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I haven't got a date for this, and I'm not sure if this is what you're =
after, but here it is anyway:
The Current Bombings by Noam Chomsky
There have been many inquiries concerning NATO (meaning primarily US)
bombing in Kosovo. A great deal has een written about the topic,
including Znet commentaries. I'd like to make a few general
observations, keeping to facts that are not seriously contested.
There are two fundamental issues: (1) What are the accepted and
applicable "rules of world order"? (2) How do
these or other considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?
(1) What are the accepted and applicable "rules of world order"?
there is a regime of international law and international order,
binding on all states, based on the UN Charter and subsequent
resolutions and World Court decisions. In brief, the threat or use of
force is banned unless explicitly authorized by the Security Council
after it has determined that peaceful means have failed, or in
self-defense against "armed attack" (a narrow concept) until the
Security Council acts.
There is, of course, more to say. Thus there is at least a tension, if
not an outright contradiction, between the rules of world order laid
down in the UN Charter and the rights articulated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UD), a second pillar of the world order
established under US initiative after World War II. The Charter bans
force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees the rights of
individuals against oppressive states. The issue of "humanitarian
intervention" arises from this tension. It is the right of
"humanitarian intervention" that is claimed by the US/NATO in Kosovo,
and that is generally supported by editorial opinion and news reports
(in the latter case, reflexively, even by the very choice of
terminology).
The question is addressed in a news report in the NY Times (March 27),
headlined "Legal Scholars Support Case for Using Force" in Kosovo
(March 27). One example is offered: Allen Gerson, former counsel to
the US mission to the UN. Two other legal scholars are cited. One, Ted
Galen Carpenter, "scoffed at the Administration argument" and
dismissed the alleged right of intervention. The third is Jack
Goldsmith, a specialist on international law at Chicago Law school. He
says that critics of the NATO bombing "have a pretty good legal
argument," but "many people think [an exception for humanitarian
intervention] does exist as a matter of custom and practice." That
summarizes the evidence offered to justify the favored conclusion
stated in the headline.
Goldsmith's observation is reasonable, at least if we agree that facts
are relevant to the determination of "custom and practice." We may
also bear in mind a truism: the right of humanitarian intervention, if
it exists, is premised on the "good faith" of those intervening, and
that assumption is based not on their rhetoric but on their record, in
particular their record of adherence to the principles of
international law, World Court decisions, and so on. That is indeed a
truism, at least with regard to others. Consider, for example, Iranian
offers to intervene in Bosnia to prevent massacres at a time when the
West would not do so. These were dismissed with ridicule (in fact,
ignored); if there was a reason beyond subordination to power, it was
because Iranian "good faith" could not be assumed. A rational person
then asks obvious questions: is the Iranian record of intervention and
terror worse than that of the US? And other questions, for example:
How should we assess the "good faith" of the only country to have
vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to obey
international law? What about its historical record? Unless such
questions are prominent on the agenda of discourse, an honest person
will dismiss it as mere allegiance to doctrine. A useful exercise is
to determine how much of the literature - -- media or other --
survives such elementary conditions as these.
2) How do these or other considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?
There has been a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in the past year,
overwhelmingly attributable to Yugoslav military forces. The main
victims have been ethnic Albanian Kosovars, some 90% of the population
of this Yugoslav territory. The standard estimate is 2000 deaths and
hundreds of thousands of refugees.
In such cases, outsiders have three choices:
(I) try to escalate the catastrophe
(II) do nothing
(III) try to mitigate the catastrophe
The choices are illustrated by other contemporary cases. Let's keep to
a few of approximately the same scale, and ask where Kosovo fits into
the pattern. (A) Colombia. In Colombia, according to State Department
estimates, the annual level of political killing by the government and
its paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo, and
refugee flight primarily from their atrocities is well over a million.
Colombia has been the leading Western hemisphere recipient of US arms
and training as violence increased through the '90s, and that
assistance is now increasing, under a "drug war" pretext dismissed by
almost all serious observers. The Clinton administration was
particularly enthusiastic in its praise for President Gaviria, whose
tenure in office was responsible for "appalling levels of violence,"
according to human rights organizations, even surpassing his
predecessors. Details are readily available.
In this case, the US reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities.
(B) Turkey. By very conservative estimate, Turkish repression of Kurds
in the '90s falls in the category of Kosovo. It peaked in the early
'90s; one index is the flight of over a million Kurds from the
countryside to the unofficial Kurdish capital Diyarbakir from 1990 to
1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the countryside. 1994 marked
two records: it was "the year of the worst repression in the Kurdish
provinces" of Turkey, Jonathan Randal reported from the scene, and the
year when Turkey became "the biggest single importer of American
military hardware and thus the world's largest arms purchaser." When
human rights groups exposed Turkey's use of US jets to bomb villages,
the Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws requiring
suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in Indonesia and
elsewhere.
Colombia and Turkey explain their (US-supported) atrocities on grounds
that they are defending their countries from the threat of terrorist
guerrillas. As does the government of Yugoslavia.
Again, the example illustrates (I): try to escalate the atrocities.
(C) Laos. Every year thousands of people, mostly children and poor
farmers, are killed in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos, the scene
of the heaviest bombing of civilian targets in history it appears, and
arguably the most cruel: Washington's furious assault on a poor
peasant society had little to do with its wars in the region. The
worst period was from 1968, when Washington was compelled to undertake
negotiations (under popular and business pressure), ending the regular
bombardment of North Vietnam. Kissinger-Nixon then decided to shift
the planes to bombardment of Laos and Cambodia.
The deaths are from "bombies," tiny anti-personnel weapons, far worse
than land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and maim, and
have no effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain was saturated with
hundreds of millions of these criminal devices, which have a
failure-to-explode rate of 20%-30% according to the manufacturer,
Honeywell. The numbers suggest either remarkably poor quality control
or a rational policy of murdering civilians by delayed action. These
were only a fraction of the technology deployed, including advanced
missiles to penetrate caves where families sought shelter. Current
annual casualties from "bombies" are estimated from hundreds a year to
"an annual nationwide casualty rate of 20,000," more than half of them
deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter Barry Wain of the Wall
Street Journal -- in its Asia edition. A conservative estimate, then,
is that the crisis this year is approximately comparable to Kosovo,
though deaths are far more highly concentrated among children - --
over half, according to analyses reported by the Mennonite Central
Committee, which has been working there since 1977 to alleviate the
continuing atrocities.
There have been efforts to publicize and deal with the humanitarian
catastrophe. A British-based Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is trying to
remove the lethal objects, but the US is "conspicuously missing from
the handful of Western organisations that have followed MAG," the
British press reports, though it has finally agreed to train some
Laotian civilians. The British press also reports, with some anger,
the allegation of MAG specialists that the US refuses to provide them
with "render harmless procedures" that would make their work "a lot
quicker and a lot safer." These remain a state secret, as does the
whole affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports a very
similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region where
US bombardment from early 1969 was most intense.
In this case, the US reaction is (II): do nothing. And the reaction of
the media and commentators is to keep silent, following the norms
under which the war against Laos was designated a "secret war" --
meaning well-known, but suppressed, as also in the case of Cambodia
from March 1969. The level of self-censorship was extraordinary then,
as is the current phase. The relevance of this shocking example should
be obvious without further comment.
I will skip other examples of (I) and (II), which abound, and also
much more serious contemporary atrocities, such as the huge slaughter
of Iraqi civilians by means of a particularly vicious form of
biological warfare -- "a very hard choice," Madeleine Albright
commented on national TV in 1996 when asked for her reaction to the
killing of half a million Iraqi children in 5 years, but "we think the
price is worth it." Current estimates remain about 5000 children
killed a month, and the price is still "worth it." These and other
examples might also be kept in mind when we read awed rhetoric about
how the "moral compass" of the Clinton Administration is at last
functioning properly, as the Kosovo example illustrates.
Just what does the example illustrate? The threat of NATO bombing,
predictably, led to a sharp escalation of atrocities by the Serbian
Army and paramilitaries, and to the departure of international
observers, which of course had the same effect. Commanding General
Wesley Clark declared that it was "entirely predictable" that Serbian
terror and violence would intensify after the NATO bombing, exactly as
happened. The terror for the first time reached the capital city of
Pristina, and there are credible reports of large-scale destruction of
villages, assassinations, generation of an enormous refugee flow,
perhaps an effort to expel a good part of the Albanian population --
all an "entirely predictable" consequence of the threat and then the
use of force, as General Clark rightly observes.
