On Fri, 11 Apr 1997, COLIN WIGHT wrote:
> Ammar wrote:
>
> >As has been already mentioned F. is opposed to the concept of
> >human nature where it is seen as something that "has been concealed,
> >alienated or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression".
>
> This is where Doug's point from long ago gets its force. For this reading of
> Foucault totally neglects Foucault#s claim that his whole project has be to
> examine the way human beings are made subjects. An implicit, or explicit
> humanism, dare I suggest? Albeit unthematised.
>
>
But why does it have to be thematized? The train of thought seems to be:
"Here is Foucault talking about the ways human beings are made subjects.
And here are the ways in which those subjects are em- or disempowered by
these constitutions. F, in particular, dislikes the disempowering kinds of
subjectivity. I, as a humanist, do not like disempowering kinds of
subjectivity either -- and so why doesn't F thematize things the way I
do?"
But what's the requirement? What is it that is supposed to be
intellectually dishonest or unsatisfying about someone talking about
disempowering forms of subjectivity without going on to sing a pretty
little tune about man as the measure of all things (or whatever tune one
chooses to insert here)?
Bob and Tom dislike disempowering forms of subjectivity. Bob doesn't like
them because he's a big fan of renaissance humanism and thinks that such
forms of subjectivity keep human beings from realizing the humanist ideal
of a fully-empowered, self-conscious, free, rational being.
Tom dislikes disempowering forms of subjectivity because they keep him
>from doing things he wants to do. Disciplines, F says, enhance the power
of individuals and groups as productive entities while reducing them as a
political force. And Tom dislikes these disciplines because they keep him
>from participating in activities (such as political ones) he is interested
in pursuing.
Bob and Tom meet at a bar. Bob listens to Tom talk about how disciplines
suck. Bob agrees wholeheartedly, and suggests they drink a toast
(Wittgensteinian daquiri) to the humanist ideal so rudely abused by modern
forms of power. Tom hesitates, and indicates that he doesn't think he has
this positive vision of what human beings *should* be in some abstract
way--he just wants to get away from some of the disempowering effects of
the disciplines and do some of the things they keep him from doing. They
end up in a big argument. Bob cannot understand why Tom doesn't "finish
the thought" about what's wrong with disciplines by pointing to an ideal
of the human personality. Bob accuses Tom of an unthematized humanism.
I'm on Tom's side. Tom's opposition to disciplines is perfectly coherent.
It does not logically require the move to humanism as Bob thinks it does.
--John
> Ammar wrote:
>
> >As has been already mentioned F. is opposed to the concept of
> >human nature where it is seen as something that "has been concealed,
> >alienated or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression".
>
> This is where Doug's point from long ago gets its force. For this reading of
> Foucault totally neglects Foucault#s claim that his whole project has be to
> examine the way human beings are made subjects. An implicit, or explicit
> humanism, dare I suggest? Albeit unthematised.
>
>
But why does it have to be thematized? The train of thought seems to be:
"Here is Foucault talking about the ways human beings are made subjects.
And here are the ways in which those subjects are em- or disempowered by
these constitutions. F, in particular, dislikes the disempowering kinds of
subjectivity. I, as a humanist, do not like disempowering kinds of
subjectivity either -- and so why doesn't F thematize things the way I
do?"
But what's the requirement? What is it that is supposed to be
intellectually dishonest or unsatisfying about someone talking about
disempowering forms of subjectivity without going on to sing a pretty
little tune about man as the measure of all things (or whatever tune one
chooses to insert here)?
Bob and Tom dislike disempowering forms of subjectivity. Bob doesn't like
them because he's a big fan of renaissance humanism and thinks that such
forms of subjectivity keep human beings from realizing the humanist ideal
of a fully-empowered, self-conscious, free, rational being.
Tom dislikes disempowering forms of subjectivity because they keep him
>from doing things he wants to do. Disciplines, F says, enhance the power
of individuals and groups as productive entities while reducing them as a
political force. And Tom dislikes these disciplines because they keep him
>from participating in activities (such as political ones) he is interested
in pursuing.
Bob and Tom meet at a bar. Bob listens to Tom talk about how disciplines
suck. Bob agrees wholeheartedly, and suggests they drink a toast
(Wittgensteinian daquiri) to the humanist ideal so rudely abused by modern
forms of power. Tom hesitates, and indicates that he doesn't think he has
this positive vision of what human beings *should* be in some abstract
way--he just wants to get away from some of the disempowering effects of
the disciplines and do some of the things they keep him from doing. They
end up in a big argument. Bob cannot understand why Tom doesn't "finish
the thought" about what's wrong with disciplines by pointing to an ideal
of the human personality. Bob accuses Tom of an unthematized humanism.
I'm on Tom's side. Tom's opposition to disciplines is perfectly coherent.
It does not logically require the move to humanism as Bob thinks it does.
--John