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Doug wrote:
>One of the things I like about JanMohamed's argument is that he points to
>common features of Marx's notion of capital and Foucault's of power - that
>they're not static and thingly but come alive only in movement and
>circulation. But he also points out that (and I'm doing this from memory,
>since I can't find my copy of the article) unlike Marx's notion of capital,
>F's notion of power can't explain why some people and groups (individuals,
>families, classes, and nations) retain power over time while others don't.
>The ownership of capital can be retained, even expanded, over time, which
>allows power to be retained and expanded, and even inherited. This
>continuity characterizes real societies over time; what about Foucaultian
>power?
As Foucault represses (or actively forgets) a marxist understanding of
commodity and of labor power as surplus-value-producing commodity, so does
he neglect to consider how the microphysics of power might produce what
JanMohamed calls 'surplus power.' Repression of Marx makes Foucault say
things like "Power must be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather
something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never
localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a
commodity or piece of wealth" (_Power/Knowledge_ 98). Obviously, under
capitalism, wealth gives those who own and/or control it the right and
capacity to exercise power, through both the State and 'Civil Society,'
over those who must work for pay to live. Foucault does not consider
structural and enduring--even heritable--power differences between those
whose labor produces surplus value (workers) and those who appropriate,
accumulate, control, and invest for further accumulation the surplus value
produced by workers. And if power never got localized, there couldn't be
the very disciplinary apparati Foucault describes so well.
To quote JanMohamed:
The problem with the Foucaultian formulation of pwoer...that power can only
be "exercised," never "possessed," become readily apparent once the
temporal structures of exercise and possession as well as of subjectivity
as such are probed. Exercise and possession, as activities, can be
characterized by relatively long or short durations: the ability to
exercise power can endure over a long period of time, for decades and--in
terms of group authority, rights, and so on--for centuries; conversely,
possession can be fleeting. How is one to distinguish power that is
exercised over a long duration from that which is possessed? (JanMohamed
54).
Yoshie Furuhashi
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Doug wrote:
>One of the things I like about JanMohamed's argument is that he points
to
>common features of Marx's notion of capital and Foucault's of power -
that
>they're not static and thingly but come alive only in movement and
>circulation. But he also points out that (and I'm doing this from
memory,
>since I can't find my copy of the article) unlike Marx's notion of
capital,
>F's notion of power can't explain why some people and groups
(individuals,
>families, classes, and nations) retain power over time while others
don't.
>The ownership of capital can be retained, even expanded, over time,
which
>allows power to be retained and expanded, and even inherited. This
>continuity characterizes real societies over time; what about
Foucaultian
>power?
As Foucault represses (or actively forgets) a marxist understanding of
commodity and of labor power as surplus-value-producing commodity, so
does he neglect to consider how the microphysics of power might produce
what JanMohamed calls 'surplus power.' Repression of Marx makes
Foucault say things like "Power must be analyzed as something that
circulates, or rather something which only functions in the form of a
chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands,
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth"
(_Power/Knowledge_ 98). Obviously, under capitalism, wealth gives those
who own and/or control it the right and capacity to exercise power,
through both the State and 'Civil Society,' over those who must work
for pay to live. Foucault does not consider structural and
enduring--even heritable--power differences between those whose labor
produces surplus value (workers) and those who appropriate, accumulate,
control, and invest for further accumulation the surplus value produced
by workers. And if power never got localized, there couldn't be the
very disciplinary apparati Foucault describes so well.
To quote JanMohamed:
<paraindent><param>right,right,left,left</param>The problem with the
Foucaultian formulation of pwoer...that power can only be "exercised,"
never "possessed," become readily apparent once the temporal structures
of exercise and possession as well as of subjectivity as such are
probed. Exercise and possession, as activities, can be characterized by
relatively long or short durations: the ability to exercise power can
endure over a long period of time, for decades and--in terms of group
authority, rights, and so on--for centuries; conversely, possession can
be fleeting. How is one to distinguish power that is exercised over a
long duration from that which is possessed? (JanMohamed 54).
