On Tue, 30 Jul 1996 16:56:25 +0400 (MEDT), Koray Caliskan wrote:
>It is sometimes the best way to judge (- and may be to reach a
> more accurate understanding) the value of a scholarly work, is to reread
> it with reference to some very recent events. There is a continuing
> hunger strike in Turkish prisons for 65 days. Two of 280 prisoners died.
> 20 of them lost their chance to live without serious health
> problems.(it is now 13 after the resolution)
...
> So the question follows. Always bearing Foucault's comments on
> "humanism" in our minds, how is it possible to support those people in
> the prison. Is there an immanent, inalienable right to live? Are there
> "human" rights? I am sure that there is nobody in this list who will
> refuse
>the concept "human rights" without offering an alternative. BUT, how is it
> possible to construct inalienable and non-transcendental conception of
> human rights when we think of Foucault.
>
> (The crucial point is that there are some concepts
> that cannot be easily criticised because of their political content that
> are very useful in activating people in resisting.)
>
Koray
There have been already a number of posts that said, with great eloquence,
the silence that besieges us when we realise the distance between the
discussion about power and some of the grimmer effects of power relations.
I would like to address the question of the political content of inalienable
human rights, about which you asked whether one can, ethically, I understand,
criticise without giving alternative.
The concept of human rights gets its political meaning from charity. It is meant to
defend those who are completely disempowered, prison inmates, war prisoners,
opressed minorities, etc. It is 'the bare minimum' of what should not be denied to
anyone. Those who aspire for more than a minimum, like most citizens, not
to say politicians, do not need to call attention to their human rights, these go without
saying; they use other resources, including positive law, to get at much higher stakes.
Because it is applied to people who are almost without any resources, the application
of the human rights principle often requires the intervention of a friend. I use that word without
quotation marks, for to call a government to respect human rights is to act in the capacity of
a friend of the opressed. The latter lack in many case even the capacity to proclaim their
human rights by themselves. Not saying that this friendly help is meaningless or not well meant,
it still requires the subject of charity to assume the position of complete nudity. To shed off
especially any political positions, demands, and resources, and become nothing but a human being.
To the extent that the recipients of such help have already been reduced to this nudity, this is the least
one can do. But in other occasions, the defense in terms of humanity is a disservice for those who
entered the battle in order to regain much more than their bare life or the wholesomeness of their body.
Are human rights inalienable? It seems to be that such a concept is impossible, at least in the way
rights have been traditionally conceptualised. My right is limited to the extent that it comes in conflict
with your right. If you come to my house and try to kill me, my infringement of your human right to live
will be justified. As this would not a mere limitation of your right to live, but its complete revocation,
it could not be said that this right is inalienable. Under condition of emergency, because of the
principle of exchangeability of rights, rights are inherently alienable.
Given the above, the question returns to what constitutes an emergency. The Nazi politologist
Schmitt (and it is an sign of the poverty of a certain juridic tradition that he is given voice here)
defined political power as the capacity to determine what counts as a state of emergency. This
capacity is a resource; it is differentially distributed. Those who lack the political power
so badly that they need to appeal to the protection of the principle of human rights are those who
are least likely to have the available resources with which to affect the public definition of emergency.
To give one example with which I am more familiar: The political public discourse in Israel recognises the
validity of human rights (regardless of what many may think in the deep of their heart). These rights have
even won some level (though I would not venture to be more specific here) of recognition at the supreme
court. However, the amount of protection that this recognition has afforded palastinians jailed by the
Israeli government has been quite low, and in most occasion the government was able to justify its
complete abrogation, with the support of the court, through the principle known as the 'ticking bomb'.
The metaphor (it is used in most cases metaphorically) refers to the right to torture an imprisoned terrorist
who witholds information about a bomb that is about to blow. This is just one set argument in a complex
discourse. I simplify. But the point is that by manipulating the notion of emergency, and streching it to
whatever the state counts as important, the human rights of the palastinians are more often than not at the
discretion of their jailers.
When faced with criticism from other western democracies, the Turkish government will be able to
justify its acts by explaining the 'raison d'etat', which, given the legal justification of the state as
the caretaker of its citizenry, can overrule the human right of a particular as a extension of the notion of
self-defense. The Turkish government would speak about the 'particularity' of the Turkish history, the
weakness and fragility of its democracy, etc, and will demand 'to be understood'. Most likely diplomats
>from other countries will be eager to show 'undersanding'; after all, these are problems that all
governmentsto some extent face, and none wants to create 'unnecessary' tensions.
In such a constellation, human rights are a still a valuable resource, extremely valuable because of its
hold on western imagination, as it was remarked here by another. One should use what resource
one has; this is no occasion for intelectual delicacy. However, we need to see how much this
resource is hollow at its origin. Like a bankrupt insurance company, it affords us protection as long
as we do not need it, but when we suddenly call upon its service, it too often reveals itself empty.
Do we have an alternative? not yet. Certainly not in terms of public mobilisation. But we should try
to think ahead, for better resources are badly needed.
