I appreciate Alexander's patience and forebearance in my delay at
responding to his response. My schedule does not allow me to devote as
much time as I would like towards my philosophical interests, but I attempt
to do what I can whenever possible. I have also attempted to carefully
think through how I would approach this, I really do appreciate his
response to my comments, they have brought to question some of the inherent
assumptions in my language.
He wrote:
> "power...is and (sic) [an] understanding of the way people in society
> understand things in general around them."
>
> I wonder if he and others would care to illuminate ....
>
> 1. what is this process of "understanding"? to leave it as such is
vague,
> _I_ don't understand.... I think power functions based on certain
> understandings and conceptions, sure, but I don't see how it "is [an]
> understanding"....are we witness some conflation here?
Understanding is a way whereby people within a given social framework see
the "reality" of a world. As with Heidegger, Foucault wrote (someone
correct me if I am wrong) that our way of knowing things around us stems
from the way language is used (for language, forms the words we use when we
think or attempt to make sense of things) governing the way a given set of
societal practices operate and develop. It is almost as if, and I say this
loosely, that he believes in a sort of societal subjectiveness, perhaps for
what is termed "the west" a western subjectiveness. I feel that too many
people fail to comprehend this basic point. Which is why I find it
difficult to accept Alexander's use of the Random house dictionary in order
to define power. He wrote:
> Random House College defines power as:
>
> 1. ability to do or act; capability of doing or accomplishing something.
> .... 3. great or marked ability to do or act; strength; might; force....
6.
> legal ability, capacity, or authority...
>
> So to me power seems rooted in the ability to do, not just the doing
itself,
> even though the doing (i.e. process) (re)informs and constructs the
ability
> to do - in other words it is a recursive relationship.
He does not realize the ability to do is grounded in the condition of the
possibility of doing. In other words, doing something is only possible if
the common language, ie. thought, ie. practices, have laid the groundwork
for doing whatever is to be done.
However, his use of Random House is also instructive. It is in such
terminology that the vast majority of people understand power today. Many
people are stuck using the language of the moderns and their determination
to find metaphysical meanings. The "capability of doing or accomplishing
something" implies there is some final end we are attempting to achieve.
This is also true of words such as "legal ability, capacity, or authority."
Foucault looked at such descriptions as outcomes to a history of
practices. They are the present "end" in a flowing linguistic dynamic
which remains in motion. Where did "legal ability" receive its present
understanding? Why is "authority" understood today as such?
--I need to close for now, however, I intend further respond to a few more
things Alexander wrote later. I hope this answers a few of his questions
though.
All the best,
Jon Eskelsen
responding to his response. My schedule does not allow me to devote as
much time as I would like towards my philosophical interests, but I attempt
to do what I can whenever possible. I have also attempted to carefully
think through how I would approach this, I really do appreciate his
response to my comments, they have brought to question some of the inherent
assumptions in my language.
He wrote:
> "power...is and (sic) [an] understanding of the way people in society
> understand things in general around them."
>
> I wonder if he and others would care to illuminate ....
>
> 1. what is this process of "understanding"? to leave it as such is
vague,
> _I_ don't understand.... I think power functions based on certain
> understandings and conceptions, sure, but I don't see how it "is [an]
> understanding"....are we witness some conflation here?
Understanding is a way whereby people within a given social framework see
the "reality" of a world. As with Heidegger, Foucault wrote (someone
correct me if I am wrong) that our way of knowing things around us stems
from the way language is used (for language, forms the words we use when we
think or attempt to make sense of things) governing the way a given set of
societal practices operate and develop. It is almost as if, and I say this
loosely, that he believes in a sort of societal subjectiveness, perhaps for
what is termed "the west" a western subjectiveness. I feel that too many
people fail to comprehend this basic point. Which is why I find it
difficult to accept Alexander's use of the Random house dictionary in order
to define power. He wrote:
> Random House College defines power as:
>
> 1. ability to do or act; capability of doing or accomplishing something.
> .... 3. great or marked ability to do or act; strength; might; force....
6.
> legal ability, capacity, or authority...
>
> So to me power seems rooted in the ability to do, not just the doing
itself,
> even though the doing (i.e. process) (re)informs and constructs the
ability
> to do - in other words it is a recursive relationship.
He does not realize the ability to do is grounded in the condition of the
possibility of doing. In other words, doing something is only possible if
the common language, ie. thought, ie. practices, have laid the groundwork
for doing whatever is to be done.
However, his use of Random House is also instructive. It is in such
terminology that the vast majority of people understand power today. Many
people are stuck using the language of the moderns and their determination
to find metaphysical meanings. The "capability of doing or accomplishing
something" implies there is some final end we are attempting to achieve.
This is also true of words such as "legal ability, capacity, or authority."
Foucault looked at such descriptions as outcomes to a history of
practices. They are the present "end" in a flowing linguistic dynamic
which remains in motion. Where did "legal ability" receive its present
understanding? Why is "authority" understood today as such?
--I need to close for now, however, I intend further respond to a few more
things Alexander wrote later. I hope this answers a few of his questions
though.
All the best,
Jon Eskelsen