On Fri, 7 Mar 1997, Murray K. Simpson wrote:
> Colin Wight wrote:
>
> > But this is exactly the problem. Explain why your borders apply and what
> > justifies them and we can debate them. Without this the relativism and
> > nihilism that you claim is a straw position is, on the contrary, a reality.
> > For if I have my answer and you have yours, but mine involves the
> > destruction of large ammounts of people how are you going to persuade me or
> > anyone else that my practice is wrong?
>
> As far as I can see, the problem is that at the end of the day these
> matters are rarely resolved by argument and persuasion, which is why
> Foucault regarded 'politics as the continuation of war by other means'.
>
> I mean I still come across Profs
> > teaching undergraduates that postmoderns (and Foucault is generally dragged
> > out here as an example) think that there is no such thing as truth. Nothing
> > could be further from the truth in F's case. Still, the undergrads, who
> > after all are only here to regurgitate what they are told, take this at face
> > value.
>
> agree with this completely...for what its worth.
>
> Best wishes
>
> Murray
> =================================
>
Yes, and certainly it is a wrong conclusion to come to that Foucault
thought there was no such thing as truth. Undergraduates sometimes think
this. A bit more broadly, undergraduates often come to this conclusion
about Nietzsche as well, and it is equally untrue of him. Sometimes, if I
may speak in defense of college teachers, this reading of these thinkers
happen because as a first stage of perception, the notion that "there is
no such thing as truth" is the easiest thematic to get ones hands on.
Undergraduates do not learn everything at once. I have found that even if
you tell them, and show them, and argue with them, and show them again,
undergraduates will still write something along the lines of "Nietzsche
thought there was no such thing as truth." This isn't so much a criticism
of them or of me as it is a cognitive stage that young minds often go
through. You may be confusing a difficult cognitive development with
superficial presentations.
But we need to be clear on what the nature of truth is here. The kind of
truth that I assume -- perhaps wrongly -- that Doug Henning refers to
in the passage that follows is a kind of truth that, I think, both
Nietzsche and Foucault would argue does not exist:
Doug Henning writes: Less melodramatically, is it acceptable for someone
writing what looks to be like history - especially history of a sort that
is making fairly sweeping claims - to "breech the laws" of "traditional
historiography"? Which means, as far as I can tell, a sloppiness about
evidence in the service of a "higher" truth. So what's your standard for
judging that higher truth then? [end quotation; this is from Doug
Henning's March 5 post.]
Unless I am misreading him, Henning wants an absolute moral standard with
which one can judge self-proclaimed "transgressive" acts. That's a capital
'T' version of truth.
But if Foucault and Nietzsche do not believe in this capital 'T' version
of truth, which version do they endorse? And can there even be a
commitment to truth that is not a commitment to the capital 'T' version?
Not so that we will bow down to him; not so that we will mechanically
agree with him; but only to learn what he thinks; here is what Foucault
says in one place about truth:
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside
power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history
and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward
of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the
privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves.
**Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue
of multiple forms of constraint.** And it induces regular effects
of power.
"Truth and Power" in _Power Knowledge_, p. 131.
emphasis in next to last sentence added
Call this the lower-case 't' version of truth. This is the version of
truth that Foucault and Nietzsche take very seriously. The fact that truth
is a thing of this world does not mean it can be dismissed as unimportant.
To say of either of them that they think "there is no such thing as truth"
is clearly a misunderstanding of their views.
But they do not, in my view, subscribe to the capital 'T' version of truth
that I take it Doug Henning thinks we subscribe to despite our
protestations to the contrary. (See Doug Henwood's March 6 post, where he
writes: "Obviously, my suspicion is that people who claim to be free of
humanist prejudices and master narratives aren't. But I want to hear why
it's ok to cross some borders but not others.")
Well, why don't F & N subscribe to this capital 'T' version? What's wrong
with master narratives? What's wrong with the capital 'T' version of truth
>from their point of view? Some people think -- and I frankly believe that
these are the ones who adopt that undergraduate view of F and N, namely
that F and N think "there's no such thing as truth" -- that this lack of
commitment to a capital 'T,' morality-guaranteeing truth is the result of
some perverse desire for novelty, or that it comes from some equally
disreputable motive.
"Humanism" is one example of this kind of capital 'T' truth that Foucault
thinks we should drop. Here's his explanation as to why:
Humanism may not be universal but may be quite relative to a
certain situation. What we call humanism has been used by
Marxists, liberals, Nazis, Catholics. This does not mean
that we have got to get rid of what we call human rights or
freedom, but that we can't say freedom or human rights has
to be limited at certain frontiers. For instance, if you
asked eighty years ago if feminine virtue was part of
universal humanism, everyone would have answered yes.
What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a
certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any
kind of freedom. I think that there are more secrets, more
possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than
we can imagine in humanism as it is dogmatically
represented on every side of the political rainbow: the Left,
the Center, the Right.
"Truth, Power, Self: An Interview" in
_Technologies of the Self_, p. 15
In the passage above, Foucault is indicting humanism for its
unreliability, its lack of contextual specificity. Not only the good guys
but the bad guys have used this "humanism." Capital 'T' versions of truth
do not do the work for you that Doug Henning thinks they do. Thinkers with
Doug Henning's approach worry that without some *a priori* identification
of uncrossable barriers, moral horrors such as the sacrifice of infant
children could be justified. Foucault's riposte is that *with* commitments
and *in the name of* commitments to capital 'T' versions of truth such as
humanism, all sorts of moral horrors take place. In addition, such an *a
priori* approach to right and wrong keeps us from seeking out,
discovering, and recognizing new truths and new freedoms, such as the
liberation of women.
