On Tue, 27 May 1997, COLIN WIGHT wrote:
> Miles,
>
> Thanks for taking the time to reply.
>
>
> >
> >Yes, this whole topic can invite ontological questions--if you're a
> >philosopher of ontology!
>
> No, that is precisely my point Foucault can't help positing an ontology.
> What work it does, how it functions and what are it's limits are all vital
> questions. Equally, the social world contains social objects and beliefs and
> about those objects and beliefs about those beliefs, and the relationship
> between social objects and the beliefs about those objects is crucial in
> understanding how discourses function, as anybody in Britain during the
> 80's, who thought about unemployment will attest to: that is, (i)
> unemployment is the result of fecklessness; or, (ii) unemployment is the
> result of structural conditions. Which discourse is the better description
> cannot be understood independent of the discourse ontology (unemployment)?
I don't understand. Both social objects and beliefs about those social
objects are -- to be redundant -- socially produced, vero?
> To tell me only that there was a discourse of unemployment being the result
> of fecklessness, is simply to tell me what I already know. If you want to
> tell me how such a discourse functions one can't help but to refer to the
> ontological object (unemployment). The belief that you need not concern
> yourself with ontology is itself ontological and that Foucualtians tend to
> deal with an ontology of discourses does indeed lead to the charge of
> discursive idealism.
Unemployment's not an ontological object! It's a social category! And of
course there isn't any brute fact of unemployment anywhere out there.
Indeed, the attempt to objectively label such phenomena is itself
ideological; a decidedly ontic activity. What if instead of "unemployment"
we called it "surplus labor"?
On a separate point: it may be true that the belief one need not concern
oneself with ontology is itself ontological, but it does not follow from
that that everyone must do or does do ontology.
>
>
>
> >Whe (If you have a hammer, everything looks like
> >a nail, I'd say.) Look, my deity argument works with AIDS too. In order
> >for the statement "AIDS is caused by HIV" to function as a truth
> >statement in any society, there have to be discursive practices and
> >related nondiscursive practices in place: medical research, popular and
> >academic reports, etc.
>
> Yes.
>
> Perhaps the effects of HIV are independent of
> >our research, but the truth that HIV causes AIDS can only socially
> >function as a truth if it is embedded in discursive and related non-
> >discursive activity.
>
> Absolutely incorrect. The truth of the HIV virus causing AIDS, is
> independent of our discourse of such a link, as Foucault found out to his
> cost. You seem to be regularly confusing epistemological statements (our
> belief that HIV causes AIDS) with ontology (whether HIV does indeed cause
> AIDS). This distinction is vital because we could be wrong about this link;
> that is HIV may not cause AIDS, irrespective of our discourses that it does.
> I don't see how you maintain fallibilty without ontology. After all, if our
> discourses aren't about something then what is there to be wrong about?
Discourses are about things. They're just not about ontological things.
Also, please notice how you rephrased Miles' comment in order to turn it
into a strawman argument. Miles says:
> >the truth that HIV causes AIDS can only socially
> >function as a truth if it is embedded in discursive and related non-
> >discursive activity.
and then you say:
> The truth of the HIV virus causing AIDS, is
> independent of our discourse of such a link, as Foucault found out to
> his cost.
But Miles doesn't say that "the truth of the HIV virus causing AIDS is
independent of our discourse of such a link," does he?
>
> A Foucauldian analysis uncovers this social
> >activity.
>
> Well maybe, but so does Marx, Mannheim, Machivelli.....
>
> >
> >There is only a "serious aporia" here if you demand that social analysis
> >should uncover the ontological strata beneath social practices and
> >language. That is simply not necessary, as sociologists of religion
> >have quite clearly demonstrated.
>
> But religion deals in things that only have an effect if they are believed.
> Medical things "care", amongst others, little whether they are believed or
> not. Religous entities, and not wanting to upset anyone, are wholly social
> constructed, diseases may not be.
So you disagree with Rousseau on this point. That's cool. But what would
you say about Attention Deficit Disorder? How about Bulimia? Alcoholism? I
would say these medical things care quite a bit whether they are believed
or not.
>
>
> >
> >If anywhere, the aporia is in the conventional materialist account:
> >as if the production of scientific truth does not require human activity
> >and discourse!
>
> Sorry, can you run that by me again? What in a materialist account demands
> such an absurdity? This is a straw figure socially constructed to take easy
> pot shots at.
Wouldn't you agree that there is no such thing as truth independent of
human cognition? Truth, in general, is a human construct, right? There is
no truth outside of a human being saying, "This is true," is there? "It is
true that my cat sleeps fourteen hours a day." If no humans were
around, however, it wouldn't be "true" that the cat slept fourteen hours a
day, simply because truth is a strictly human convention that is not
found in the minds or beings of any other creature or object. Without
humans around, my cat would sleep fourteen hours a day but it wouldn't be
"true" that my cat slept fourteen hours a day, simply because without
humans "truth" has no being -- has no "referent" if you like.