-------------
Gabriel Ash
Notre-Dame
-------------
>It is sometimes the best way to judge (- and may be to reach a
> more accurate understanding) the value of a scholarly work, is to reread
> it with reference to some very recent events. There is a continuing
> hunger strike in Turkish prisons for 65 days. Two of 280 prisoners died.
> 20 of them lost their chance to live without serious health
> problems.(it is now 13 after the resolution)
...
> So the question follows. Always bearing Foucault's comments on
> "humanism" in our minds, how is it possible to support those people in
> the prison. Is there an immanent, inalienable right to live? Are there
> "human" rights? I am sure that there is nobody in this list who will
> refuse
>the concept "human rights" without offering an alternative. BUT, how is it
> possible to construct inalienable and non-transcendental conception of
> human rights when we think of Foucault.
>
> (The crucial point is that there are some concepts
> that cannot be easily criticised because of their political content that
> are very useful in activating people in resisting.)
>
Koray
There have been already a number of posts that said, with great eloquence,
the silence that besieges us when we realise the distance between the
discussion about power and some of the grimmer effects of power relations.
I would like to address the question of the political content of inalienable
human rights, about which you asked whether one can, ethically, I understand,
criticise without giving alternative.
The concept of human rights gets its political meaning from charity. It is meant to
defend those who are completely disempowered, prison inmates, war prisoners,
opressed minorities, etc. It is 'the bare minimum' of what should not be denied to
anyone. Those who aspire for more than a minimum, like most citizens, not
to say politicians, do not need to call attention to their human rights, these go without
saying; they use other resources, including positive law, to get at much higher stakes.
Because it is applied to people who are almost without any resources, the application
of the human rights principle often requires the intervention of a friend. I use that word without
quotation marks, for to call a government to respect human rights is to act in the capacity of
a friend of the opressed. The latter lack in many case even the capacity to proclaim their
human rights by themselves. Not saying that this friendly help is meaningless or not well meant,
it still requires the subject of charity to assume the position of complete nudity. To shed off
especially any political positions, demands, and resources, and become nothing but a human being.
To the extent that the recipients of such help have already been reduced to this nudity, this is the least
one can do. But in other occasions, the defense in terms of humanity is a disservice for those who
entered the battle in order to regain much more than their bare life or the wholesomeness of their body.
Are human rights inalienable? It seems to be that such a concept is impossible, at least in the way
rights have been traditionally conceptualised. My right is limited to the extent that it comes in conflict
with your right. If you come to my house and try to kill me, my infringement of your human right to live
will be justified. As this would not a mere limitation of your right to live, but its complete revocation,
it could not be said that this right is inalienable. Under condition of emergency, because of the
principle of exchangeability of rights, rights are inherently alienable.
Given the above, the question returns to what constitutes an emergency. The Nazi politologist
Schmitt (and it is an sign of the poverty of a certain juridic tradition that he is given voice here)
defined political power as the capacity to determine what counts as a state of emergency. This
capacity is a resource; it is differentially distributed. Those who lack the political power
so badly that they need to appeal to the protection of the principle of human rights are those who
are least likely to have the available resources with which to affect the public definition of emergency.
To give one example with which I am more familiar: The political public discourse in Israel recognises the
validity of human rights (regardless of what many may think in the deep of their heart). These rights have
even won some level (though I would not venture to be more specific here) of recognition at the supreme
court. However, the amount of protection that this recognition has afforded palastinians jailed by the
Israeli government has been quite low, and in most occasion the government was able to justify its
complete abrogation, with the support of the court, through the principle known as the 'ticking bomb'.
The metaphor (it is used in most cases metaphorically) refers to the right to torture an imprisoned terrorist
who witholds information about a bomb that is about to blow. This is just one set argument in a complex
discourse. I simplify. But the point is that by manipulating the notion of emergency, and streching it to
whatever the state counts as important, the human rights of the palastinians are more often than not at the
discretion of their jailers.
When faced with criticism from other western democracies, the Turkish government will be able to
justify its acts by explaining the 'raison d'etat', which, given the legal justification of the state as
the caretaker of its citizenry, can overrule the human right of a particular as a extension of the notion of
self-defense. The Turkish government would speak about the 'particularity' of the Turkish history, the
weakness and fragility of its democracy, etc, and will demand 'to be understood'. Most likely diplomats
>from other countries will be eager to show 'undersanding'; after all, these are problems that all
governmentsto some extent face, and none wants to create 'unnecessary' tensions.
In such a constellation, human rights are a still a valuable resource, extremely valuable because of its
hold on western imagination, as it was remarked here by another. One should use what resource
one has; this is no occasion for intelectual delicacy. However, we need to see how much this
resource is hollow at its origin. Like a bankrupt insurance company, it affords us protection as long
as we do not need it, but when we suddenly call upon its service, it too often reveals itself empty.
Do we have an alternative? not yet. Certainly not in terms of public mobilisation. But we should try
to think ahead, for better resources are badly needed.
-------------
Gabriel Ash
Notre-Dame
-------------