More on Foucault and Truth:
What we are concerned with here is finding those grounds on which Foucault
can argue we should prefer genealogical accounts to discourses associated
with the disciplines given the seemingly universalist claim that all
knowledge and discourses are constituted in a "power-knowledge circuit."
How does the argument: "The truth exists, but as a thing of this world, and
not as an absolute" help us with our problem? For it would seem that only
an absolute or essentialist notion of truth could ever give us critical
grounds for preferring one discourse over another. If it is true,
absolutely and essentially, that men and women are inherently rational
agents, then certain moral consequences will follow (such as treating each
agent equally, or promoting their participation in non-coercive discursive
formations) which when violated will be subject to critique from the
absolute standpoint of the essence said to characterize human beings. It is
not clear how an empirically deduced conclusion about the rational nature of
human beings arising on the basis of contingent historical factors could
provide such a stable point for criticizing violations of norms associated
with rationality. And if that is true, then the realization that Foucault
affirms an empirical notion of truth, while perhaps interesting, is less
than central to our concern here.
We will come back to the problem of the relation between truth and
critique. But first, the whole relationship between power and knowledge,
including truth, must be reexamined. In the thumbnail sketch of Foucault's
views which is itself symbolized in the misleading and over-used
"power/knowledge," power is said to produce knowledge leading to a
relativist, sometimes bordering on functionalist description of the relation
of power to knowledge. Now, if this is a misunderstanding of Foucault's
position--and pretty clearly it is--then it is one Foucault has contributed
to:
"My problem is...this:...what type of power is susceptible of
producing discourses of truth that in a society such as ours are endowed
with such potent effects? What I mean is this: in a society such as
ours...there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise
and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot
themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse....We
are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise
power except through the production of truth." (P/K, 93)
Power produces the kind of truth it needs in order to function. It is at
least plausible to read this as dismissing truth tout court, including the
absolute as well as "empirical" version produced above. In that case
"truth" would always require quotation marks as there would never be
anything that one could refer to in an unqualified way as true. Everything
said to be true is simply part of the production of a discourse which forms
part of the prerequisites for the functioning of power.
Indeed, in some places, notably in the interview "Truth and Power" Foucault
stops referring to truth and instead speaks of the effects of truth. For
instance, one of the problems with the notion of ideology discussed by
Foucault is its unfortunate tendency to implicitly assume the existence of a
truth which has been masked or distorted.
Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line
between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity
or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing
historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in
themselves are neither true nor false. (P/K, 118)
Effects of truth would seem to be completely distinct from truth, no matter
how that latter term is construed. All sorts of things--like lies--having
nothing to do with truth can have effects of truth. If we take this
approach to truth--that is, dismissing it and focusing on the effects of
truth associated with discourses "which in themselves are neither true nor
false" --then perhaps we will never appeal to truth as a potentially
critical standard against which to measure the machinations of power, or
with which one could correct error. At the very end of "Truth and Power"
Foucault maintains,
"It is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power
(which would be a chimera, for truth is already power), but of detaching the
power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural,
within which it operates at the present time." (P/K, 133)
The last paragraphs of "Truth and Power" then, appear to rule out the
appeal to truth itself as a possible critical foil to the "power of truth"
attached to the forms of hegemony operating at the present time. Foucault
explicitly says in the same interview that he does not want to see a battle
"on behalf" of truth, but rather one over the status of truth and the
economic and political role it plays (P/K, 132).
The strongly Nietzschean elements of Foucault's views on truth are
encountered again in "Two Lectures." There Foucault rejects the idea that
genealogies are an attempt to correct the errors of science through a more
careful and precise use of scientific method--rather they are to be
considered "anti-sciences" (P/K, 83-84).
A great deal of care must, however, be taken when referring to
statements such as the above. The possibility exists that a certain kind or
category of truth is being attacked, which it is wrong to extend to every
possible meaning of the term. Most important to consider is the prospect
that Foucault was not an unthinking student of Nietzsche on truth--that he
used him rather than copied him.
-----Messaggio originale-----
Da: j'nell <Jenell.M.Johnson-1@xxxxxxxxxx>
A: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Data: Wednesday, November 25, 1998 1:01 AM
Oggetto: RE: TRUTH
>On Tue, 24 Nov 1998 19:03:43 +0100,
>marx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote...
>>Please, can you give me an explanation of or a hint to the
>>Foucauldian concept of truth ...
>>Regards
>>Joerg, Cologne/Germany
>>
>>
>
>How about where he speaks about the "will to truth" in his inaugural
lecture
>at the College d'France? I've got translations called "The Discourse on
>Language" and "The Order of Discourse."