--John
> Miles,
>
> Thanks for taking the time to reply.
>
>
> >
> >Yes, this whole topic can invite ontological questions--if you're a
> >philosopher of ontology!
>
> No, that is precisely my point Foucault can't help positing an ontology.
> What work it does, how it functions and what are it's limits are all vital
> questions. Equally, the social world contains social objects and beliefs and
> about those objects and beliefs about those beliefs, and the relationship
> between social objects and the beliefs about those objects is crucial in
> understanding how discourses function, as anybody in Britain during the
> 80's, who thought about unemployment will attest to: that is, (i)
> unemployment is the result of fecklessness; or, (ii) unemployment is the
> result of structural conditions. Which discourse is the better description
> cannot be understood independent of the discourse ontology (unemployment)?
I don't understand. Both social objects and beliefs about those social
objects are -- to be redundant -- socially produced, vero?
> To tell me only that there was a discourse of unemployment being the result
> of fecklessness, is simply to tell me what I already know. If you want to
> tell me how such a discourse functions one can't help but to refer to the
> ontological object (unemployment). The belief that you need not concern
> yourself with ontology is itself ontological and that Foucualtians tend to
> deal with an ontology of discourses does indeed lead to the charge of
> discursive idealism.
Unemployment's not an ontological object! It's a social category! And of
course there isn't any brute fact of unemployment anywhere out there.
Indeed, the attempt to objectively label such phenomena is itself
ideological; a decidedly ontic activity. What if instead of "unemployment"
we called it "surplus labor"?
On a separate point: it may be true that the belief one need not concern
oneself with ontology is itself ontological, but it does not follow from
that that everyone must do or does do ontology.
>
>
>
> >Whe (If you have a hammer, everything looks like
> >a nail, I'd say.) Look, my deity argument works with AIDS too. In order
> >for the statement "AIDS is caused by HIV" to function as a truth
> >statement in any society, there have to be discursive practices and
> >related nondiscursive practices in place: medical research, popular and
> >academic reports, etc.
>
> Yes.
>
> Perhaps the effects of HIV are independent of
> >our research, but the truth that HIV causes AIDS can only socially
> >function as a truth if it is embedded in discursive and related non-
> >discursive activity.
>
> Absolutely incorrect. The truth of the HIV virus causing AIDS, is
> independent of our discourse of such a link, as Foucault found out to his
> cost. You seem to be regularly confusing epistemological statements (our
> belief that HIV causes AIDS) with ontology (whether HIV does indeed cause
> AIDS). This distinction is vital because we could be wrong about this link;
> that is HIV may not cause AIDS, irrespective of our discourses that it does.
> I don't see how you maintain fallibilty without ontology. After all, if our
> discourses aren't about something then what is there to be wrong about?
Discourses are about things. They're just not about ontological things.
Also, please notice how you rephrased Miles' comment in order to turn it
into a strawman argument. Miles says:
> >the truth that HIV causes AIDS can only socially
> >function as a truth if it is embedded in discursive and related non-
> >discursive activity.
and then you say:
> The truth of the HIV virus causing AIDS, is
> independent of our discourse of such a link, as Foucault found out to
> his cost.
But Miles doesn't say that "the truth of the HIV virus causing AIDS is
independent of our discourse of such a link," does he?
>
> A Foucauldian analysis uncovers this social
> >activity.
>
> Well maybe, but so does Marx, Mannheim, Machivelli.....
>
> >
> >There is only a "serious aporia" here if you demand that social analysis
> >should uncover the ontological strata beneath social practices and
> >language. That is simply not necessary, as sociologists of religion
> >have quite clearly demonstrated.
>
> But religion deals in things that only have an effect if they are believed.
> Medical things "care", amongst others, little whether they are believed or
> not. Religous entities, and not wanting to upset anyone, are wholly social
> constructed, diseases may not be.
So you disagree with Rousseau on this point. That's cool. But what would
you say about Attention Deficit Disorder? How about Bulimia? Alcoholism? I
would say these medical things care quite a bit whether they are believed
or not.
>
>
> >
> >If anywhere, the aporia is in the conventional materialist account:
> >as if the production of scientific truth does not require human activity
> >and discourse!
>
> Sorry, can you run that by me again? What in a materialist account demands
> such an absurdity? This is a straw figure socially constructed to take easy
> pot shots at.
Wouldn't you agree that there is no such thing as truth independent of
human cognition? Truth, in general, is a human construct, right? There is
no truth outside of a human being saying, "This is true," is there? "It is
true that my cat sleeps fourteen hours a day." If no humans were
around, however, it wouldn't be "true" that the cat slept fourteen hours a
day, simply because truth is a strictly human convention that is not
found in the minds or beings of any other creature or object. Without
humans around, my cat would sleep fourteen hours a day but it wouldn't be
"true" that my cat slept fourteen hours a day, simply because without
humans "truth" has no being -- has no "referent" if you like.
--John