Kosovo is therefore another illustration of (I): try to escalate the
violence, with exactly that expectation. To find examples illustrating
(III) is all too easy, at least if we keep to official rhetoric. The
major recent academic study of "humanitarian intervention," by Sean
Murphy, reviews the record after the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 which
outlawed war, and then since the UN Charter, which strengthened and
articulated these provisions. In the first phase, he writes, the most
prominent examples of "humanitarian intervention" were Japan's attack
on Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and Hitler's
occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia. All were accompanied by highly
uplifting humanitarian rhetoric, and factual justifications as well.
Japan was going to establish an "earthly paradise" as it defended
Manchurians from "Chinese bandits," with the support of a leading
Chinese nationalist, a far more credible figure than anyone the US was
able to conjure up during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini was
liberating thousands of slaves as he carried forth the Western
"civilizing mission." Hitler announced Germany's intention to end
ethnic tensions and violence, and "safeguard the national
individuality of the German and Czech peoples," in an operation
"filled with earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples
dwelling in the area," in accordance with their will; the Slovakian
President asked Hitler to declare Slovakia a protectorate.
Another useful intellectual exercise is to compare those obscene
justifications with those offered for interventions, including
"humanitarian interventions," in the post-UN Charter period.
In that period, perhaps the most compelling example of (III) is the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating Pol
Pot's atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded the right
of self-defense against armed attack, one of the few post-Charter
examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge regime
(Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous attacks against
Vietnam in border areas. The US reaction is instructive. The press
condemned the "Prussians" of Asia for their outrageous violation of
international law. They were harshly punished for the crime of having
terminated Pol Pot's slaughters, first by a (US-backed) Chinese
invasion, then by US imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. The US
recognized the expelled DK as the official government of Cambodia,
because of its "continuity" with the Pol Pot regime, the State
Department explained. Not too subtly, the US supported the Khmer Rouge
in its continuing attacks in Cambodia.
The example tells us more about the "custom and practice" that
underlies "the emerging legal norms of humanitarian intervention."
Despite the desperate efforts of ideologues to prove that circles are
square, there is no serious doubt that the NATO bombings further
undermine what remains of the fragile structure of international law.
The US made that entirely clear in the discussions leading to the NATO
decision. Apart from the UK (by now, about as much of an independent
actor as the Ukraine was in the pre-Gorbachev years), NATO countries
were skeptical of US policy, and were particularly annoyed by
Secretary of State Albright's "saber-rattling" (Kevin Cullen, Boston
Globe, Feb.22). Today, the more closely one approaches the conflicted
region, the greater the opposition to Washington's insistence on
force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy). France had called for a UN
Security Council resolution to authorize deployment of NATO
peacekeepers. The US flatly refused, insisting on "its stand that NATO
should be able to act independently of the United Nations," State
Department officials explained. The US refused to permit the
"neuralgic word `authorize'" to appear in the final NATO statement,
unwilling to concede any authority to the UN Charter and international
law; only the word "endorse" was permitted (Jane Perlez, NYT, Feb.
11).
Similarly the bombing of Iraq was a brazen expression of contempt for
the UN, even the specific timing, and was so understood. And of course
the same is true of the destruction of half the pharmaceutical
production of a small African country a few months earlier, an event
that also does not indicate that the "moral compass" is straying from
righteousness -- not to speak of a record that would be prominently
reviewed right now if facts were considered relevant to determining
"custom and practice."
It could be argued, rather plausibly, that further demolition of the
rules of world order is irrelevant, just as it had lost its meaning by
the late 1930s. The contempt of the world's leading power for the
framework of world order has become so extreme that there is nothing
left to discuss. A review of the internal documentary record
demonstrates that the stance traces back to the earliest days, even to
the first memorandum of the newly-formed National Security Council in
1947. During the Kennedy years, the stance began to gain overt
expression. The main innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is that
defiance of international law and the Charter has become entirely
open. It has also been backed with interesting explanations, which
would be on the front pages, and prominent in the school and
university curriculum, if truth and honesty were considered
significant values. The highest authorities explained with brutal
clarity that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had become
irrelevant because they no longer follow US orders, as they did in the
early postwar years.
One might then adopt the official position. That would be an honest
stand, at least if it were accompanied by refusal to play the cynical
game of self-righteous posturing and wielding of the despised
principles of international law as a highly selective weapon against
shifting enemies.
While the Reaganites broke new ground, under Clinton the defiance of
world order has become so extreme as to be of concern even to hawkish
policy analysts. In the current issue of the leading establishment
journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that Washington is
treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the world - --
probably most of the world, he suggests -- the US is "becoming the
rogue superpower," considered "the single greatest external threat to
their societies." Realist "international relations theory," he argues,
predicts that coalitions may arise to counterbalance the rogue
superpower. On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should be
reconsidered. Americans who prefer a different image of their society
might call for a reconsideration on other than pragmatic grounds.
Where does that leave the question of what to do in Kosovo? It leaves
it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action which, as it
explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and violence --
"predictably"; a course of action that also strikes yet another blow
against the regime of international order, which does offer the weak
at least some limited protection from predatory states. As for the
longer term, consequences are unpredictable. One plausible observation
is that "every bomb that falls on Serbia and every ethnic killing in
Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be possible for Serbs and
Albanians to live beside each other in some sort of peace" (Financial
Times, March 27). Some of the longer-term possible outcomes are
extremely ugly, as has not gone without notice.
A standard argument is that we had to do something: we could not
simply stand by as atrocities continue. That is never true. One
choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: "First, do no
harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary
principle, then do nothing. There are always ways that can be
considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end.
The right of "humanitarian intervention" is likely to be more
frequently invoked in coming years -- maybe with justification, maybe
not -- now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy. In such an
era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of highly
respected commentators -- not to speak of the World Court, which
explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision rejected by the United
States, its essentials not even reported.
In the scholarly disciplines of international affairs and
international law it would be hard to find more respected voices than
Hedley Bull or Leon Henkin. Bull warned 15 years ago that "Particular
states or groups of states that set themselves up as the authoritative
judges of the world common good, in disregard of the views of others,
are in fact a menace to international order, and thus to effective
action in this field." Henkin, in a standard work on world order,
writes that the "pressures eroding the prohibition on the use of force
are deplorable, and the arguments to legitimize the use of force in
those circumstances are unpersuasive and dangerous... Violations of
human rights are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible to
remedy them by external use of force, there would be no law to forbid
the use of force by almost any state against almost any other. Human
rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other injustices
remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the door to
aggression and destroying the principle advance in international law,
the outlawing of war and the prohibition of force."
