> >The question I'm trying to ask, and apparently not doing it well, is how
> >one chooses what boundaries are worth transgressing (e.g., various
> >restrictive sexual moralities, rules I'm happy to see broken) and those
> >which aren't (e.g. random enucleation).
>
>
First of all, Foucault distinguishes morality from ethics. When he
talks about (something like) "experimenting on oneself" he is talking
about the latter (rapport a soi), not the former. He does not say,
"experiment on others." More importantly, the idea of "experiment" in
Foucault is explicitly (and repeatedly) characterized by him as an
alternative to ethical (or political) projects which are "global" or
"total." If he is to be criticized here, it is from the opposite point
of view from the one underlying the above-quoted 'question.' In a
way, the idea of "experimentation" in Foucault is a critique of
radicalism, not moralism or conformism.
In any case, the question of "how one chooses what boundaries are
worth transgressing" is not a difficult one for Foucault. One
examines the situation, possibly deliberates, weighs the pros and cons
of one course of action or another, perhaps discusses it with others,
and finally makes a choice (or delays, and chooses later). Having
done so, one checks to see whether the outcome of the choice was
desirable or undesirable, or a little of both. Presumably one
thereafter takes the experience into account. (I assume that one is
taking the trouble to choose, whereas usually one acts according to
habit).
Nothing innovative here. Foucault's innovation in ethics, if there is
one (which there isn't), is to say: there is no piece of information
about human beings (their purpose, their genes, what is normal among
them, what aids their survival, what makes them happy, what they
desire deep down) that can settle the ethical -- or moral, or
political -- questions that arise in their lives. This is because, he
says, "the self is not given," which Foucault calls "Sartre's
theoretical insight." From this premise, he concludes: we must
create our selves "as works of art."
What do artists do? They make judgements, of course. One hopes that
their important ones are made after studying "the masters" (on some
_judgement_ of who these are), and after considerable practice
(experiment?), and in light of an appreciation of the accomplishments
embodied in certain provisionally authoritative exemplars. In the
best cases, their judgements are informed by exceptional imagination
and sensitivity. Either way, artists must make judgements.
But, then, others also judge. Critics or art historians or visitors
to a museum all make judgements. There are good artists and bad
artists, according to these judgements.
Likewise, there are people who live in ways that, on consideration, I
take to be cases of good living. And there are those who live in ways
that, on reflection (or before it), I judge to be repugnant or, more
often, mediocre.
If I (or Foucault) tell you that for any judge there will be other
judges who disagree, will you be surprised?!
But that doesn't mean that I'm going to buy a black velvet Elvis
painting! On the contrary, it means that I will aspire to judge well.
Steve D'Arcy
University of Toronto
Department of Philosophy
> >one chooses what boundaries are worth transgressing (e.g., various
> >restrictive sexual moralities, rules I'm happy to see broken) and those
> >which aren't (e.g. random enucleation).
>
>
First of all, Foucault distinguishes morality from ethics. When he
talks about (something like) "experimenting on oneself" he is talking
about the latter (rapport a soi), not the former. He does not say,
"experiment on others." More importantly, the idea of "experiment" in
Foucault is explicitly (and repeatedly) characterized by him as an
alternative to ethical (or political) projects which are "global" or
"total." If he is to be criticized here, it is from the opposite point
of view from the one underlying the above-quoted 'question.' In a
way, the idea of "experimentation" in Foucault is a critique of
radicalism, not moralism or conformism.
In any case, the question of "how one chooses what boundaries are
worth transgressing" is not a difficult one for Foucault. One
examines the situation, possibly deliberates, weighs the pros and cons
of one course of action or another, perhaps discusses it with others,
and finally makes a choice (or delays, and chooses later). Having
done so, one checks to see whether the outcome of the choice was
desirable or undesirable, or a little of both. Presumably one
thereafter takes the experience into account. (I assume that one is
taking the trouble to choose, whereas usually one acts according to
habit).
Nothing innovative here. Foucault's innovation in ethics, if there is
one (which there isn't), is to say: there is no piece of information
about human beings (their purpose, their genes, what is normal among
them, what aids their survival, what makes them happy, what they
desire deep down) that can settle the ethical -- or moral, or
political -- questions that arise in their lives. This is because, he
says, "the self is not given," which Foucault calls "Sartre's
theoretical insight." From this premise, he concludes: we must
create our selves "as works of art."
What do artists do? They make judgements, of course. One hopes that
their important ones are made after studying "the masters" (on some
_judgement_ of who these are), and after considerable practice
(experiment?), and in light of an appreciation of the accomplishments
embodied in certain provisionally authoritative exemplars. In the
best cases, their judgements are informed by exceptional imagination
and sensitivity. Either way, artists must make judgements.
But, then, others also judge. Critics or art historians or visitors
to a museum all make judgements. There are good artists and bad
artists, according to these judgements.
Likewise, there are people who live in ways that, on consideration, I
take to be cases of good living. And there are those who live in ways
that, on reflection (or before it), I judge to be repugnant or, more
often, mediocre.
If I (or Foucault) tell you that for any judge there will be other
judges who disagree, will you be surprised?!
But that doesn't mean that I'm going to buy a black velvet Elvis
painting! On the contrary, it means that I will aspire to judge well.
Steve D'Arcy
University of Toronto
Department of Philosophy