Diane,
Hi, well at least we are talking, that in itself, I suppose, implies that
conversational exchange can get off the ground. As you say genres leak, they
are not hermetically sealed islands of "rightness". Hence these areas of
overlap provide fertile grounds on which to converse. You say the primary
question is what is epistemic violence? I have real problems here because as
far as I can see epistemology has nothing whatever to do with much of the
post-thingy discourse. Since epistemology is typically conceived of as the
'study of what grounds we have for believing the things we believe', and
insofar as much post-thingyism (not Derrida by the way) denies that such an
enterprise is possible, it constitutes a denial of epistemology not a
different one. If anything epistemic here is being used in a way that
Wittgenstein would find find laughable. That is, he would simply say that
'they are simply not playing cricket'. If you can tell me what, say,
Lyotard's epistemology is I would be grateful. To say it is relativist, by
the way, is not an answer.
>Several things. First, no, of course this is not simply a "you say
>tomAto and I say toAUto" approach to difference. It's simply the
>recognition that discourses follow different standards of linking to
>produce what then goes by the name of Knowledge.
Ah yes, but are you now suggesting that there are ways to translate between
these different discourses and hence reach tentative comparisons, or
claiming incommensurability al la Lyotard? One question implies the other.
>Second, I bring up Lyotard b/c the question was about epistemic
>violence, and that's his thang. But I really have a problem with your
>cavalier dismissal of anything he has to say b/c you have detected
>"unthematized foundationalism" in his work. You're KIDDING?
No, I am not suggesting anything of the kind. I myself am not against
dipping into the pools of Lyotardian wisdom (I wish I could think of a
better word but I simply can't). His early stuff, in particular, stands as a
robust critique of the linguistic reductionism he saw in much early
poststructuralist work. Later on he got bit weird, but hey, that's probably
to do with his advancing years (you should try talking to my gran).
Anyway, my point about Lyotard was specifically (this is a Foucault list
after all) related to the issue of incommensurability, and here his hidden
foundationalism does restrict how much sense we can give to his account of
it. That is, incommensurability only works for Lyotard because he has set
the "bedrock" at which he rests on the claim/belief/knowledge (see what I
mean about epistemology being slippery) that each discourse has its own
standards and this principle is _universal_. And yes, I suppose I do get
suspicious of people who say they are not foundationalist, humanists etc.
but who patently smuggle these terms in (Rorty is a prime example here).
I've read
>your posts to this list for a long time and am stunned by this
>anti-intellectual response. Heidegger's work ultimately put Being over
>the Other and led him into some of the most unethical territory ever (de
>Man has a similar story), but that doesn't suggest that we shouldn't
>read his work.
Now that is a very interesting question, and not only one about whether we
should read the work, because that of course is trivial. I have read
Lyotard, but reading is not the same as agreeing or utilising. For example,
is your claim about Heiddeger that his prioritising of Being over Other led
him into his ethical misadventures? If so that would seem to be a good
reason TO read him so as we can avoid similar errors. This is exactly the
same with my point about Lyotard, at least in relation to incommensurability.
:
>
>> does it simply function as an institutionalised assumption which
>> serves to butress your own theoretical/ideological account of the
>> world against criticism. 'It's my view and you commit epistemic
>> violence if you critise it from any discourse other than it'.
I put this question to you and it is quite straightforward. What concerns
you about it. I reject any strong form of the incommensurability thesis, but
then again so did Kuhn and Feyerabend. Not only because I think that
philosophically it is incoherent. But that ethically it is problematic. And
this not because I wish to reserve the right to interfere in other
discourses and point out where I consider they are going wrong, but because
I would defend the right of others to criticise the discourses I engage in.
The least those who deny the possibility of communication can do, someone
once said, is to 'shut up'.
>
>And third, Lyotard's primary example of epistemic violence in The
>Differend has to do with Auschwitz, and I would not consider that
>trivial. If you haven't read it, lemme know, and I'll rehearse what he's
>suggesting.
Yes I have read it. Are you convinced by it? I think it is a brave attempt
but ultimately awful resolution. Eagleton, in his new book, ends by arguing
that the yardstick for any nascent social-theory is how it would fare when
confronted by Fascism. Eagleton argues that although, much contemporary
post-thingyism would do well on certain grounds ultimately it would fail,
and I agree.
>
>Lastly, a question back to you. What is it, do you think, that you have
>invested in this quick dismissal of the possibility of epistemic
>violence? That is, what is it do you think that made you want to say NO
>WAY instead of hmmm...this is interesting even if something bugs me
>about it. ? What do you think might be being protected here?
Nah, nah, nah. That simply won't do. I can now accuse you of the
anti-intellectualism that you so tritely threw at me. Just to set the record
straight. I have an article out in the Journal Millennium: Journal of
International Relations, (1996) entitled, 'Incommensurability and
Cross-Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: What's the
Frequency Kenneth?'.
The fact that I dismiss it arises because I have studied it, not out of some
gut reaction as you seem to suggest (not epistemic violence, but
incommensurability, which was the issue I objected to). Also, aren't you
alluding to some deeper meaning behind my post. Now that would be an
interesting paradox, would it not? Anyway, given the informal means of
communication between participantss on this list, you simply can't expect
everyone to give a 20,000 word treatise of why they reject, or accept,
certain positions. If this was the case we may as well all sign off now.