Recognized principles of international law and world order, solemn
treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court, considered
pronouncements by the most respected commentators -- these do not
automatically solve particular problems. Each issue has to be
considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt the standards of
Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof to meet in
undertaking the threat or use of force in violation of the principles
of international order. Perhaps the burden can be met, but that has to
be shown, not merely proclaimed with passionate rhetoric. The
consequences of such violations have to be assessed carefully -- in
particular, what we understand to be "predictable." And for those who
are minimally serious, the reasons for the actions also have to be
assessed -- again, not simply by adulation of our leaders and their
"moral compass." _
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<DIV>I haven't got a date for this, and I'm not sure if this is what =
you're=20
after, but here it is anyway:<BR><BR>The Current Bombings by Noam=20
Chomsky<BR><BR>There have been many inquiries concerning NATO (meaning =
primarily=20
US)<BR>bombing in Kosovo. A great deal has een written about the=20
topic,<BR>including Znet commentaries. I'd like to make a few=20
general<BR>observations, keeping to facts that are not seriously=20
contested.<BR><BR>There are two fundamental issues: (1) What are the =
accepted=20
and<BR>applicable "rules of world order"? (2) How do<BR>these =
or other=20
considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?<BR><BR>(1) What are the =
accepted and=20
applicable "rules of world order"?<BR>there is a regime of=20
international law and international order,<BR>binding on all states, =
based on=20
the UN Charter and subsequent<BR>resolutions and World Court decisions. =
In=20
brief, the threat or use of<BR>force is banned unless explicitly =
authorized by=20
the Security Council<BR>after it has determined that peaceful means have =
failed,=20
or in<BR>self-defense against "armed attack" (a narrow =
concept) until=20
the<BR>Security Council acts.<BR><BR>There is, of course, more to say. =
Thus=20
there is at least a tension, if<BR>not an outright contradiction, =
between the=20
rules of world order laid<BR>down in the UN Charter and the rights =
articulated=20
in the Universal<BR>Declaration of Human Rights (UD), a second pillar of =
the=20
world order<BR>established under US initiative after World War II. The =
Charter=20
bans<BR>force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees the rights=20
of<BR>individuals against oppressive states. The issue of=20
"humanitarian<BR>intervention" arises from this tension. It is =
the=20
right of<BR>"humanitarian intervention" that is claimed by the =
US/NATO=20
in Kosovo,<BR>and that is generally supported by editorial opinion and =
news=20
reports<BR>(in the latter case, reflexively, even by the very choice=20
of<BR>terminology).<BR><BR>The question is addressed in a news report in =
the NY=20
Times (March 27),<BR>headlined "Legal Scholars Support Case for =
Using=20
Force" in Kosovo<BR>(March 27). One example is offered: Allen =
Gerson,=20
former counsel to<BR>the US mission to the UN. Two other legal scholars =
are=20
cited. One, Ted<BR>Galen Carpenter, "scoffed at the Administration=20
argument" and<BR>dismissed the alleged right of intervention. The =
third is=20
Jack<BR>Goldsmith, a specialist on international law at Chicago Law =
school.=20
He<BR>says that critics of the NATO bombing "have a pretty good=20
legal<BR>argument," but "many people think [an exception for=20
humanitarian<BR>intervention] does exist as a matter of custom and=20
practice." That<BR>summarizes the evidence offered to justify the =
favored=20
conclusion<BR>stated in the headline.<BR><BR>Goldsmith's observation is=20
reasonable, at least if we agree that facts<BR>are relevant to the =
determination=20
of "custom and practice." We may<BR>also bear in mind a =
truism: the=20
right of humanitarian intervention, if<BR>it exists, is premised on the=20
"good faith" of those intervening, and<BR>that assumption is =
based not=20
on their rhetoric but on their record, in<BR>particular their record of=20
adherence to the principles of<BR>international law, World Court =
decisions, and=20
so on. That is indeed a<BR>truism, at least with regard to others. =
Consider, for=20
example, Iranian<BR>offers to intervene in Bosnia to prevent massacres =
at a time=20
when the<BR>West would not do so. These were dismissed with ridicule (in =
fact,<BR>ignored); if there was a reason beyond subordination to power, =
it=20
was<BR>because Iranian "good faith" could not be assumed. A =
rational=20
person<BR>then asks obvious questions: is the Iranian record of =
intervention=20
and<BR>terror worse than that of the US? And other questions, for=20
example:<BR>How should we assess the "good faith" of the only =
country=20
to have<BR>vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to =
obey<BR>international law? What about its historical record? Unless=20
such<BR>questions are prominent on the agenda of discourse, an honest=20
person<BR>will dismiss it as mere allegiance to doctrine. A useful =
exercise=20
is<BR>to determine how much of the literature - -- media or other =
--<BR>survives=20
such elementary conditions as these.<BR><BR>2) How do these or other=20
considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?<BR>There has been a =
humanitarian=20
catastrophe in Kosovo in the past year,<BR>overwhelmingly attributable =
to=20
Yugoslav military forces. The main<BR>victims have been ethnic Albanian=20
Kosovars, some 90% of the population<BR>of this Yugoslav territory. The =
standard=20
estimate is 2000 deaths and<BR>hundreds of thousands of =
refugees.<BR><BR>In such=20
cases, outsiders have three choices:<BR><BR>(I) try to escalate the=20
catastrophe<BR><BR>(II) do nothing<BR><BR>(III) try to mitigate the=20
catastrophe<BR><BR>The choices are illustrated by other contemporary =
cases.=20
Let's keep to<BR>a few of approximately the same scale, and ask where =
Kosovo=20
fits into<BR>the pattern. (A) Colombia. In Colombia, according to State=20
Department<BR>estimates, the annual level of political killing by the =
government=20
and<BR>its paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo,=20
and<BR>refugee flight primarily from their atrocities is well over a=20
million.<BR>Colombia has been the leading Western hemisphere recipient =
of US=20
arms<BR>and training as violence increased through the '90s, and=20
that<BR>assistance is now increasing, under a "drug war" =
pretext=20
dismissed by<BR>almost all serious observers. The Clinton administration =
was<BR>particularly enthusiastic in its praise for President Gaviria,=20
whose<BR>tenure in office was responsible for "appalling levels of=20
violence,"<BR>according to human rights organizations, even =
surpassing=20
his<BR>predecessors. Details are readily available.<BR><BR>In this case, =
the US=20
reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities.<BR><BR>(B) Turkey. By very=20
conservative estimate, Turkish repression of Kurds<BR>in the '90s falls =
in the=20
category of Kosovo. It peaked in the early<BR>'90s; one index is the =
flight of=20
over a million Kurds from the<BR>countryside to the unofficial Kurdish =
capital=20
Diyarbakir from 1990 to<BR>1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the =
countryside. 1994 marked<BR>two records: it was "the year of the =
worst=20
repression in the Kurdish<BR>provinces" of Turkey, Jonathan Randal =
reported=20
from the scene, and the<BR>year when Turkey became "the biggest =
single=20
importer of American<BR>military hardware and thus the world's largest =
arms=20
purchaser." When<BR>human rights groups exposed Turkey's use of US =
jets to=20
bomb villages,<BR>the Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws=20
requiring<BR>suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in =
Indonesia=20
and<BR>elsewhere.<BR><BR>Colombia and Turkey explain their =
(US-supported)=20
atrocities on grounds<BR>that they are defending their countries from =
the threat=20
of terrorist<BR>guerrillas. As does the government of =
Yugoslavia.<BR><BR>Again,=20
the example illustrates (I): try to escalate the atrocities.<BR><BR>(C) =
Laos.=20
Every year thousands of people, mostly children and poor<BR>farmers, are =
killed=20
in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos, the scene<BR>of the heaviest =
bombing of=20
civilian targets in history it appears, and<BR>arguably the most cruel:=20
Washington's furious assault on a poor<BR>peasant society had little to =
do with=20
its wars in the region. The<BR>worst period was from 1968, when =
Washington was=20
compelled to undertake<BR>negotiations (under popular and business =
pressure),=20
ending the regular<BR>bombardment of North Vietnam. Kissinger-Nixon then =
decided=20
to shift<BR>the planes to bombardment of Laos and Cambodia.<BR><BR>The =
deaths=20
are from "bombies," tiny anti-personnel weapons, far =
worse<BR>than=20
land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and maim, and<BR>have =
no=20
effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain was saturated =
with<BR>hundreds of=20
millions of these criminal devices, which have a<BR>failure-to-explode =
rate of=20
20%-30% according to the manufacturer,<BR>Honeywell. The numbers suggest =
either=20
remarkably poor quality control<BR>or a rational policy of murdering =
civilians=20
by delayed action. These<BR>were only a fraction of the technology =
deployed,=20
including advanced<BR>missiles to penetrate caves where families sought =
shelter.=20
Current<BR>annual casualties from "bombies" are estimated from =
hundreds a year to<BR>"an annual nationwide casualty rate of =
20,000,"=20
more than half of them<BR>deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter =
Barry=20
Wain of the Wall<BR>Street Journal -- in its Asia edition. A =
conservative=20
estimate, then,<BR>is that the crisis this year is approximately =
comparable to=20
Kosovo,<BR>though deaths are far more highly concentrated among children =
-=20
--<BR>over half, according to analyses reported by the Mennonite=20
