Daniel Vukovich wrote:
>
>I suppose the egregiousness of Hayek's politics is one of those things that
>is either obvious to someone, or isn't.
Ahhh...
Suffice it to mention that
>Hayek, over and over again in his career as a Cold War Warrior, most
>emphatically claims that any belief in *social* justice is absurd and,
>moreover, dangerous (cf the Law... volumes, as Im sure you know, "dls").
Yup. Though I'm not sure why arguing against such a totalizing concept
makes his political theory egregious
>So too is any type of collective- thinking or desire nothing but a "herd
>mentality." In other words, I think Hayek's "fatal conceit" concept (the
>error here is called "constructivism", i.e., social engineering and the
>belief that we can somehow put abstractions, plans, holism into practice).
>One doesnt have to be a Maoist to see the class-position of this mode of
>thought. Or its anti-democratic ethos and politics.
I'm definitely no Maoist, but again I don't see how Hayek's arguments
against contructivist rationalism translate into a "class-position"
that is inherently anti-democratic. Perhaps this is another one of those
things that one either sees or doesn't.
>
>I do not, myself, believe that market systems promote something called
>"freedom"-- as if "freedom" were some Real thing, that is, a concept which
>is ultimately identical to its object (to call Hayek pre-Saussarian is not
>I think an exaggeration).
I too have problems with Hayek's conception of freedom. However, to call him
pre-Saussarian is, I think, unfair.
(Please do advise me otherwise, but my (cursory)
>sense of Hayek's phenomenological/psychological writings is that they are
>not simply underdetermined philosophically, but rationalist through and
>through.)
Again, I agree that Hayek often exhibits the very rationalism he decries,
but to call his work rationalist through and through is
arguable.
Hayek's point, of course, is that this bourgeois ideal was a
>real product of bourgeois societies, but is now under threat from the
>expansion of both socialist systems, and the Keynesian welfare state.
>>From a very basic marxist or "materialist" perspective -- and obviously
>Foucault shares at least this much with the Old Moor -- such ideals or
>concepts as "freedom" or individual (and collective) justice or liberty,
>can only be products of specific moments of history, and specific social
>relations (or specific stratifications of power/knowledge, in more F.
>parlance). In sum, to say that the workers of the world have nothing to
>lose but the chains that bind them, does not mean they will then enter
>*the* realm of Freedom; it means that they "have no ideals to realize."
>This is also why that famous passage in Capital III on the dialectic
>between the realms of Freedom and Necessity concludes with the shortening
>of the working day being the first, necessary step on any road to the
>latter realm. In short, I do not think this perspective -- call it
>"materialism," "specificity," "sociological," etc. -- is shared by Hayek.
I'm not really sure what your point is here, but if you're suggesting that
Hayek wouldn't agree that the act *legislating*, via the state, the
shortening of the work day is somehow a step towards better social
conditions, then I'd say your right.
I
>suspect this is one reason why I polemically called him "absurd."
>
>About price information: My point above is that regardless of whether Hayek
>bases the "catallaxy" and Good Society (his words here) on the distributive
>functions of the "market mechanism", on some theory of human
>nature/perception, on "true" liberty, or on cows breaking wind in the
>Subcontinent, neither these bases nor the market system in general produce
>"freedom" as such, or in-itself. They give some groups, classes and
>genders some specific types of power, or *specific* "freedoms" if you wish.
If your referring to the detestable imperialist/fascist/socialist/capitalist
social formations that have spread over the world over the last two
centuries, then I'd agree. However, to blame market systems/mechanisms seems
to me to ignore the social contexts from which they emerged and in which
they now function.
> As I believe the historical record still shows, these same mechanisms or
>systems also "empower" other people in other, ethically and politically
>egregious ways. Among other things, I mean poverty and a relation to
>temporality in which time is always already deffered, or in which time
>becomes an impersonal form of domination. (c.f. Moishe Postone's *Time,
>Labor and Social Domination* on this).
See above.
>That said, you are right to object to my reducing Hayek's market-theory to
>"only" price-information. There are other things in play, true. For what
>its worth, I think his take on "the division of knowledge" (as distinct
>from the division of labor), is a real contribution to economic, even
>social theory. For him, "society" is indeed unimaginably complex. For me
>too, and for all kinds of thinkers. But his conclusion is that we
>therefore need necessarily rely on markey systems, in fact on market
>societies, not just market-economies. I disagree.
Not that I'm acontextually praising market-systems (that would be as bad
acontextually damning them), but what alternative do you propose?
Moreover, I cannot help
>but see Hayek's liberalism and economics as analytically based on price
>information, in the last analysis.
I'm not sure how.
And surely no one can deny that he is a
>fanatic about legitimizing liberal regimes, and nowhere interested in
>problematizing them. Hence his current rebirth, post-Keynesianism, and
>hence his egregiousness.
Yeah, but that doesn't make his observations about complexity
and knowledge any less troublesome for those who would
implement systems that putatively promote "social justice."
>But Im no Hayek exegete, so if you've got a better reading, let me know.
>Or let me know what you think of the realtions b/w Hayek and Foucault. No
>doubt a lot to mine here, including the "liberal" dimensions of Foucault,
>as well as the "governmentality" writings (which have to be about the
>Keynsian state/society). Right off, I'd say they might agree on society
>being unimaginably complex (or an "impossible object" as Laclau and Mouffe
>put it), but not only do they arrive here differently -- Hayek through
>epistemology and a liberal/conservative ethos, the Nietzchean Foucault thru
>a critique of epistemology and what Althusser called the ISA's -- but draw
>different conclusions about "freedom," "liberty," and "power."
Perhaps not as different as you suggest. But that's a project in itself.
