift in peneal technolgoeies, procedures, etc.
You seem to suggest that one should dispense with this
general level of analysis, which you call 'epochal'. First
of all, I don't see Foucault's generalties as being
constituted along periodal lines, as you suggest in your
article when you say that "The weakness of the 'epochal'
approach is that it lapses into a crude
periodisation...flattening our historical developments in
the mean time." I suggest that Foucault's treatment of
"generalities," and his inclusion of generalities in his
"grey meticulous" accounts is not periodical, but
archeological. The "carcel society" stenms from certain
rationalities. The first step of genealogy, as I have been
suggesting, is archeological, as he claims in "Two
Lectures": "What I mean is this: In a society such as ours,
but basically in any society, there are manifold relations
of power whcih permeate, characterize, and constitute the
social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves
be established, consolidated nor implemented without the
production, accumulation, circulation, and fucntioning of a
discourse."(P/K, 93)
Why does Foucault refer to a "carceral society"? Because
that's what he finds in nineteenth century
disciplinary-architectural manuals which make an
invariable reference to Bentham. What can be said is that
a discourse on penal technologies has been produced,
distributed, and accumulated at a general level.
This is consistent with a Marxian analysis. One respects
what one finds at teh local, empirical level - but there are
general phenomenon - otherwise capital could not be
distributed and appropriated on a general level. In other
words, not all empirical accounts have to remain at the
local and particualr level; there are general phenomenon,
and Focualt is trying to grap these phenomenon in their
'specificity,' just as Marx attempted to grasp the concept
of labour ion its material, historical specificity without
resorted to idealist "mystifications." The local level of
analysis is necessary for criticval purposes as well as
methodological ones - but that does not mean that the
phenomena under investigation have no generality. I will
close with a quote from REMARKS ON MARX (152):
"Localizing problems in indispensable for theoretical and
political reasons. But that doesn't mean that they are not,
however, general problems. After all, what is more general
in a society than the way in which it defines its realtion
ot madness? Or the way in which society is recognized as
"rationality" personified?...It is quite true that I
localize problems, but I believe that this permits me to
make others emerge from them that are very general..."(RM,
152).
I agree, we have been talking past each other, but I'm not
quite satisfied with yoyur response. In your article "On
Foucault's Use of the Notion of 'Biopower'" (cited from
Michel Foucault: Philosopher), you make a distinction
between the genealogical level of analysis, and what you
call an 'epochal' analysis:
To put the distinction in other terms: certaqin formulations
in Foucault's texts refer to PARTICULAR (my emphasis)
targets of biopower in delimited time periods; these can be
called 'genealogical'. Other formulations summarise long
periods and refer to effects of biopower on 'society' -
to orderly, enduring, 'programmed' consequences which follow
from the application, according to strategic calculations,
of biopower; these can be called 'epochal'.
What is unwarranted, according to the article, is a kind of
inference from the 'genalogical' (defined as a kind of
particularity, I still hold), and the 'epochal' - an example
of which is the 'carceral society' in D&P. Follwing form
this unwarranted inference, is an 'elision' of the two
descriptions - one genealogical, and one epochal. The
virtue of genealogy, you argue, is its particularism: "as a
result the accounts are burdened with historical detail and
necessarily localised in character." The unwarranted
aspect, ("the contrast,") is his general desiptions: "the
disciplinary techniques whose historical constitution he has
tried to document are formalised into a general 'diagram'
('panopticism'), emptied of specific contents or contexts."
You then claim that "What is striking here is the
suspension of those patient and nominalist procedures..."
According to your account, there are two histories Foucault
is writing, mixing them together at certain points: the
first is "particular" "Localised" and "nominalist," the
se4cond is "general" "programmtic," and "formalised."
Here is where the problems begin. First of all, where does
Foucault ever give a "grey, meticulous, patiently
documentary" account? As early as Madness and Civ., he
chose "pivotal" figures such as Tuke and Pinel, Freud,
Bentham, etc. - all of whom exerted a "general" influence.
In Discipline and Punish, the description of Damiens is
quoted out of a few manuals, as are the timetables from the
1830's. Foucault cites these texts to demonstrate a
"general" shift in peneal technolgoeies, procedures, etc.
You seem to suggest that one should dispense with this
general level of analysis, which you call 'epochal'. First
of all, I don't see Foucault's generalties as being
constituted along periodal lines, as you suggest in your
article when you say that "The weakness of the 'epochal'
approach is that it lapses into a crude
periodisation...flattening our historical developments in
the mean time." I suggest that Foucault's treatment of
"generalities," and his inclusion of generalities in his
"grey meticulous" accounts is not periodical, but
archeological. The "carcel society" stenms from certain
rationalities. The first step of genealogy, as I have been
suggesting, is archeological, as he claims in "Two
Lectures": "What I mean is this: In a society such as ours,
but basically in any society, there are manifold relations
of power whcih permeate, characterize, and constitute the
social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves
be established, consolidated nor implemented without the
production, accumulation, circulation, and fucntioning of a
discourse."(P/K, 93)
Why does Foucault refer to a "carceral society"? Because
that's what he finds in nineteenth century
disciplinary-architectural manuals which make an
invariable reference to Bentham. What can be said is that
a discourse on penal technologies has been produced,
distributed, and accumulated at a general level.
This is consistent with a Marxian analysis. One respects
what one finds at teh local, empirical level - but there are
general phenomenon - otherwise capital could not be
distributed and appropriated on a general level. In other
words, not all empirical accounts have to remain at the
local and particualr level; there are general phenomenon,
and Focualt is trying to grap these phenomenon in their
'specificity,' just as Marx attempted to grasp the concept
of labour ion its material, historical specificity without
resorted to idealist "mystifications." The local level of
analysis is necessary for criticval purposes as well as
methodological ones - but that does not mean that the
phenomena under investigation have no generality. I will
close with a quote from REMARKS ON MARX (152):
"Localizing problems in indispensable for theoretical and
political reasons. But that doesn't mean that they are not,
however, general problems. After all, what is more general
in a society than the way in which it defines its realtion
ot madness? Or the way in which society is recognized as
"rationality" personified?...It is quite true that I
localize problems, but I believe that this permits me to
make others emerge from them that are very general..."(RM,
152).