Central<BR>Committee, which has been working there since 1977 to =
alleviate=20
the<BR>continuing atrocities.<BR><BR>There have been efforts to =
publicize and=20
deal with the humanitarian<BR>catastrophe. A British-based Mine Advisory =
Group=20
(MAG) is trying to<BR>remove the lethal objects, but the US is=20
"conspicuously missing from<BR>the handful of Western organisations =
that=20
have followed MAG," the<BR>British press reports, though it has =
finally=20
agreed to train some<BR>Laotian civilians. The British press also =
reports, with=20
some anger,<BR>the allegation of MAG specialists that the US refuses to =
provide=20
them<BR>with "render harmless procedures" that would make =
their work=20
"a lot<BR>quicker and a lot safer." These remain a state =
secret, as=20
does the<BR>whole affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports =
a=20
very<BR>similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region=20
where<BR>US bombardment from early 1969 was most intense.<BR><BR>In this =
case,=20
the US reaction is (II): do nothing. And the reaction of<BR>the media =
and=20
commentators is to keep silent, following the norms<BR>under which the =
war=20
against Laos was designated a "secret war" --<BR>meaning =
well-known,=20
but suppressed, as also in the case of Cambodia<BR>from March 1969. The =
level of=20
self-censorship was extraordinary then,<BR>as is the current phase. The=20
relevance of this shocking example should<BR>be obvious without further=20
comment.<BR><BR>I will skip other examples of (I) and (II), which =
abound, and=20
also<BR>much more serious contemporary atrocities, such as the huge=20
slaughter<BR>of Iraqi civilians by means of a particularly vicious form=20
of<BR>biological warfare -- "a very hard choice," Madeleine=20
Albright<BR>commented on national TV in 1996 when asked for her reaction =
to=20
the<BR>killing of half a million Iraqi children in 5 years, but "we =
think=20
the<BR>price is worth it." Current estimates remain about 5000=20
children<BR>killed a month, and the price is still "worth it." =
These=20
and other<BR>examples might also be kept in mind when we read awed =
rhetoric=20
about<BR>how the "moral compass" of the Clinton Administration =
is at=20
last<BR>functioning properly, as the Kosovo example =
illustrates.<BR><BR>Just=20
what does the example illustrate? The threat of NATO =
bombing,<BR>predictably,=20
led to a sharp escalation of atrocities by the Serbian<BR>Army and=20
paramilitaries, and to the departure of international<BR>observers, =
which of=20
course had the same effect. Commanding General<BR>Wesley Clark declared =
that it=20
was "entirely predictable" that Serbian<BR>terror and violence =
would=20
intensify after the NATO bombing, exactly as<BR>happened. The terror for =
the=20
first time reached the capital city of<BR>Pristina, and there are =
credible=20
reports of large-scale destruction of<BR>villages, assassinations, =
generation of=20
an enormous refugee flow,<BR>perhaps an effort to expel a good part of =
the=20
Albanian population --<BR>all an "entirely predictable" =
consequence of=20
the threat and then the<BR>use of force, as General Clark rightly=20
observes.<BR><BR>Kosovo is therefore another illustration of (I): try to =
escalate the<BR>violence, with exactly that expectation. To find =
examples=20
illustrating<BR>(III) is all too easy, at least if we keep to official =
rhetoric.=20
The<BR>major recent academic study of "humanitarian =
intervention," by=20
Sean<BR>Murphy, reviews the record after the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 =
which<BR>outlawed war, and then since the UN Charter, which strengthened =
and<BR>articulated these provisions. In the first phase, he writes, the=20
most<BR>prominent examples of "humanitarian intervention" were =
Japan's=20
attack<BR>on Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and=20
Hitler's<BR>occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia. All were accompanied =
by=20
highly<BR>uplifting humanitarian rhetoric, and factual justifications as =
well.<BR>Japan was going to establish an "earthly paradise" as =
it=20
defended<BR>Manchurians from "Chinese bandits," with the =
support of a=20
leading<BR>Chinese nationalist, a far more credible figure than anyone =
the US=20
was<BR>able to conjure up during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini=20
was<BR>liberating thousands of slaves as he carried forth the=20
Western<BR>"civilizing mission." Hitler announced Germany's =
intention=20
to end<BR>ethnic tensions and violence, and "safeguard the=20
national<BR>individuality of the German and Czech peoples," in an=20
operation<BR>"filled with earnest desire to serve the true =
interests of the=20
peoples<BR>dwelling in the area," in accordance with their will; =
the=20
Slovakian<BR>President asked Hitler to declare Slovakia a=20
protectorate.<BR><BR>Another useful intellectual exercise is to compare =
those=20
obscene<BR>justifications with those offered for interventions,=20
including<BR>"humanitarian interventions," in the post-UN =
Charter=20
period.<BR><BR>In that period, perhaps the most compelling example of =
(III) is=20
the<BR>Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating=20
Pol<BR>Pot's atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded the=20
right<BR>of self-defense against armed attack, one of the few=20
post-Charter<BR>examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge=20
regime<BR>(Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous attacks=20
against<BR>Vietnam in border areas. The US reaction is instructive. The=20
press<BR>condemned the "Prussians" of Asia for their =
outrageous=20
violation of<BR>international law. They were harshly punished for the =
crime of=20
having<BR>terminated Pol Pot's slaughters, first by a (US-backed)=20
Chinese<BR>invasion, then by US imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. =
The=20
US<BR>recognized the expelled DK as the official government of=20
Cambodia,<BR>because of its "continuity" with the Pol Pot =
regime, the=20
State<BR>Department explained. Not too subtly, the US supported the =
Khmer=20
Rouge<BR>in its continuing attacks in Cambodia.<BR><BR>The example tells =
us more=20
about the "custom and practice" that<BR>underlies "the =
emerging=20
legal norms of humanitarian intervention."<BR><BR>Despite the =
desperate=20
efforts of ideologues to prove that circles are<BR>square, there is no =
serious=20
doubt that the NATO bombings further<BR>undermine what remains of the =
fragile=20
structure of international law.<BR>The US made that entirely clear in =
the=20
discussions leading to the NATO<BR>decision. Apart from the UK (by now, =
about as=20
much of an independent<BR>actor as the Ukraine was in the pre-Gorbachev =
years),=20
NATO countries<BR>were skeptical of US policy, and were particularly =
annoyed=20
by<BR>Secretary of State Albright's "saber-rattling" (Kevin =
Cullen,=20
Boston<BR>Globe, Feb.22). Today, the more closely one approaches the=20
conflicted<BR>region, the greater the opposition to Washington's =
insistence=20
on<BR>force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy). France had called for =
a=20
UN<BR>Security Council resolution to authorize deployment of=20
NATO<BR>peacekeepers. The US flatly refused, insisting on "its =
stand that=20
NATO<BR>should be able to act independently of the United Nations," =
State<BR>Department officials explained. The US refused to permit=20
the<BR>"neuralgic word `authorize'" to appear in the final =
NATO=20
statement,<BR>unwilling to concede any authority to the UN Charter and=20
international<BR>law; only the word "endorse" was permitted =
(Jane=20
Perlez, NYT, Feb.<BR>11).<BR><BR>Similarly the bombing of Iraq was a =
brazen=20
expression of contempt for<BR>the UN, even the specific timing, and was =
so=20
understood. And of course<BR>the same is true of the destruction of half =
the=20
pharmaceutical<BR>production of a small African country a few months =
earlier, an=20
event<BR>that also does not indicate that the "moral compass" =
is=20
straying from<BR>righteousness -- not to speak of a record that would be =
prominently<BR>reviewed right now if facts were considered relevant to=20
determining<BR>"custom and practice."<BR><BR>It could be =
argued,=20
rather plausibly, that further demolition of the<BR>rules of world order =
is=20
irrelevant, just as it had lost its meaning by<BR>the late 1930s. The =
contempt=20
of the world's leading power for the<BR>framework of world order has =
become so=20
extreme that there is nothing<BR>left to discuss. A review of the =
internal=20
documentary record<BR>demonstrates that the stance traces back to the =
earliest=20
days, even to<BR>the first memorandum of the newly-formed National =
Security=20
Council in<BR>1947. During the Kennedy years, the stance began to gain=20
overt<BR>expression. The main innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is=20
that<BR>defiance of international law and the Charter has become=20
entirely<BR>open. It has also been backed with interesting explanations, =
which<BR>would be on the front pages, and prominent in the school=20
and<BR>university curriculum, if truth and honesty were=20
considered<BR>significant values. The highest authorities explained with =
brutal<BR>clarity that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had=20
become<BR>irrelevant because they no longer follow US orders, as they =
did in=20
the<BR>early postwar years.<BR><BR>One might then adopt the official =
position.=20
That would be an honest<BR>stand, at least if it were accompanied by =
refusal to=20
play the cynical<BR>game of self-righteous posturing and wielding of the =
despised<BR>principles of international law as a highly selective weapon =
against<BR>shifting enemies.<BR><BR>While the Reaganites broke new =
ground, under=20
Clinton the defiance of<BR>world order has become so extreme as to be of =
concern=20
even to hawkish<BR>policy analysts. In the current issue of the leading=20
establishment<BR>journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that=20
Washington is<BR>treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the =
world -=20
--<BR>probably most of the world, he suggests -- the US is =
"becoming=20
the<BR>rogue superpower," considered "the single greatest =