Somehow I doubt any exchange btw us will resolve our differences;
so I suggest that we agree to disagree.
dls
>
>I suppose the egregiousness of Hayek's politics is one of those things that
>is either obvious to someone, or isn't.
Ahhh...
Suffice it to mention that
>Hayek, over and over again in his career as a Cold War Warrior, most
>emphatically claims that any belief in *social* justice is absurd and,
>moreover, dangerous (cf the Law... volumes, as Im sure you know, "dls").
Yup. Though I'm not sure why arguing against such a totalizing concept
makes his political theory egregious
>So too is any type of collective- thinking or desire nothing but a "herd
>mentality." In other words, I think Hayek's "fatal conceit" concept (the
>error here is called "constructivism", i.e., social engineering and the
>belief that we can somehow put abstractions, plans, holism into practice).
>One doesnt have to be a Maoist to see the class-position of this mode of
>thought. Or its anti-democratic ethos and politics.
I'm definitely no Maoist, but again I don't see how Hayek's arguments
against contructivist rationalism translate into a "class-position"
that is inherently anti-democratic. Perhaps this is another one of those
things that one either sees or doesn't.
>
>I do not, myself, believe that market systems promote something called
>"freedom"-- as if "freedom" were some Real thing, that is, a concept which
>is ultimately identical to its object (to call Hayek pre-Saussarian is not
>I think an exaggeration).
I too have problems with Hayek's conception of freedom. However, to call him
pre-Saussarian is, I think, unfair.
(Please do advise me otherwise, but my (cursory)
>sense of Hayek's phenomenological/psychological writings is that they are
>not simply underdetermined philosophically, but rationalist through and
>through.)
Again, I agree that Hayek often exhibits the very rationalism he decries,
but to call his work rationalist through and through is
arguable.
Hayek's point, of course, is that this bourgeois ideal was a
>real product of bourgeois societies, but is now under threat from the
>expansion of both socialist systems, and the Keynesian welfare state.
>>From a very basic marxist or "materialist" perspective -- and obviously
>Foucault shares at least this much with the Old Moor -- such ideals or
>concepts as "freedom" or individual (and collective) justice or liberty,
>can only be products of specific moments of history, and specific social
>relations (or specific stratifications of power/knowledge, in more F.
>parlance). In sum, to say that the workers of the world have nothing to
>lose but the chains that bind them, does not mean they will then enter
>*the* realm of Freedom; it means that they "have no ideals to realize."
>This is also why that famous passage in Capital III on the dialectic
>between the realms of Freedom and Necessity concludes with the shortening
>of the working day being the first, necessary step on any road to the
>latter realm. In short, I do not think this perspective -- call it
>"materialism," "specificity," "sociological," etc. -- is shared by Hayek.
I'm not really sure what your point is here, but if you're suggesting that
Hayek wouldn't agree that the act *legislating*, via the state, the
shortening of the work day is somehow a step towards better social
conditions, then I'd say your right.
I
>suspect this is one reason why I polemically called him "absurd."
>
>About price information: My point above is that regardless of whether Hayek
>bases the "catallaxy" and Good Society (his words here) on the distributive
>functions of the "market mechanism", on some theory of human
>nature/perception, on "true" liberty, or on cows breaking wind in the
>Subcontinent, neither these bases nor the market system in general produce
>"freedom" as such, or in-itself. They give some groups, classes and
>genders some specific types of power, or *specific* "freedoms" if you wish.
If your referring to the detestable imperialist/fascist/socialist/capitalist
social formations that have spread over the world over the last two
centuries, then I'd agree. However, to blame market systems/mechanisms seems
to me to ignore the social contexts from which they emerged and in which
they now function.
> As I believe the historical record still shows, these same mechanisms or
>systems also "empower" other people in other, ethically and politically
>egregious ways. Among other things, I mean poverty and a relation to
>temporality in which time is always already deffered, or in which time
>becomes an impersonal form of domination. (c.f. Moishe Postone's *Time,
>Labor and Social Domination* on this).
See above.
>That said, you are right to object to my reducing Hayek's market-theory to
>"only" price-information. There are other things in play, true. For what
>its worth, I think his take on "the division of knowledge" (as distinct
>from the division of labor), is a real contribution to economic, even
>social theory. For him, "society" is indeed unimaginably complex. For me
>too, and for all kinds of thinkers. But his conclusion is that we
>therefore need necessarily rely on markey systems, in fact on market
>societies, not just market-economies. I disagree.
Not that I'm acontextually praising market-systems (that would be as bad
acontextually damning them), but what alternative do you propose?
Moreover, I cannot help
>but see Hayek's liberalism and economics as analytically based on price
>information, in the last analysis.
I'm not sure how.
And surely no one can deny that he is a
>fanatic about legitimizing liberal regimes, and nowhere interested in
>problematizing them. Hence his current rebirth, post-Keynesianism, and
>hence his egregiousness.
Yeah, but that doesn't make his observations about complexity
and knowledge any less troublesome for those who would
implement systems that putatively promote "social justice."
>But Im no Hayek exegete, so if you've got a better reading, let me know.
>Or let me know what you think of the realtions b/w Hayek and Foucault. No
>doubt a lot to mine here, including the "liberal" dimensions of Foucault,
>as well as the "governmentality" writings (which have to be about the
>Keynsian state/society). Right off, I'd say they might agree on society
>being unimaginably complex (or an "impossible object" as Laclau and Mouffe
>put it), but not only do they arrive here differently -- Hayek through
>epistemology and a liberal/conservative ethos, the Nietzchean Foucault thru
>a critique of epistemology and what Althusser called the ISA's -- but draw
>different conclusions about "freedom," "liberty," and "power."
Perhaps not as different as you suggest. But that's a project in itself.
Somehow I doubt any exchange btw us will resolve our differences;
so I suggest that we agree to disagree.
dls