Ok, still re normativity and power ...
John wrote:
> But to be normative, normative criteria have to have a fundamental basis,
> don't they? Or at least don't they have to be grounded in this way when
> we're talking about redeeming validity claims when it comes to morality?
>From my understanding of this, yes. Although of course this grounding can
be intersubjective re social agreement rather than "physical fact".
> > I'm sorry to ask this obvious and maybe tedious question but what do you
> > mean by "bad" in your phrase?
>
> By "bad" I mean an exercise or kind of power that diminishes human
> potential and/or violates agreements. But it seems to me it is authors
> like Fraser who want to retain this distinction between good and bad forms
> of power -- though of course we're just talking, and the casual terms
> "good and bad" are inadequate to the task at hand!
Well, OKish I guess.
Violates agreements? Interesting. On what basis then are the agreements
made?
And what does human potential mean without a subject? (I guess I should
read your book!), although I'm beginning to feel that Foucault's toolbox,
although fine for crafting interesting descriptions of social systems,
doesn't contain the tools necessary for criticism and construction of
better (fairer?) alternatives.
> I'm not sure he's trying to say something about goodness/badness. For
> instance, in _Discipline and Punish_, he's not saying that disciplines are
> bad, is he? Instead, he's saying: "Look at this incredibly productive form
> of power that has been effectively missed by an over-emphasis on more
> familiar and more easily identified sovereign forms of power."
Yeh, fair enough.
> > BUT, doesn't it then make it more difficult for the relatively powerless
> > to produce persuasive arguments for change? The making of distinctions is
> > a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for making arguments for
> > change, isn't it?
>
> I don't see how it makes it more difficult. You're right, "distinctions"
> by themselves are informative merely and cannot by themselves persuade us
> to act. But neither is it necessary for action that a set of distinctions
> be accompanied by a fully worked out and universally applicable set of
> norms. To move beyond mere distinctions the workers on an assembly line
> need not ground their opposition to the way they're treated in a universal
> ethic of treating others as ends not means. Instead, they can just say
> "this may be helping you (the factory owner), but it's not helping us (the
> workers)!"
But, there are more options than:
1) a "fully worked out and universally applicable set of norms"
or
2) No normative framework
aren't there?
So, the workers say "this may be helping you, but it's not helping us" -
(aren't they saying this is wrong or unfair?) - and the factory owner who
has more power/domination, or is more able to control the flows of power,
sacks them or worse. The workers then don't even have a decent argument to
persuade others to support their cause. In non-Foucauldian terms, the
powerful remain powerful.
hmmm ... i don't see that Foucault provides a way round this. Perhaps he
never tried to.
later,
alan
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Dr. Alan C. Hudson
University Assistant Lecturer
and
IB Director of Studies at Fitzwilliam College
Department of Geography, and Fitzwilliam College,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
CB2 3EN, CB3 0DG,
United Kingdom. United Kingdom.
Tel: + 44 (0) 1223 333364 (Department - Direct line)
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