On Tue, 20 May 1997, malgosia askanas wrote:
> But also, if you force the question into a mental universe where the
> concept of "intellectual" is counter-posited against the concept of "mob",
> then you're dooming all possibilities of fruitful discussion of the
> role of intellectuals, because one is compelled to start by protesting
> this concept of "mob" and as soon as one starts to protest, one is
> immediately protesting too much. It is quite possible that the concept
> of "intellectual" is always already, as soon as it is posited as a separate
> social function, thusly doomed. In which case there is no point in faulting
> specific intellectuals for not being able to transcend this doomedness.
> All one can do is fault them, if one indeed wants to fault, for being
> intellectuals in the existing society. Are you prepared to do that?
> Me, I certainly am not. There is much too much I owe to intellectuals.
May I recommend in this regard the little essay "Resignation" by Adorno,
which appears as Chapter nine of Adorno, _The culture industry: Selected
essays on mass culture_ (Routledge, 1991; ed. by J.M. Bernstein). It
begins as follows:
We older representatives of that for which the name Frankfurt
School has established itself have recently had the reproach
of resignation levelled against us. We had, it is stated,
developed elements of a critical theory of society, but we
were not prepared to draw the practical consequences from
this theory. We neither designed programmes for action
nor did we support the actions of those who felt themselves
inspired by critical theory. I shall sidestep the question
whether this demand can be made at all upon theoretical
thinkers who always remain to a certain degree sensitive
and by no means unshakable instruments. The task assigned
such individuals within a society characterized by the
division of labor might indeed be questionable; they
themselves might well be deformed by it. But they have also
been formed by it. And there is no way in which they can
repeal that which they have become merely through an act
of their own will . . . . The objection raised against us
can be stated approximately in these words; a person who
in the present hour doubts the possibility of radical
change in society and who for that reason neither takes
part in nor recommends spectacular violent action is
guilty of resignation. He does not consider the vision of
change which he once held capable of realization; indeed,
he actually had no true desire to see it realized in the
first place. In leaving conditions as they are, he offers his
tacit approval of them.
Distance from praxis is disreputable in the eyes of
everyone. Anyone who does not take immediate action and who
is not willing to get his hands dirty is the subject of
suspicion; it is felt that his antipathy toward such action
was not legitimate, and further that his view has even
been distorted by the privileges he enjoys. Distrust of
those who distrust praxis extends from those on the
opposite side, who repeat the old slogan, 'We've had enough
of talking' all the way to the objective spirit of
advertising, which propagates the picture . . . of the
actively involved human being, no matter whether his
activity lies in the realm of economics or athletics. One
should take part. Whoever restricts himself to thinking
but does not get involved is weak, cowardly, and
virtually a traitor. (pp. 171-172 of _Culture industry_)
There's also some great stuff in Adorno's _Minima Moralia_ concerning the
role of intellectuals.
--John
> But also, if you force the question into a mental universe where the
> concept of "intellectual" is counter-posited against the concept of "mob",
> then you're dooming all possibilities of fruitful discussion of the
> role of intellectuals, because one is compelled to start by protesting
> this concept of "mob" and as soon as one starts to protest, one is
> immediately protesting too much. It is quite possible that the concept
> of "intellectual" is always already, as soon as it is posited as a separate
> social function, thusly doomed. In which case there is no point in faulting
> specific intellectuals for not being able to transcend this doomedness.
> All one can do is fault them, if one indeed wants to fault, for being
> intellectuals in the existing society. Are you prepared to do that?
> Me, I certainly am not. There is much too much I owe to intellectuals.
May I recommend in this regard the little essay "Resignation" by Adorno,
which appears as Chapter nine of Adorno, _The culture industry: Selected
essays on mass culture_ (Routledge, 1991; ed. by J.M. Bernstein). It
begins as follows:
We older representatives of that for which the name Frankfurt
School has established itself have recently had the reproach
of resignation levelled against us. We had, it is stated,
developed elements of a critical theory of society, but we
were not prepared to draw the practical consequences from
this theory. We neither designed programmes for action
nor did we support the actions of those who felt themselves
inspired by critical theory. I shall sidestep the question
whether this demand can be made at all upon theoretical
thinkers who always remain to a certain degree sensitive
and by no means unshakable instruments. The task assigned
such individuals within a society characterized by the
division of labor might indeed be questionable; they
themselves might well be deformed by it. But they have also
been formed by it. And there is no way in which they can
repeal that which they have become merely through an act
of their own will . . . . The objection raised against us
can be stated approximately in these words; a person who
in the present hour doubts the possibility of radical
change in society and who for that reason neither takes
part in nor recommends spectacular violent action is
guilty of resignation. He does not consider the vision of
change which he once held capable of realization; indeed,
he actually had no true desire to see it realized in the
first place. In leaving conditions as they are, he offers his
tacit approval of them.
Distance from praxis is disreputable in the eyes of
everyone. Anyone who does not take immediate action and who
is not willing to get his hands dirty is the subject of
suspicion; it is felt that his antipathy toward such action
was not legitimate, and further that his view has even
been distorted by the privileges he enjoys. Distrust of
those who distrust praxis extends from those on the
opposite side, who repeat the old slogan, 'We've had enough
of talking' all the way to the objective spirit of
advertising, which propagates the picture . . . of the
actively involved human being, no matter whether his
activity lies in the realm of economics or athletics. One
should take part. Whoever restricts himself to thinking
but does not get involved is weak, cowardly, and
virtually a traitor. (pp. 171-172 of _Culture industry_)
There's also some great stuff in Adorno's _Minima Moralia_ concerning the
role of intellectuals.
--John