</paraindent>Yoshie Furuhashi
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Doug wrote:
>One of the things I like about JanMohamed's argument is that he points to
>common features of Marx's notion of capital and Foucault's of power - that
>they're not static and thingly but come alive only in movement and
>circulation. But he also points out that (and I'm doing this from memory,
>since I can't find my copy of the article) unlike Marx's notion of capital,
>F's notion of power can't explain why some people and groups (individuals,
>families, classes, and nations) retain power over time while others don't.
>The ownership of capital can be retained, even expanded, over time, which
>allows power to be retained and expanded, and even inherited. This
>continuity characterizes real societies over time; what about Foucaultian
>power?
As Foucault represses (or actively forgets) a marxist understanding of
commodity and of labor power as surplus-value-producing commodity, so does
he neglect to consider how the microphysics of power might produce what
JanMohamed calls 'surplus power.' Repression of Marx makes Foucault say
things like "Power must be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather
something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never
localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a
commodity or piece of wealth" (_Power/Knowledge_ 98). Obviously, under
capitalism, wealth gives those who own and/or control it the right and
capacity to exercise power, through both the State and 'Civil Society,'
over those who must work for pay to live. Foucault does not consider
structural and enduring--even heritable--power differences between those
whose labor produces surplus value (workers) and those who appropriate,
accumulate, control, and invest for further accumulation the surplus value
produced by workers. And if power never got localized, there couldn't be
the very disciplinary apparati Foucault describes so well.
To quote JanMohamed:
The problem with the Foucaultian formulation of pwoer...that power can only
be "exercised," never "possessed," become readily apparent once the
temporal structures of exercise and possession as well as of subjectivity
as such are probed. Exercise and possession, as activities, can be
characterized by relatively long or short durations: the ability to
exercise power can endure over a long period of time, for decades and--in
terms of group authority, rights, and so on--for centuries; conversely,
possession can be fleeting. How is one to distinguish power that is
exercised over a long duration from that which is possessed? (JanMohamed
54).
Yoshie Furuhashi
--============_-1311644075==_ma============
Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii"
Doug wrote:
>One of the things I like about JanMohamed's argument is that he points
to
>common features of Marx's notion of capital and Foucault's of power -
that
>they're not static and thingly but come alive only in movement and
>circulation. But he also points out that (and I'm doing this from
memory,
>since I can't find my copy of the article) unlike Marx's notion of
capital,
>F's notion of power can't explain why some people and groups
(individuals,
>families, classes, and nations) retain power over time while others
don't.
>The ownership of capital can be retained, even expanded, over time,
which
>allows power to be retained and expanded, and even inherited. This
>continuity characterizes real societies over time; what about
Foucaultian
>power?
As Foucault represses (or actively forgets) a marxist understanding of
commodity and of labor power as surplus-value-producing commodity, so
does he neglect to consider how the microphysics of power might produce
what JanMohamed calls 'surplus power.' Repression of Marx makes
Foucault say things like "Power must be analyzed as something that
circulates, or rather something which only functions in the form of a
chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands,
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth"
(_Power/Knowledge_ 98). Obviously, under capitalism, wealth gives those
who own and/or control it the right and capacity to exercise power,
through both the State and 'Civil Society,' over those who must work
for pay to live. Foucault does not consider structural and
enduring--even heritable--power differences between those whose labor
produces surplus value (workers) and those who appropriate, accumulate,
control, and invest for further accumulation the surplus value produced
by workers. And if power never got localized, there couldn't be the
very disciplinary apparati Foucault describes so well.
To quote JanMohamed:
<paraindent><param>right,right,left,left</param>The problem with the
Foucaultian formulation of pwoer...that power can only be "exercised,"
never "possessed," become readily apparent once the temporal structures
of exercise and possession as well as of subjectivity as such are
probed. Exercise and possession, as activities, can be characterized by
relatively long or short durations: the ability to exercise power can
endure over a long period of time, for decades and--in terms of group
authority, rights, and so on--for centuries; conversely, possession can
be fleeting. How is one to distinguish power that is exercised over a
long duration from that which is possessed? (JanMohamed 54).
</paraindent>Yoshie Furuhashi
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