external=20
threat to<BR>their societies." Realist "international =
relations=20
theory," he argues,<BR>predicts that coalitions may arise to =
counterbalance=20
the rogue<BR>superpower. On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should=20
be<BR>reconsidered. Americans who prefer a different image of their=20
society<BR>might call for a reconsideration on other than pragmatic=20
grounds.<BR><BR>Where does that leave the question of what to do in =
Kosovo? It=20
leaves<BR>it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action which, as=20
it<BR>explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and violence=20
--<BR>"predictably"; a course of action that also strikes yet =
another=20
blow<BR>against the regime of international order, which does offer the=20
weak<BR>at least some limited protection from predatory states. As for=20
the<BR>longer term, consequences are unpredictable. One plausible=20
observation<BR>is that "every bomb that falls on Serbia and every =
ethnic=20
killing in<BR>Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be possible for =
Serbs=20
and<BR>Albanians to live beside each other in some sort of peace"=20
(Financial<BR>Times, March 27). Some of the longer-term possible =
outcomes=20
are<BR>extremely ugly, as has not gone without notice.<BR><BR>A standard =
argument is that we had to do something: we could not<BR>simply stand by =
as=20
atrocities continue. That is never true. One<BR>choice, always, is to =
follow the=20
Hippocratic principle: "First, do no<BR>harm." If you can =
think of no=20
way to adhere to that elementary<BR>principle, then do nothing. There =
are always=20
ways that can be<BR>considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at =
an=20
end.<BR><BR>The right of "humanitarian intervention" is likely =
to be=20
more<BR>frequently invoked in coming years -- maybe with justification,=20
maybe<BR>not -- now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy. In =
such=20
an<BR>era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of=20
highly<BR>respected commentators -- not to speak of the World Court,=20
which<BR>explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision rejected by the=20
United<BR>States, its essentials not even reported.<BR><BR>In the =
scholarly=20
disciplines of international affairs and<BR>international law it would =
be hard=20
to find more respected voices than<BR>Hedley Bull or Leon Henkin. Bull =
warned 15=20
years ago that "Particular<BR>states or groups of states that set=20
themselves up as the authoritative<BR>judges of the world common good, =
in=20
disregard of the views of others,<BR>are in fact a menace to =
international=20
order, and thus to effective<BR>action in this field." Henkin, in a =
standard work on world order,<BR>writes that the "pressures eroding =
the=20
prohibition on the use of force<BR>are deplorable, and the arguments to=20
legitimize the use of force in<BR>those circumstances are unpersuasive =
and=20
dangerous... Violations of<BR>human rights are indeed all too common, =
and if it=20
were permissible to<BR>remedy them by external use of force, there would =
be no=20
law to forbid<BR>the use of force by almost any state against almost any =
other.=20
Human<BR>rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other=20
injustices<BR>remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the =
door=20
to<BR>aggression and destroying the principle advance in international=20
law,<BR>the outlawing of war and the prohibition of=20
force."<BR><BR>Recognized principles of international law and world =
order,=20
solemn<BR>treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court,=20
considered<BR>pronouncements by the most respected commentators -- these =
do=20
not<BR>automatically solve particular problems. Each issue has to=20
be<BR>considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt the standards =
of<BR>Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof to meet =
in<BR>undertaking=20
the threat or use of force in violation of the principles<BR>of =
international=20
order. Perhaps the burden can be met, but that has to<BR>be shown, not =
merely=20
proclaimed with passionate rhetoric. The<BR>consequences of such =
violations have=20
to be assessed carefully -- in<BR>particular, what we understand to be=20
"predictable." And for those who<BR>are minimally serious, the =
reasons=20
for the actions also have to be<BR>assessed -- again, not simply by =
adulation of=20
our leaders and their<BR>"moral compass."=20
_<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR> --- from =
list=20
postcolonial@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---<BR></DIV></BODY></HTML>
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I haven't got a date for this, and I'm not sure if this is what you're =
after, but here it is anyway:
The Current Bombings by Noam Chomsky
There have been many inquiries concerning NATO (meaning primarily US)
bombing in Kosovo. A great deal has een written about the topic,
including Znet commentaries. I'd like to make a few general
observations, keeping to facts that are not seriously contested.
There are two fundamental issues: (1) What are the accepted and
applicable "rules of world order"? (2) How do
these or other considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?
(1) What are the accepted and applicable "rules of world order"?
there is a regime of international law and international order,
binding on all states, based on the UN Charter and subsequent
resolutions and World Court decisions. In brief, the threat or use of
force is banned unless explicitly authorized by the Security Council
after it has determined that peaceful means have failed, or in
self-defense against "armed attack" (a narrow concept) until the
Security Council acts.
There is, of course, more to say. Thus there is at least a tension, if
not an outright contradiction, between the rules of world order laid
down in the UN Charter and the rights articulated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UD), a second pillar of the world order
established under US initiative after World War II. The Charter bans
force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees the rights of
individuals against oppressive states. The issue of "humanitarian
intervention" arises from this tension. It is the right of
"humanitarian intervention" that is claimed by the US/NATO in Kosovo,
and that is generally supported by editorial opinion and news reports
(in the latter case, reflexively, even by the very choice of
terminology).
The question is addressed in a news report in the NY Times (March 27),
headlined "Legal Scholars Support Case for Using Force" in Kosovo
(March 27). One example is offered: Allen Gerson, former counsel to
the US mission to the UN. Two other legal scholars are cited. One, Ted
Galen Carpenter, "scoffed at the Administration argument" and
dismissed the alleged right of intervention. The third is Jack
Goldsmith, a specialist on international law at Chicago Law school. He
says that critics of the NATO bombing "have a pretty good legal
argument," but "many people think [an exception for humanitarian
intervention] does exist as a matter of custom and practice." That
summarizes the evidence offered to justify the favored conclusion
stated in the headline.
Goldsmith's observation is reasonable, at least if we agree that facts
are relevant to the determination of "custom and practice." We may
also bear in mind a truism: the right of humanitarian intervention, if
it exists, is premised on the "good faith" of those intervening, and
that assumption is based not on their rhetoric but on their record, in
particular their record of adherence to the principles of
international law, World Court decisions, and so on. That is indeed a
truism, at least with regard to others. Consider, for example, Iranian
offers to intervene in Bosnia to prevent massacres at a time when the
West would not do so. These were dismissed with ridicule (in fact,
ignored); if there was a reason beyond subordination to power, it was
because Iranian "good faith" could not be assumed. A rational person
then asks obvious questions: is the Iranian record of intervention and
terror worse than that of the US? And other questions, for example:
How should we assess the "good faith" of the only country to have
vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to obey
international law? What about its historical record? Unless such
questions are prominent on the agenda of discourse, an honest person
will dismiss it as mere allegiance to doctrine. A useful exercise is
to determine how much of the literature - -- media or other --
survives such elementary conditions as these.
2) How do these or other considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?
There has been a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in the past year,
overwhelmingly attributable to Yugoslav military forces. The main
victims have been ethnic Albanian Kosovars, some 90% of the population
of this Yugoslav territory. The standard estimate is 2000 deaths and
hundreds of thousands of refugees.
In such cases, outsiders have three choices:
(I) try to escalate the catastrophe
(II) do nothing
(III) try to mitigate the catastrophe
The choices are illustrated by other contemporary cases. Let's keep to
a few of approximately the same scale, and ask where Kosovo fits into
the pattern. (A) Colombia. In Colombia, according to State Department
estimates, the annual level of political killing by the government and
its paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo, and
refugee flight primarily from their atrocities is well over a million.
Colombia has been the leading Western hemisphere recipient of US arms
and training as violence increased through the '90s, and that
assistance is now increasing, under a "drug war" pretext dismissed by
almost all serious observers. The Clinton administration was
particularly enthusiastic in its praise for President Gaviria, whose
tenure in office was responsible for "appalling levels of violence,"
according to human rights organizations, even surpassing his
predecessors. Details are readily available.
In this case, the US reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities.