Cheers,
Hi, well at least we are talking, that in itself, I suppose, implies that
conversational exchange can get off the ground. As you say genres leak, they
are not hermetically sealed islands of "rightness". Hence these areas of
overlap provide fertile grounds on which to converse. You say the primary
question is what is epistemic violence? I have real problems here because as
far as I can see epistemology has nothing whatever to do with much of the
post-thingy discourse. Since epistemology is typically conceived of as the
'study of what grounds we have for believing the things we believe', and
insofar as much post-thingyism (not Derrida by the way) denies that such an
enterprise is possible, it constitutes a denial of epistemology not a
different one. If anything epistemic here is being used in a way that
Wittgenstein would find find laughable. That is, he would simply say that
'they are simply not playing cricket'. If you can tell me what, say,
Lyotard's epistemology is I would be grateful. To say it is relativist, by
the way, is not an answer.
>Several things. First, no, of course this is not simply a "you say
>tomAto and I say toAUto" approach to difference. It's simply the
>recognition that discourses follow different standards of linking to
>produce what then goes by the name of Knowledge.
Ah yes, but are you now suggesting that there are ways to translate between
these different discourses and hence reach tentative comparisons, or
claiming incommensurability al la Lyotard? One question implies the other.
>Second, I bring up Lyotard b/c the question was about epistemic
>violence, and that's his thang. But I really have a problem with your
>cavalier dismissal of anything he has to say b/c you have detected
>"unthematized foundationalism" in his work. You're KIDDING?
No, I am not suggesting anything of the kind. I myself am not against
dipping into the pools of Lyotardian wisdom (I wish I could think of a
better word but I simply can't). His early stuff, in particular, stands as a
robust critique of the linguistic reductionism he saw in much early
poststructuralist work. Later on he got bit weird, but hey, that's probably
to do with his advancing years (you should try talking to my gran).
Anyway, my point about Lyotard was specifically (this is a Foucault list
after all) related to the issue of incommensurability, and here his hidden
foundationalism does restrict how much sense we can give to his account of
it. That is, incommensurability only works for Lyotard because he has set
the "bedrock" at which he rests on the claim/belief/knowledge (see what I
mean about epistemology being slippery) that each discourse has its own
standards and this principle is _universal_. And yes, I suppose I do get
suspicious of people who say they are not foundationalist, humanists etc.
but who patently smuggle these terms in (Rorty is a prime example here).
I've read
>your posts to this list for a long time and am stunned by this
>anti-intellectual response. Heidegger's work ultimately put Being over
>the Other and led him into some of the most unethical territory ever (de
>Man has a similar story), but that doesn't suggest that we shouldn't
>read his work.
Now that is a very interesting question, and not only one about whether we
should read the work, because that of course is trivial. I have read
Lyotard, but reading is not the same as agreeing or utilising. For example,
is your claim about Heiddeger that his prioritising of Being over Other led
him into his ethical misadventures? If so that would seem to be a good
reason TO read him so as we can avoid similar errors. This is exactly the
same with my point about Lyotard, at least in relation to incommensurability.
:
>
>> does it simply function as an institutionalised assumption which
>> serves to butress your own theoretical/ideological account of the
>> world against criticism. 'It's my view and you commit epistemic
>> violence if you critise it from any discourse other than it'.
I put this question to you and it is quite straightforward. What concerns
you about it. I reject any strong form of the incommensurability thesis, but
then again so did Kuhn and Feyerabend. Not only because I think that
philosophically it is incoherent. But that ethically it is problematic. And
this not because I wish to reserve the right to interfere in other
discourses and point out where I consider they are going wrong, but because
I would defend the right of others to criticise the discourses I engage in.
The least those who deny the possibility of communication can do, someone
once said, is to 'shut up'.
>
>And third, Lyotard's primary example of epistemic violence in The
>Differend has to do with Auschwitz, and I would not consider that
>trivial. If you haven't read it, lemme know, and I'll rehearse what he's
>suggesting.
Yes I have read it. Are you convinced by it? I think it is a brave attempt
but ultimately awful resolution. Eagleton, in his new book, ends by arguing
that the yardstick for any nascent social-theory is how it would fare when
confronted by Fascism. Eagleton argues that although, much contemporary
post-thingyism would do well on certain grounds ultimately it would fail,
and I agree.
>
>Lastly, a question back to you. What is it, do you think, that you have
>invested in this quick dismissal of the possibility of epistemic
>violence? That is, what is it do you think that made you want to say NO
>WAY instead of hmmm...this is interesting even if something bugs me
>about it. ? What do you think might be being protected here?
Nah, nah, nah. That simply won't do. I can now accuse you of the
anti-intellectualism that you so tritely threw at me. Just to set the record
straight. I have an article out in the Journal Millennium: Journal of
International Relations, (1996) entitled, 'Incommensurability and
Cross-Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: What's the
Frequency Kenneth?'.
The fact that I dismiss it arises because I have studied it, not out of some
gut reaction as you seem to suggest (not epistemic violence, but
incommensurability, which was the issue I objected to). Also, aren't you
alluding to some deeper meaning behind my post. Now that would be an
interesting paradox, would it not? Anyway, given the informal means of
communication between participantss on this list, you simply can't expect
everyone to give a 20,000 word treatise of why they reject, or accept,
certain positions. If this was the case we may as well all sign off now.
Cheers,