--John Ransom
Dickinson College
> Colin Wight wrote:
>
> > But this is exactly the problem. Explain why your borders apply and what
> > justifies them and we can debate them. Without this the relativism and
> > nihilism that you claim is a straw position is, on the contrary, a reality.
> > For if I have my answer and you have yours, but mine involves the
> > destruction of large ammounts of people how are you going to persuade me or
> > anyone else that my practice is wrong?
>
> As far as I can see, the problem is that at the end of the day these
> matters are rarely resolved by argument and persuasion, which is why
> Foucault regarded 'politics as the continuation of war by other means'.
>
> I mean I still come across Profs
> > teaching undergraduates that postmoderns (and Foucault is generally dragged
> > out here as an example) think that there is no such thing as truth. Nothing
> > could be further from the truth in F's case. Still, the undergrads, who
> > after all are only here to regurgitate what they are told, take this at face
> > value.
>
> agree with this completely...for what its worth.
>
> Best wishes
>
> Murray
> =================================
>
Yes, and certainly it is a wrong conclusion to come to that Foucault
thought there was no such thing as truth. Undergraduates sometimes think
this. A bit more broadly, undergraduates often come to this conclusion
about Nietzsche as well, and it is equally untrue of him. Sometimes, if I
may speak in defense of college teachers, this reading of these thinkers
happen because as a first stage of perception, the notion that "there is
no such thing as truth" is the easiest thematic to get ones hands on.
Undergraduates do not learn everything at once. I have found that even if
you tell them, and show them, and argue with them, and show them again,
undergraduates will still write something along the lines of "Nietzsche
thought there was no such thing as truth." This isn't so much a criticism
of them or of me as it is a cognitive stage that young minds often go
through. You may be confusing a difficult cognitive development with
superficial presentations.
But we need to be clear on what the nature of truth is here. The kind of
truth that I assume -- perhaps wrongly -- that Doug Henning refers to
in the passage that follows is a kind of truth that, I think, both
Nietzsche and Foucault would argue does not exist:
Doug Henning writes: Less melodramatically, is it acceptable for someone
writing what looks to be like history - especially history of a sort that
is making fairly sweeping claims - to "breech the laws" of "traditional
historiography"? Which means, as far as I can tell, a sloppiness about
evidence in the service of a "higher" truth. So what's your standard for
judging that higher truth then? [end quotation; this is from Doug
Henning's March 5 post.]
Unless I am misreading him, Henning wants an absolute moral standard with
which one can judge self-proclaimed "transgressive" acts. That's a capital
'T' version of truth.
But if Foucault and Nietzsche do not believe in this capital 'T' version
of truth, which version do they endorse? And can there even be a
commitment to truth that is not a commitment to the capital 'T' version?
Not so that we will bow down to him; not so that we will mechanically
agree with him; but only to learn what he thinks; here is what Foucault
says in one place about truth:
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside
power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history
and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward
of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the
privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves.
**Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue
of multiple forms of constraint.** And it induces regular effects
of power.
"Truth and Power" in _Power Knowledge_, p. 131.
emphasis in next to last sentence added
Call this the lower-case 't' version of truth. This is the version of
truth that Foucault and Nietzsche take very seriously. The fact that truth
is a thing of this world does not mean it can be dismissed as unimportant.
To say of either of them that they think "there is no such thing as truth"
is clearly a misunderstanding of their views.
But they do not, in my view, subscribe to the capital 'T' version of truth
that I take it Doug Henning thinks we subscribe to despite our
protestations to the contrary. (See Doug Henwood's March 6 post, where he
writes: "Obviously, my suspicion is that people who claim to be free of
humanist prejudices and master narratives aren't. But I want to hear why
it's ok to cross some borders but not others.")
Well, why don't F & N subscribe to this capital 'T' version? What's wrong
with master narratives? What's wrong with the capital 'T' version of truth
>from their point of view? Some people think -- and I frankly believe that
these are the ones who adopt that undergraduate view of F and N, namely
that F and N think "there's no such thing as truth" -- that this lack of
commitment to a capital 'T,' morality-guaranteeing truth is the result of
some perverse desire for novelty, or that it comes from some equally
disreputable motive.
"Humanism" is one example of this kind of capital 'T' truth that Foucault
thinks we should drop. Here's his explanation as to why:
Humanism may not be universal but may be quite relative to a
certain situation. What we call humanism has been used by
Marxists, liberals, Nazis, Catholics. This does not mean
that we have got to get rid of what we call human rights or
freedom, but that we can't say freedom or human rights has
to be limited at certain frontiers. For instance, if you
asked eighty years ago if feminine virtue was part of
universal humanism, everyone would have answered yes.
What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a
certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any
kind of freedom. I think that there are more secrets, more
possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than
we can imagine in humanism as it is dogmatically
represented on every side of the political rainbow: the Left,
the Center, the Right.
"Truth, Power, Self: An Interview" in
_Technologies of the Self_, p. 15
In the passage above, Foucault is indicting humanism for its
unreliability, its lack of contextual specificity. Not only the good guys
but the bad guys have used this "humanism." Capital 'T' versions of truth
do not do the work for you that Doug Henning thinks they do. Thinkers with
Doug Henning's approach worry that without some *a priori* identification
of uncrossable barriers, moral horrors such as the sacrifice of infant
children could be justified. Foucault's riposte is that *with* commitments
and *in the name of* commitments to capital 'T' versions of truth such as
humanism, all sorts of moral horrors take place. In addition, such an *a
priori* approach to right and wrong keeps us from seeking out,
discovering, and recognizing new truths and new freedoms, such as the
liberation of women.
--John Ransom
Dickinson College