(B) Turkey. By very conservative estimate, Turkish repression of Kurds
in the '90s falls in the category of Kosovo. It peaked in the early
'90s; one index is the flight of over a million Kurds from the
countryside to the unofficial Kurdish capital Diyarbakir from 1990 to
1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the countryside. 1994 marked
two records: it was "the year of the worst repression in the Kurdish
provinces" of Turkey, Jonathan Randal reported from the scene, and the
year when Turkey became "the biggest single importer of American
military hardware and thus the world's largest arms purchaser." When
human rights groups exposed Turkey's use of US jets to bomb villages,
the Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws requiring
suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in Indonesia and
elsewhere.
Colombia and Turkey explain their (US-supported) atrocities on grounds
that they are defending their countries from the threat of terrorist
guerrillas. As does the government of Yugoslavia.
Again, the example illustrates (I): try to escalate the atrocities.
(C) Laos. Every year thousands of people, mostly children and poor
farmers, are killed in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos, the scene
of the heaviest bombing of civilian targets in history it appears, and
arguably the most cruel: Washington's furious assault on a poor
peasant society had little to do with its wars in the region. The
worst period was from 1968, when Washington was compelled to undertake
negotiations (under popular and business pressure), ending the regular
bombardment of North Vietnam. Kissinger-Nixon then decided to shift
the planes to bombardment of Laos and Cambodia.
The deaths are from "bombies," tiny anti-personnel weapons, far worse
than land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and maim, and
have no effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain was saturated with
hundreds of millions of these criminal devices, which have a
failure-to-explode rate of 20%-30% according to the manufacturer,
Honeywell. The numbers suggest either remarkably poor quality control
or a rational policy of murdering civilians by delayed action. These
were only a fraction of the technology deployed, including advanced
missiles to penetrate caves where families sought shelter. Current
annual casualties from "bombies" are estimated from hundreds a year to
"an annual nationwide casualty rate of 20,000," more than half of them
deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter Barry Wain of the Wall
Street Journal -- in its Asia edition. A conservative estimate, then,
is that the crisis this year is approximately comparable to Kosovo,
though deaths are far more highly concentrated among children - --
over half, according to analyses reported by the Mennonite Central
Committee, which has been working there since 1977 to alleviate the
continuing atrocities.
There have been efforts to publicize and deal with the humanitarian
catastrophe. A British-based Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is trying to
remove the lethal objects, but the US is "conspicuously missing from
the handful of Western organisations that have followed MAG," the
British press reports, though it has finally agreed to train some
Laotian civilians. The British press also reports, with some anger,
the allegation of MAG specialists that the US refuses to provide them
with "render harmless procedures" that would make their work "a lot
quicker and a lot safer." These remain a state secret, as does the
whole affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports a very
similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region where
US bombardment from early 1969 was most intense.
In this case, the US reaction is (II): do nothing. And the reaction of
the media and commentators is to keep silent, following the norms
under which the war against Laos was designated a "secret war" --
meaning well-known, but suppressed, as also in the case of Cambodia
from March 1969. The level of self-censorship was extraordinary then,
as is the current phase. The relevance of this shocking example should
be obvious without further comment.
I will skip other examples of (I) and (II), which abound, and also
much more serious contemporary atrocities, such as the huge slaughter
of Iraqi civilians by means of a particularly vicious form of
biological warfare -- "a very hard choice," Madeleine Albright
commented on national TV in 1996 when asked for her reaction to the
killing of half a million Iraqi children in 5 years, but "we think the
price is worth it." Current estimates remain about 5000 children
killed a month, and the price is still "worth it." These and other
examples might also be kept in mind when we read awed rhetoric about
how the "moral compass" of the Clinton Administration is at last
functioning properly, as the Kosovo example illustrates.
Just what does the example illustrate? The threat of NATO bombing,
predictably, led to a sharp escalation of atrocities by the Serbian
Army and paramilitaries, and to the departure of international
observers, which of course had the same effect. Commanding General
Wesley Clark declared that it was "entirely predictable" that Serbian
terror and violence would intensify after the NATO bombing, exactly as
happened. The terror for the first time reached the capital city of
Pristina, and there are credible reports of large-scale destruction of
villages, assassinations, generation of an enormous refugee flow,
perhaps an effort to expel a good part of the Albanian population --
all an "entirely predictable" consequence of the threat and then the
use of force, as General Clark rightly observes.
Kosovo is therefore another illustration of (I): try to escalate the
violence, with exactly that expectation. To find examples illustrating
(III) is all too easy, at least if we keep to official rhetoric. The
major recent academic study of "humanitarian intervention," by Sean
Murphy, reviews the record after the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 which
outlawed war, and then since the UN Charter, which strengthened and
articulated these provisions. In the first phase, he writes, the most
prominent examples of "humanitarian intervention" were Japan's attack
on Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and Hitler's
occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia. All were accompanied by highly
uplifting humanitarian rhetoric, and factual justifications as well.
Japan was going to establish an "earthly paradise" as it defended
Manchurians from "Chinese bandits," with the support of a leading
Chinese nationalist, a far more credible figure than anyone the US was
able to conjure up during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini was
liberating thousands of slaves as he carried forth the Western
"civilizing mission." Hitler announced Germany's intention to end
ethnic tensions and violence, and "safeguard the national
individuality of the German and Czech peoples," in an operation
"filled with earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples
dwelling in the area," in accordance with their will; the Slovakian
President asked Hitler to declare Slovakia a protectorate.
Another useful intellectual exercise is to compare those obscene
justifications with those offered for interventions, including
"humanitarian interventions," in the post-UN Charter period.
In that period, perhaps the most compelling example of (III) is the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating Pol
Pot's atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded the right
of self-defense against armed attack, one of the few post-Charter
examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge regime
(Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous attacks against
Vietnam in border areas. The US reaction is instructive. The press
condemned the "Prussians" of Asia for their outrageous violation of
international law. They were harshly punished for the crime of having
terminated Pol Pot's slaughters, first by a (US-backed) Chinese
invasion, then by US imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. The US
recognized the expelled DK as the official government of Cambodia,
because of its "continuity" with the Pol Pot regime, the State
Department explained. Not too subtly, the US supported the Khmer Rouge
in its continuing attacks in Cambodia.
The example tells us more about the "custom and practice" that
underlies "the emerging legal norms of humanitarian intervention."
Despite the desperate efforts of ideologues to prove that circles are
square, there is no serious doubt that the NATO bombings further
undermine what remains of the fragile structure of international law.
The US made that entirely clear in the discussions leading to the NATO
decision. Apart from the UK (by now, about as much of an independent
actor as the Ukraine was in the pre-Gorbachev years), NATO countries
were skeptical of US policy, and were particularly annoyed by
Secretary of State Albright's "saber-rattling" (Kevin Cullen, Boston
Globe, Feb.22). Today, the more closely one approaches the conflicted
region, the greater the opposition to Washington's insistence on
force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy). France had called for a UN
Security Council resolution to authorize deployment of NATO
peacekeepers. The US flatly refused, insisting on "its stand that NATO
should be able to act independently of the United Nations," State
Department officials explained. The US refused to permit the
"neuralgic word `authorize'" to appear in the final NATO statement,
unwilling to concede any authority to the UN Charter and international
law; only the word "endorse" was permitted (Jane Perlez, NYT, Feb.
11).
Similarly the bombing of Iraq was a brazen expression of contempt for
the UN, even the specific timing, and was so understood. And of course
the same is true of the destruction of half the pharmaceutical
production of a small African country a few months earlier, an event
that also does not indicate that the "moral compass" is straying from
righteousness -- not to speak of a record that would be prominently
reviewed right now if facts were considered relevant to determining
"custom and practice."
It could be argued, rather plausibly, that further demolition of the
rules of world order is irrelevant, just as it had lost its meaning by
the late 1930s. The contempt of the world's leading power for the
framework of world order has become so extreme that there is nothing
left to discuss. A review of the internal documentary record
demonstrates that the stance traces back to the earliest days, even to
the first memorandum of the newly-formed National Security Council in
1947. During the Kennedy years, the stance began to gain overt
expression. The main innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is that
defiance of international law and the Charter has become entirely
open. It has also been backed with interesting explanations, which
would be on the front pages, and prominent in the school and
university curriculum, if truth and honesty were considered
significant values. The highest authorities explained with brutal
clarity that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had become
irrelevant because they no longer follow US orders, as they did in the
early postwar years.