>
>-Jenell
>
>
>
>
What we are concerned with here is finding those grounds on which Foucault
can argue we should prefer genealogical accounts to discourses associated
with the disciplines given the seemingly universalist claim that all
knowledge and discourses are constituted in a "power-knowledge circuit."
How does the argument: "The truth exists, but as a thing of this world, and
not as an absolute" help us with our problem? For it would seem that only
an absolute or essentialist notion of truth could ever give us critical
grounds for preferring one discourse over another. If it is true,
absolutely and essentially, that men and women are inherently rational
agents, then certain moral consequences will follow (such as treating each
agent equally, or promoting their participation in non-coercive discursive
formations) which when violated will be subject to critique from the
absolute standpoint of the essence said to characterize human beings. It is
not clear how an empirically deduced conclusion about the rational nature of
human beings arising on the basis of contingent historical factors could
provide such a stable point for criticizing violations of norms associated
with rationality. And if that is true, then the realization that Foucault
affirms an empirical notion of truth, while perhaps interesting, is less
than central to our concern here.
We will come back to the problem of the relation between truth and
critique. But first, the whole relationship between power and knowledge,
including truth, must be reexamined. In the thumbnail sketch of Foucault's
views which is itself symbolized in the misleading and over-used
"power/knowledge," power is said to produce knowledge leading to a
relativist, sometimes bordering on functionalist description of the relation
of power to knowledge. Now, if this is a misunderstanding of Foucault's
position--and pretty clearly it is--then it is one Foucault has contributed
to:
"My problem is...this:...what type of power is susceptible of
producing discourses of truth that in a society such as ours are endowed
with such potent effects? What I mean is this: in a society such as
ours...there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise
and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot
themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse....We
are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise
power except through the production of truth." (P/K, 93)
Power produces the kind of truth it needs in order to function. It is at
least plausible to read this as dismissing truth tout court, including the
absolute as well as "empirical" version produced above. In that case
"truth" would always require quotation marks as there would never be
anything that one could refer to in an unqualified way as true. Everything
said to be true is simply part of the production of a discourse which forms
part of the prerequisites for the functioning of power.
Indeed, in some places, notably in the interview "Truth and Power" Foucault
stops referring to truth and instead speaks of the effects of truth. For
instance, one of the problems with the notion of ideology discussed by
Foucault is its unfortunate tendency to implicitly assume the existence of a
truth which has been masked or distorted.
Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line
between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity
or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing
historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in
themselves are neither true nor false. (P/K, 118)
Effects of truth would seem to be completely distinct from truth, no matter
how that latter term is construed. All sorts of things--like lies--having
nothing to do with truth can have effects of truth. If we take this
approach to truth--that is, dismissing it and focusing on the effects of
truth associated with discourses "which in themselves are neither true nor
false" --then perhaps we will never appeal to truth as a potentially
critical standard against which to measure the machinations of power, or
with which one could correct error. At the very end of "Truth and Power"
Foucault maintains,
"It is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power
(which would be a chimera, for truth is already power), but of detaching the
power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural,
within which it operates at the present time." (P/K, 133)
The last paragraphs of "Truth and Power" then, appear to rule out the
appeal to truth itself as a possible critical foil to the "power of truth"
attached to the forms of hegemony operating at the present time. Foucault
explicitly says in the same interview that he does not want to see a battle
"on behalf" of truth, but rather one over the status of truth and the
economic and political role it plays (P/K, 132).
The strongly Nietzschean elements of Foucault's views on truth are
encountered again in "Two Lectures." There Foucault rejects the idea that
genealogies are an attempt to correct the errors of science through a more
careful and precise use of scientific method--rather they are to be
considered "anti-sciences" (P/K, 83-84).
A great deal of care must, however, be taken when referring to
statements such as the above. The possibility exists that a certain kind or
category of truth is being attacked, which it is wrong to extend to every
possible meaning of the term. Most important to consider is the prospect
that Foucault was not an unthinking student of Nietzsche on truth--that he
used him rather than copied him.
-----Messaggio originale-----
Da: j'nell <Jenell.M.Johnson-1@xxxxxxxxxx>
A: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Data: Wednesday, November 25, 1998 1:01 AM
Oggetto: RE: TRUTH
>On Tue, 24 Nov 1998 19:03:43 +0100,
>marx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote...
>>Please, can you give me an explanation of or a hint to the
>>Foucauldian concept of truth ...
>>Regards
>>Joerg, Cologne/Germany
>>
>>
>
>How about where he speaks about the "will to truth" in his inaugural
lecture
>at the College d'France? I've got translations called "The Discourse on
>Language" and "The Order of Discourse."
>
>-Jenell
>
>
>
>