On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, Miles Jackson wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, Matthew Scott Archer wrote:
>
> [a bit snipped]
>
> > Therefore, I do not see Foucault saying that there is no such thing as
> > truth, rather the opposite. Truth exists and is 'real', but it is produced
> > as such. I am not sure this adds anything to the conversation in progress,
> > and perhaps others might feel inclined to critique it. However, I feel
> > that the posting concerning "the truth that there is no truth" while
> > entirely legitimate within the discourse of epistemology, talks past
> > Foucault (who, as I said above, seems to be attempting to move outside this
> > discourse) and does not engage with his insights.
> >
>
> Yeah Matt! I also think it's quite interesting how people try to fit
> Foucault into the persona of the Great Western Philosopher ala Plato
> who tells us what is Good, True, and Beautiful. Foucault is simply not
> a philosopher: all this banter about "is-it-true-that-nothing-is-true"
> is irrelevant to Foucault's work (a double-shot of Wittgenstein for
> me too, by the way, barkeep).
The above won't work. We cannot isolate Foucault from this debate. He says
he thinks truth is profane. That means he thinks truth isn't what it is
usually made out to be. Or at least, that's a reasonable (thus not
irrelevant) question to ask about him. He has an article called "Truth and
Power." He specifically says there that intellectuals should not battle
'on behalf' of truth but rather about the status of truth" (see _FR_,
74-75). At least an implicit claim about the truth we should not battle on
behalf is being made. He also says in the same place that "Truth is system
of ordered procedures for production and operation of statements." That's
a claim about truth. Well, other people want to say he's wrong. You can't
(honestly) get away from their objections by saying "he doesn't want to
talk about the kind of truth you want to talk about." In the same place he
says that we should not "try to emancipate truth from every system of
power" in part because "truth is already power." Some people think F is
wrong about truth already being power, some people think he's right, some
people think he's too silly to be wrong or right. It's not "irrelevant" to
F's work to discuss these issues. In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,"
Foucault discusses at some length Nietzsche's arguments on truth. F talks
about truth *all the time*. I agree with those who would maintain that
this is a different kind of truth than is usually implied by the term, but
that makes a discussion of the conceptual distinction among different
kinds of truth quite relevant.
On the history of the discussion: a member of the list said that
Foucault's claims about truth were self-erasing. The logic exercise that
resulted was an attempt to dispute the claim that F was involved in a
performative contradiction. I see nothing wrong or irrelevant about the
criticism of F or the attempt to respond to it.
>
> All this leads me to an important question: how do people read Foucault's
> work and come to this silly conclusion that "Foucault says nothing is
> true" or "Foucault is a relativist"? Foucault studies how true
> statements are deployed and used in our society, how they intersect
> with power relations. The ontological status of these statements is
> irrelevant to the analysis; what matters is that they function as
> true statements in a given sociohistorical context.
I think a misuse of the word "relevant" is at work here. I mean, for
instance, to get to the place where you can have the insight that "truth
is already power" wouldn't you need to do some work with the ontological
claim that truth is power-free and essential?
--jsr
> (In this, I see
> Foucault as much like sociologists of religion who point out the social
> functions embedded in a religious belief system such as monotheism.
> Whether or not these sociologists believe in a deity is completely
> irrelevant to their work).
>
> Bottom line: if you want somebody to help you to debate philosophical
> positions like realism or relativism, Foucault's not going to be
> useful to you. As Matt says, you and Foucault will simply be talking
> past one another.
>
> Miles Jackson
> cqmv@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
>
> On Tue, 11 Mar 1997, Matthew Scott Archer wrote:
>
> [a bit snipped]
>
> > Therefore, I do not see Foucault saying that there is no such thing as
> > truth, rather the opposite. Truth exists and is 'real', but it is produced
> > as such. I am not sure this adds anything to the conversation in progress,
> > and perhaps others might feel inclined to critique it. However, I feel
> > that the posting concerning "the truth that there is no truth" while
> > entirely legitimate within the discourse of epistemology, talks past
> > Foucault (who, as I said above, seems to be attempting to move outside this
> > discourse) and does not engage with his insights.
> >
>
> Yeah Matt! I also think it's quite interesting how people try to fit
> Foucault into the persona of the Great Western Philosopher ala Plato
> who tells us what is Good, True, and Beautiful. Foucault is simply not
> a philosopher: all this banter about "is-it-true-that-nothing-is-true"
> is irrelevant to Foucault's work (a double-shot of Wittgenstein for
> me too, by the way, barkeep).
The above won't work. We cannot isolate Foucault from this debate. He says
he thinks truth is profane. That means he thinks truth isn't what it is
usually made out to be. Or at least, that's a reasonable (thus not
irrelevant) question to ask about him. He has an article called "Truth and
Power." He specifically says there that intellectuals should not battle
'on behalf' of truth but rather about the status of truth" (see _FR_,
74-75). At least an implicit claim about the truth we should not battle on
behalf is being made. He also says in the same place that "Truth is system
of ordered procedures for production and operation of statements." That's
a claim about truth. Well, other people want to say he's wrong. You can't
(honestly) get away from their objections by saying "he doesn't want to
talk about the kind of truth you want to talk about." In the same place he
says that we should not "try to emancipate truth from every system of
power" in part because "truth is already power." Some people think F is
wrong about truth already being power, some people think he's right, some
people think he's too silly to be wrong or right. It's not "irrelevant" to
F's work to discuss these issues. In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,"
Foucault discusses at some length Nietzsche's arguments on truth. F talks
about truth *all the time*. I agree with those who would maintain that
this is a different kind of truth than is usually implied by the term, but
that makes a discussion of the conceptual distinction among different
kinds of truth quite relevant.
On the history of the discussion: a member of the list said that
Foucault's claims about truth were self-erasing. The logic exercise that
resulted was an attempt to dispute the claim that F was involved in a
performative contradiction. I see nothing wrong or irrelevant about the
criticism of F or the attempt to respond to it.
>
> All this leads me to an important question: how do people read Foucault's
> work and come to this silly conclusion that "Foucault says nothing is
> true" or "Foucault is a relativist"? Foucault studies how true
> statements are deployed and used in our society, how they intersect
> with power relations. The ontological status of these statements is
> irrelevant to the analysis; what matters is that they function as
> true statements in a given sociohistorical context.
I think a misuse of the word "relevant" is at work here. I mean, for
instance, to get to the place where you can have the insight that "truth
is already power" wouldn't you need to do some work with the ontological
claim that truth is power-free and essential?
--jsr
> (In this, I see
> Foucault as much like sociologists of religion who point out the social
> functions embedded in a religious belief system such as monotheism.
> Whether or not these sociologists believe in a deity is completely
> irrelevant to their work).
>
> Bottom line: if you want somebody to help you to debate philosophical
> positions like realism or relativism, Foucault's not going to be
> useful to you. As Matt says, you and Foucault will simply be talking
> past one another.
>
> Miles Jackson
> cqmv@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>