One might then adopt the official position. That would be an honest
stand, at least if it were accompanied by refusal to play the cynical
game of self-righteous posturing and wielding of the despised
principles of international law as a highly selective weapon against
shifting enemies.
While the Reaganites broke new ground, under Clinton the defiance of
world order has become so extreme as to be of concern even to hawkish
policy analysts. In the current issue of the leading establishment
journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that Washington is
treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the world - --
probably most of the world, he suggests -- the US is "becoming the
rogue superpower," considered "the single greatest external threat to
their societies." Realist "international relations theory," he argues,
predicts that coalitions may arise to counterbalance the rogue
superpower. On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should be
reconsidered. Americans who prefer a different image of their society
might call for a reconsideration on other than pragmatic grounds.
Where does that leave the question of what to do in Kosovo? It leaves
it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action which, as it
explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and violence --
"predictably"; a course of action that also strikes yet another blow
against the regime of international order, which does offer the weak
at least some limited protection from predatory states. As for the
longer term, consequences are unpredictable. One plausible observation
is that "every bomb that falls on Serbia and every ethnic killing in
Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be possible for Serbs and
Albanians to live beside each other in some sort of peace" (Financial
Times, March 27). Some of the longer-term possible outcomes are
extremely ugly, as has not gone without notice.
A standard argument is that we had to do something: we could not
simply stand by as atrocities continue. That is never true. One
choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: "First, do no
harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary
principle, then do nothing. There are always ways that can be
considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end.
The right of "humanitarian intervention" is likely to be more
frequently invoked in coming years -- maybe with justification, maybe
not -- now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy. In such an
era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of highly
respected commentators -- not to speak of the World Court, which
explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision rejected by the United
States, its essentials not even reported.
In the scholarly disciplines of international affairs and
international law it would be hard to find more respected voices than
Hedley Bull or Leon Henkin. Bull warned 15 years ago that "Particular
states or groups of states that set themselves up as the authoritative
judges of the world common good, in disregard of the views of others,
are in fact a menace to international order, and thus to effective
action in this field." Henkin, in a standard work on world order,
writes that the "pressures eroding the prohibition on the use of force
are deplorable, and the arguments to legitimize the use of force in
those circumstances are unpersuasive and dangerous... Violations of
human rights are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible to
remedy them by external use of force, there would be no law to forbid
the use of force by almost any state against almost any other. Human
rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other injustices
remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the door to
aggression and destroying the principle advance in international law,
the outlawing of war and the prohibition of force."
Recognized principles of international law and world order, solemn
treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court, considered
pronouncements by the most respected commentators -- these do not
automatically solve particular problems. Each issue has to be
considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt the standards of
Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof to meet in
undertaking the threat or use of force in violation of the principles
of international order. Perhaps the burden can be met, but that has to
be shown, not merely proclaimed with passionate rhetoric. The
consequences of such violations have to be assessed carefully -- in
particular, what we understand to be "predictable." And for those who
are minimally serious, the reasons for the actions also have to be
assessed -- again, not simply by adulation of our leaders and their
"moral compass." _
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<DIV>I haven't got a date for this, and I'm not sure if this is what =
you're=20
after, but here it is anyway:<BR><BR>The Current Bombings by Noam=20
Chomsky<BR><BR>There have been many inquiries concerning NATO (meaning =
primarily=20
US)<BR>bombing in Kosovo. A great deal has een written about the=20
topic,<BR>including Znet commentaries. I'd like to make a few=20
general<BR>observations, keeping to facts that are not seriously=20
contested.<BR><BR>There are two fundamental issues: (1) What are the =
accepted=20
and<BR>applicable "rules of world order"? (2) How do<BR>these =
or other=20
considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?<BR><BR>(1) What are the =
accepted and=20
applicable "rules of world order"?<BR>there is a regime of=20
international law and international order,<BR>binding on all states, =
based on=20
the UN Charter and subsequent<BR>resolutions and World Court decisions. =
In=20
brief, the threat or use of<BR>force is banned unless explicitly =
authorized by=20
the Security Council<BR>after it has determined that peaceful means have =
failed,=20
or in<BR>self-defense against "armed attack" (a narrow =
concept) until=20
the<BR>Security Council acts.<BR><BR>There is, of course, more to say. =
Thus=20
there is at least a tension, if<BR>not an outright contradiction, =
between the=20
rules of world order laid<BR>down in the UN Charter and the rights =
articulated=20
in the Universal<BR>Declaration of Human Rights (UD), a second pillar of =
the=20
world order<BR>established under US initiative after World War II. The =
Charter=20
bans<BR>force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees the rights=20
of<BR>individuals against oppressive states. The issue of=20
"humanitarian<BR>intervention" arises from this tension. It is =
the=20
right of<BR>"humanitarian intervention" that is claimed by the =
US/NATO=20
in Kosovo,<BR>and that is generally supported by editorial opinion and =
news=20
reports<BR>(in the latter case, reflexively, even by the very choice=20
of<BR>terminology).<BR><BR>The question is addressed in a news report in =
the NY=20
Times (March 27),<BR>headlined "Legal Scholars Support Case for =
Using=20
Force" in Kosovo<BR>(March 27). One example is offered: Allen =
Gerson,=20
former counsel to<BR>the US mission to the UN. Two other legal scholars =
are=20
cited. One, Ted<BR>Galen Carpenter, "scoffed at the Administration=20
argument" and<BR>dismissed the alleged right of intervention. The =
third is=20
Jack<BR>Goldsmith, a specialist on international law at Chicago Law =
school.=20
He<BR>says that critics of the NATO bombing "have a pretty good=20
legal<BR>argument," but "many people think [an exception for=20
humanitarian<BR>intervention] does exist as a matter of custom and=20
practice." That<BR>summarizes the evidence offered to justify the =
favored=20
conclusion<BR>stated in the headline.<BR><BR>Goldsmith's observation is=20
reasonable, at least if we agree that facts<BR>are relevant to the =
determination=20
of "custom and practice." We may<BR>also bear in mind a =
truism: the=20
right of humanitarian intervention, if<BR>it exists, is premised on the=20
"good faith" of those intervening, and<BR>that assumption is =
based not=20
on their rhetoric but on their record, in<BR>particular their record of=20
adherence to the principles of<BR>international law, World Court =
decisions, and=20
so on. That is indeed a<BR>truism, at least with regard to others. =
Consider, for=20
example, Iranian<BR>offers to intervene in Bosnia to prevent massacres =
at a time=20
when the<BR>West would not do so. These were dismissed with ridicule (in =
fact,<BR>ignored); if there was a reason beyond subordination to power, =
it=20
was<BR>because Iranian "good faith" could not be assumed. A =
rational=20
person<BR>then asks obvious questions: is the Iranian record of =
intervention=20
and<BR>terror worse than that of the US? And other questions, for=20
example:<BR>How should we assess the "good faith" of the only =
country=20
to have<BR>vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to =
obey<BR>international law? What about its historical record? Unless=20
such<BR>questions are prominent on the agenda of discourse, an honest=20
person<BR>will dismiss it as mere allegiance to doctrine. A useful =
exercise=20
is<BR>to determine how much of the literature - -- media or other =
--<BR>survives=20
such elementary conditions as these.<BR><BR>2) How do these or other=20
considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?<BR>There has been a =
humanitarian=20
catastrophe in Kosovo in the past year,<BR>overwhelmingly attributable =
to=20
Yugoslav military forces. The main<BR>victims have been ethnic Albanian=20
Kosovars, some 90% of the population<BR>of this Yugoslav territory. The =
standard=20
estimate is 2000 deaths and<BR>hundreds of thousands of =
refugees.<BR><BR>In such=20
