Good Greif.
I've been allied with the promulgators
of the Grand Unified Theory of
Everything. Before I was allied with an
evangelistic religious movement. I'll
deal with the first misunderstanding
first: Why does dialogue necessarily
imply dialectic? It rather implies the
absence of the dialectic. Take a look
at Blanchot's _The Infinite
Conversation_ to see how he works this
out. I'm arguing *against* the sort of
conformism in the name of thoroughgoing
logical consistency currently found in
the sciences. I'm arguing *for* a
plurality of scientific practices and
paradigms.
As for people hanging their heads in
shame (malgosia's sarcasm), my point is
just the opposite of this sort of
moralism. An intense moralism is
ubiquitous in mainstream science -- just
the sort of moralism that Foucault
is lighting up in _Madness and
Civilization_. Moralism is the most
effective means of ensuring a unity of
perspective, necessary for building
the monad. Nothing could be more
repellant to me. The point is not that
people would "change their ways" but
that they would cease to feel the need
to "change their ways", which science as
a moralism constantly foists upon
scientists and non-scientists alike.
And, I am beginning to suspect, this
partitioning of scientific and
non-scientific discourse is itself a
disciplinary measure, and that these are
the probibitions most in need of
transgression.
Lastly, the analogies you point out are
between one science and another.
Can genealogy do nothing besides
document the fact that power operates in
unsuspected ways? I mean, really, so
what if it does? What sort of
practice would result? Why is there so
much theorising, and so little practice
informed by that theory, these days?
Hannah Arendt addresses this, but not to
my satisfaction.
Wynship
Nesta wrote:
> Now, I am cautiously trying to avoid accusations of churlishness etc,
> but I want to know why there is an assumption that a mid-life change of
> career will bring about dialogue - or not, in the case of people who
> have apparently abandoned their former interests - 'burn'out' was the
> word, I think. Because it seems to me that the notion of 'dialogue'
> across the gap has a kind of dialectical underpinning, or perhaps the
> concept of the unity of knowledge - a very mediaeval view that in the
> end, all knowledge being the creation of one Being, it must have an
> internal logic. I would think that Foucault discussing the formation of
> disciplines rather suggests that they are constructs located in a time,
> place and culture, and therefore not open , necessarily to this kind of
> universality. It may be that there simply is no way that you can
> reconcile being a Presbyterian theologist with being a physicist.
> Perhaps. This might be an instance of Lyotard's 'differend'...
>
> Certainly if the connection is by way of analogy, I think it is very
> dubious, and yet it is common. The biologists' notion of evolution has
> been applied to economics, with in my opinion disastrous results, the
> notion of the individual has yet to be unravelled from Hobbes
> watchspring or whatever it was - analogy creates infinite work for
> genealogists.
>
> Nesta
I've been allied with the promulgators
of the Grand Unified Theory of
Everything. Before I was allied with an
evangelistic religious movement. I'll
deal with the first misunderstanding
first: Why does dialogue necessarily
imply dialectic? It rather implies the
absence of the dialectic. Take a look
at Blanchot's _The Infinite
Conversation_ to see how he works this
out. I'm arguing *against* the sort of
conformism in the name of thoroughgoing
logical consistency currently found in
the sciences. I'm arguing *for* a
plurality of scientific practices and
paradigms.
As for people hanging their heads in
shame (malgosia's sarcasm), my point is
just the opposite of this sort of
moralism. An intense moralism is
ubiquitous in mainstream science -- just
the sort of moralism that Foucault
is lighting up in _Madness and
Civilization_. Moralism is the most
effective means of ensuring a unity of
perspective, necessary for building
the monad. Nothing could be more
repellant to me. The point is not that
people would "change their ways" but
that they would cease to feel the need
to "change their ways", which science as
a moralism constantly foists upon
scientists and non-scientists alike.
And, I am beginning to suspect, this
partitioning of scientific and
non-scientific discourse is itself a
disciplinary measure, and that these are
the probibitions most in need of
transgression.
Lastly, the analogies you point out are
between one science and another.
Can genealogy do nothing besides
document the fact that power operates in
unsuspected ways? I mean, really, so
what if it does? What sort of
practice would result? Why is there so
much theorising, and so little practice
informed by that theory, these days?
Hannah Arendt addresses this, but not to
my satisfaction.
Wynship
Nesta wrote:
> Now, I am cautiously trying to avoid accusations of churlishness etc,
> but I want to know why there is an assumption that a mid-life change of
> career will bring about dialogue - or not, in the case of people who
> have apparently abandoned their former interests - 'burn'out' was the
> word, I think. Because it seems to me that the notion of 'dialogue'
> across the gap has a kind of dialectical underpinning, or perhaps the
> concept of the unity of knowledge - a very mediaeval view that in the
> end, all knowledge being the creation of one Being, it must have an
> internal logic. I would think that Foucault discussing the formation of
> disciplines rather suggests that they are constructs located in a time,
> place and culture, and therefore not open , necessarily to this kind of
> universality. It may be that there simply is no way that you can
> reconcile being a Presbyterian theologist with being a physicist.
> Perhaps. This might be an instance of Lyotard's 'differend'...
>
> Certainly if the connection is by way of analogy, I think it is very
> dubious, and yet it is common. The biologists' notion of evolution has
> been applied to economics, with in my opinion disastrous results, the
> notion of the individual has yet to be unravelled from Hobbes
> watchspring or whatever it was - analogy creates infinite work for
> genealogists.
>
> Nesta