In your message of 16:25 Apr 6 1997, you write:
> Blaine wrote:
>
> > I doubt that Foucault thinks it makes sense to consider what humans are
> > or are not, essentially, vis-a-vis morality. I don't think it's correct
> > to say that Foucault simply eschewed all talk of essentialism, but in
> > terms of moral essentialism, I think he wouldn't entertain any such
> > notions.
>
> I wouldn't defend my very dubious formulation about Foucault believing human
> beings were essentially "good"; but one reason why I left it in is that
> I think it is useful to distinguish between these kinds of beliefs and
> "essentialism". For example, a person's initial attitude towards others
> might be to assume that they have certain moral qualities. Now this does
> not mean that the person would support an effort to define the term "human",
> an inclusion in it of the possession of these qualitities, or a declaration
> that those who don't possess these qualities are somehow less human. What
> however is characteristic of the kind of belief I was referring to is that it
> is basically unfalsifiable -- that is, unaffected by disappointments.
> It is not really a "notion" that one "entertains"; rather, it is as if the
> attitude was part of the very fabric of one's being (and I speak very, very
> loosely here). And, lest somebody twist what I am saying to mean that,
> by ascribing to Foucault the "goodness" belief, I am pointing to
> an "inconsistency" or a "hypocrisy" in Foucault: nope. A refusal to engage
> in essentialism is not a denial that there are certain underlying attitudes
> to the way one conducts one's life; nor is it a denial that there may
> be a shared set of such attitudes; it is simply a refusal to engage in
> essentialism.
>
> -m
Well, Malgosia, if you are suggesting that Foucault felt deep-down that
humans are basically good, I suppose I'd have to say that I'd categorize
your belief as "basically unfalsifiable." I tried to offer some
evidence that this wasn't the case, but I suppose there's nothing extant
that could, strictly speaking, falsify your belief. I'm not sure where
that gets us, however....
Peace,
Blaine Rehkopf
Philosophy
York University
CANADA
--
> Blaine wrote:
>
> > I doubt that Foucault thinks it makes sense to consider what humans are
> > or are not, essentially, vis-a-vis morality. I don't think it's correct
> > to say that Foucault simply eschewed all talk of essentialism, but in
> > terms of moral essentialism, I think he wouldn't entertain any such
> > notions.
>
> I wouldn't defend my very dubious formulation about Foucault believing human
> beings were essentially "good"; but one reason why I left it in is that
> I think it is useful to distinguish between these kinds of beliefs and
> "essentialism". For example, a person's initial attitude towards others
> might be to assume that they have certain moral qualities. Now this does
> not mean that the person would support an effort to define the term "human",
> an inclusion in it of the possession of these qualitities, or a declaration
> that those who don't possess these qualities are somehow less human. What
> however is characteristic of the kind of belief I was referring to is that it
> is basically unfalsifiable -- that is, unaffected by disappointments.
> It is not really a "notion" that one "entertains"; rather, it is as if the
> attitude was part of the very fabric of one's being (and I speak very, very
> loosely here). And, lest somebody twist what I am saying to mean that,
> by ascribing to Foucault the "goodness" belief, I am pointing to
> an "inconsistency" or a "hypocrisy" in Foucault: nope. A refusal to engage
> in essentialism is not a denial that there are certain underlying attitudes
> to the way one conducts one's life; nor is it a denial that there may
> be a shared set of such attitudes; it is simply a refusal to engage in
> essentialism.
>
> -m
Well, Malgosia, if you are suggesting that Foucault felt deep-down that
humans are basically good, I suppose I'd have to say that I'd categorize
your belief as "basically unfalsifiable." I tried to offer some
evidence that this wasn't the case, but I suppose there's nothing extant
that could, strictly speaking, falsify your belief. I'm not sure where
that gets us, however....
Peace,
Blaine Rehkopf
Philosophy
York University
CANADA
--