I've been listening to this discussion on "power and authenticity" and
two things have stricken me as relevant issues that are not completely
understood (or at least are far from consensual).
1. Foucault stated very clearly that power is productive and "positive"
and that any vulgar interpretation of his work that characterized power
as bad or evil would be misleading. (Interview with Henri-L=E9vy, 1977)
2. However as everybody knows, Foucault was an "engag=E9" himself and=20
anybody reading carefully his work can notice that when he talks about
disciplinary power, for example in Surveiller et Punir (DP), although it
is not clearly or directly critical his tone is very critical.
How can we make sense of this (perhaps apparent) contradiction?
Personally, I think that Foucault had some kind of metaphysical
obsession: on one hand his books represent an extensive work in showing
the historicity and power contamination of what was then considered
essential, universal and neutral; on the other hand his criticism
pointed to some kind of freedom that seems related to a surpassing of
those contingent and power related situations -- surpassing that was
possible by the very knowledge of its contingency and power
contamination.
I would like very much to hear comments on those issues.
Pablo Ortellado
two things have stricken me as relevant issues that are not completely
understood (or at least are far from consensual).
1. Foucault stated very clearly that power is productive and "positive"
and that any vulgar interpretation of his work that characterized power
as bad or evil would be misleading. (Interview with Henri-L=E9vy, 1977)
2. However as everybody knows, Foucault was an "engag=E9" himself and=20
anybody reading carefully his work can notice that when he talks about
disciplinary power, for example in Surveiller et Punir (DP), although it
is not clearly or directly critical his tone is very critical.
How can we make sense of this (perhaps apparent) contradiction?
Personally, I think that Foucault had some kind of metaphysical
obsession: on one hand his books represent an extensive work in showing
the historicity and power contamination of what was then considered
essential, universal and neutral; on the other hand his criticism
pointed to some kind of freedom that seems related to a surpassing of
those contingent and power related situations -- surpassing that was
possible by the very knowledge of its contingency and power
contamination.
I would like very much to hear comments on those issues.
Pablo Ortellado