>> One of the most often cited charges against Foucault is that his
>> work is neo-conservative.
>
>the basis for this critique seems to rest on a 'if not x, then must
>be y' sort of logic. the abandonment of positivism is seen as the
>abandonment of all critical thought for if the 'centre' doesn't hold
>then nothing must. the abandonment of moral universalism is seen as
>the abandonment of morality in general.
No it's not actually. The choices are not dogmatic certainty nor dogmatic
uncertainty. I can accept that we can only know the world through our
descriptions of it and also that we can not step outside of our decriptions
to see how they match up to the world. But this does not mean that all
descriptions are equally good, and we can decide between competing
description, not always of course, but at least the possibilty exists. For
example, even Hume the arch sceptic, recognised that when all dismissals of
a mind-independent reality cease, the sceptic will still leave the seminar
room by the door and not the second floor window. We come to know the world
in virtue of our language not in spite of it.
>
>'postmodern culture with its decentred subject can be the space
>where ties are severed or it can provide the occasion for _new and
>varied forms of bonding_. To some extent, ruptures, surfaces,
>contextuality and a host of other happenings create gaps that make
>space for oppositional practices which no longer require
>intellectuals to be confined to narrow separate spheres with no
>meaningful connection to the world of the everyday...a space is
>there for _critical exchange_...'
I don't have a problem with this. However, the dogmatic assertion (which I
am not suggesting that you are advocating) that such spaces are a priori
valuable is as dangerous as the dogmatic assertion that we know everything.
Look, let me be clear, one of the things that most gets to me about
post-whaterism, is the manner in which its advocates simply refuse to
countenance any critique of their own position. This is doubly ironic when
it is they that argue that everything is open to critique. Well yes, I
agree, but surely this should include the tools of that critique. Whenever,
i try to engage such people i get "hurt feelings", claims of "epistemic
violence" and claims that "this has nothing to do with X". These, to my
critical eyes, are devices used to avoid the issue. This makes me suspicious.
foucault's system (not
>foucault personally, because although he didn't love animals, i'm
>think he loved young boys...) is not meant to be an unconditional
>acceptance of moral relativism, a position which foucault admits
>would be equally as totalising as moral universalism.
Good, then we agree, but I still push the point: if unconditional acceptance
of moral relativism is to be rejected, Why?
>'but if you claim you are opening up a radical interrogation, if you
>wish to place your discourse at the level at which we place
>ourselves, you know very well that it will enter our game, and in
>turn, extend the dimension that is trying to free itself from.
>either it does not reach us or we claim it. I admit this question
>embarrasses me more than your earlier objections. i am not entirely
>suprised by it; but i would prefer to leave it in suspense a little
>longer. this is because, for the moment, and as in far as I can see,
>my discourse, far from determining the locus in which it speaks, is
>avoiding the ground on which it could find support...it is trying to
>deploy a dispersion that can never be reduced to a single system of
>differences...' (Arch of Knldg)
>
Well I am glad someone raised this. Because, consider. think for a moment if
the question had been about whether Foucault would silence the Nazi's? What
is his reply: He wants to leave it in suspense a little longer, the Nazis,
of course, would agree, 'don't ask us we will show you, it will be alright
on the night!'. Also, the very possibility of avoiding the ground from which
he could speak is highly supsect since he is indeed speaking. And this is
only possible if a whole host of metaphysical speculations have been put on
hold (which he admits) and into which it is perfectly admissable to inquire.
>foucault ironically recognises this paradox in his work. i think to
>rip away the tightrope between postmodern thought and positivism is
>to abandon critical inquiry into issues such as _them nasty
>cyber-nazis_. foucault isn't asking for positivist categories,
>identities, methods, to be wiped theoretically away, that would be
>naive given that they ontologically still exist for the majority of
>people (this is something baudrillard seems to enjoy ignoring).
>ultimately he is questioning their construction, not reducing them
>to mere constructions.
Okay, given this reading I can go along with you so far. Still, is anything
and everything a construct? if so the ethical problem merely reemerges a
level further down. If not then what seems to me to be a legit question.
>
>as for _them nasty cyber-nazis_, they exist in 'reality'. but they
>are also visions, conceptions, constructions to a certain extent.
Not so, one has to deal with matters of perspective here. Some time ago a
group of people went adventuring from Europe. They landed on a far away
shore where the inhabitants constructed them as Gods. Unfortunately, them
there Gods were actually Humans intent on conquest, and no amount of
construction of them as Gods made them benevolent (unless of course you want
to argue that they simply gave the indegenious people an early ticket to the
promised land).
Yes, we do construct images of Nazis etc and these images shape our
understanding and form the vast majority of our social being, no one denies
this. but those images and constructions do not exhaust the reality (no
scare quotes) of our existence. We cannot just construct people intent on
violence as nice people. However nice such a prospect might sound.
. foucualt's method of questioning how these issues are
>presented to us and how power is tied in with how we view things is
>indispensible for traversing these issues.
Well, yes, but there is nothing new in this formulation. We have known this
since the ancient Greeks. This is not BTW an arguemnt against Foucault. I
accept that there are many valuable ways to get to the same point. And just
cos the Greeks told us does not mean that we do not need to be reminded. My
argument is when this insight is presented as some major discovery by
Foucault that no one else gives us. I mean, after all, the Power/knowledge
nexus was elaborated by Bacon long before Foucault reminded us.
>
>certain people on the list repeatedly say _silence, silence,
>silence_ as if it is the only option. is silencing going to solve
>the problem or is it a quick solution for more fundamental racial
>and class dynamics?
I love that last phrase BTW. Class dynamics.
no one seems to be wanting to ask or answer
>these questions, its much easier to just say 'silence'.
Yiou might want to reflect on this point vis-a-vis the Foucault quote you
used above, which to me did seem to be advocating just such a silence -
something we pass over?
Which is precisely why I will continue to play this role, despite Murray's
claims that they have been comprehensively answered.
Thanks,
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Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
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