cases, outsiders have three choices:<BR><BR>(I) try to escalate the=20
catastrophe<BR><BR>(II) do nothing<BR><BR>(III) try to mitigate the=20
catastrophe<BR><BR>The choices are illustrated by other contemporary =
cases.=20
Let's keep to<BR>a few of approximately the same scale, and ask where =
Kosovo=20
fits into<BR>the pattern. (A) Colombia. In Colombia, according to State=20
Department<BR>estimates, the annual level of political killing by the =
government=20
and<BR>its paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo,=20
and<BR>refugee flight primarily from their atrocities is well over a=20
million.<BR>Colombia has been the leading Western hemisphere recipient =
of US=20
arms<BR>and training as violence increased through the '90s, and=20
that<BR>assistance is now increasing, under a "drug war" =
pretext=20
dismissed by<BR>almost all serious observers. The Clinton administration =
was<BR>particularly enthusiastic in its praise for President Gaviria,=20
whose<BR>tenure in office was responsible for "appalling levels of=20
violence,"<BR>according to human rights organizations, even =
surpassing=20
his<BR>predecessors. Details are readily available.<BR><BR>In this case, =
the US=20
reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities.<BR><BR>(B) Turkey. By very=20
conservative estimate, Turkish repression of Kurds<BR>in the '90s falls =
in the=20
category of Kosovo. It peaked in the early<BR>'90s; one index is the =
flight of=20
over a million Kurds from the<BR>countryside to the unofficial Kurdish =
capital=20
Diyarbakir from 1990 to<BR>1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the =
countryside. 1994 marked<BR>two records: it was "the year of the =
worst=20
repression in the Kurdish<BR>provinces" of Turkey, Jonathan Randal =
reported=20
from the scene, and the<BR>year when Turkey became "the biggest =
single=20
importer of American<BR>military hardware and thus the world's largest =
arms=20
purchaser." When<BR>human rights groups exposed Turkey's use of US =
jets to=20
bomb villages,<BR>the Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws=20
requiring<BR>suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in =
Indonesia=20
and<BR>elsewhere.<BR><BR>Colombia and Turkey explain their =
(US-supported)=20
atrocities on grounds<BR>that they are defending their countries from =
the threat=20
of terrorist<BR>guerrillas. As does the government of =
Yugoslavia.<BR><BR>Again,=20
the example illustrates (I): try to escalate the atrocities.<BR><BR>(C) =
Laos.=20
Every year thousands of people, mostly children and poor<BR>farmers, are =
killed=20
in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos, the scene<BR>of the heaviest =
bombing of=20
civilian targets in history it appears, and<BR>arguably the most cruel:=20
Washington's furious assault on a poor<BR>peasant society had little to =
do with=20
its wars in the region. The<BR>worst period was from 1968, when =
Washington was=20
compelled to undertake<BR>negotiations (under popular and business =
pressure),=20
ending the regular<BR>bombardment of North Vietnam. Kissinger-Nixon then =
decided=20
to shift<BR>the planes to bombardment of Laos and Cambodia.<BR><BR>The =
deaths=20
are from "bombies," tiny anti-personnel weapons, far =
worse<BR>than=20
land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and maim, and<BR>have =
no=20
effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain was saturated =
with<BR>hundreds of=20
millions of these criminal devices, which have a<BR>failure-to-explode =
rate of=20
20%-30% according to the manufacturer,<BR>Honeywell. The numbers suggest =
either=20
remarkably poor quality control<BR>or a rational policy of murdering =
civilians=20
by delayed action. These<BR>were only a fraction of the technology =
deployed,=20
including advanced<BR>missiles to penetrate caves where families sought =
shelter.=20
Current<BR>annual casualties from "bombies" are estimated from =
hundreds a year to<BR>"an annual nationwide casualty rate of =
20,000,"=20
more than half of them<BR>deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter =
Barry=20
Wain of the Wall<BR>Street Journal -- in its Asia edition. A =
conservative=20
estimate, then,<BR>is that the crisis this year is approximately =
comparable to=20
Kosovo,<BR>though deaths are far more highly concentrated among children =
-=20
--<BR>over half, according to analyses reported by the Mennonite=20
Central<BR>Committee, which has been working there since 1977 to =
alleviate=20
the<BR>continuing atrocities.<BR><BR>There have been efforts to =
publicize and=20
deal with the humanitarian<BR>catastrophe. A British-based Mine Advisory =
Group=20
(MAG) is trying to<BR>remove the lethal objects, but the US is=20
"conspicuously missing from<BR>the handful of Western organisations =
that=20
have followed MAG," the<BR>British press reports, though it has =
finally=20
agreed to train some<BR>Laotian civilians. The British press also =
reports, with=20
some anger,<BR>the allegation of MAG specialists that the US refuses to =
provide=20
them<BR>with "render harmless procedures" that would make =
their work=20
"a lot<BR>quicker and a lot safer." These remain a state =
secret, as=20
does the<BR>whole affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports =
a=20
very<BR>similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region=20
where<BR>US bombardment from early 1969 was most intense.<BR><BR>In this =
case,=20
the US reaction is (II): do nothing. And the reaction of<BR>the media =
and=20
commentators is to keep silent, following the norms<BR>under which the =
war=20
against Laos was designated a "secret war" --<BR>meaning =
well-known,=20
but suppressed, as also in the case of Cambodia<BR>from March 1969. The =
level of=20
self-censorship was extraordinary then,<BR>as is the current phase. The=20
relevance of this shocking example should<BR>be obvious without further=20
comment.<BR><BR>I will skip other examples of (I) and (II), which =
abound, and=20
also<BR>much more serious contemporary atrocities, such as the huge=20
slaughter<BR>of Iraqi civilians by means of a particularly vicious form=20
of<BR>biological warfare -- "a very hard choice," Madeleine=20
Albright<BR>commented on national TV in 1996 when asked for her reaction =
to=20
the<BR>killing of half a million Iraqi children in 5 years, but "we =
think=20
the<BR>price is worth it." Current estimates remain about 5000=20
children<BR>killed a month, and the price is still "worth it." =
These=20
and other<BR>examples might also be kept in mind when we read awed =
rhetoric=20
about<BR>how the "moral compass" of the Clinton Administration =
is at=20
last<BR>functioning properly, as the Kosovo example =
illustrates.<BR><BR>Just=20
what does the example illustrate? The threat of NATO =
bombing,<BR>predictably,=20
led to a sharp escalation of atrocities by the Serbian<BR>Army and=20
paramilitaries, and to the departure of international<BR>observers, =
which of=20
course had the same effect. Commanding General<BR>Wesley Clark declared =
that it=20
was "entirely predictable" that Serbian<BR>terror and violence =
would=20
intensify after the NATO bombing, exactly as<BR>happened. The terror for =
the=20
first time reached the capital city of<BR>Pristina, and there are =
credible=20
reports of large-scale destruction of<BR>villages, assassinations, =
generation of=20
an enormous refugee flow,<BR>perhaps an effort to expel a good part of =
the=20
Albanian population --<BR>all an "entirely predictable" =
consequence of=20
the threat and then the<BR>use of force, as General Clark rightly=20
observes.<BR><BR>Kosovo is therefore another illustration of (I): try to =
escalate the<BR>violence, with exactly that expectation. To find =
examples=20
illustrating<BR>(III) is all too easy, at least if we keep to official =
rhetoric.=20
The<BR>major recent academic study of "humanitarian =
intervention," by=20
Sean<BR>Murphy, reviews the record after the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 =
which<BR>outlawed war, and then since the UN Charter, which strengthened =
and<BR>articulated these provisions. In the first phase, he writes, the=20
most<BR>prominent examples of "humanitarian intervention" were =
Japan's=20
attack<BR>on Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and=20
Hitler's<BR>occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia. All were accompanied =
by=20
highly<BR>uplifting humanitarian rhetoric, and factual justifications as =
well.<BR>Japan was going to establish an "earthly paradise" as =
it=20
defended<BR>Manchurians from "Chinese bandits," with the =
support of a=20
leading<BR>Chinese nationalist, a far more credible figure than anyone =
the US=20
was<BR>able to conjure up during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini=20
was<BR>liberating thousands of slaves as he carried forth the=20
Western<BR>"civilizing mission." Hitler announced Germany's =
intention=20
to end<BR>ethnic tensions and violence, and "safeguard the=20
national<BR>individuality of the German and Czech peoples," in an=20
operation<BR>"filled with earnest desire to serve the true =
interests of the=20
peoples<BR>dwelling in the area," in accordance with their will; =
the=20
Slovakian<BR>President asked Hitler to declare Slovakia a=20
protectorate.<BR><BR>Another useful intellectual exercise is to compare =
those=20
obscene<BR>justifications with those offered for interventions,=20
including<BR>"humanitarian interventions," in the post-UN =
Charter=20
period.<BR><BR>In that period, perhaps the most compelling example of =
(III) is=20
the<BR>Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating=20
Pol<BR>Pot's atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded the=20
right<BR>of self-defense against armed attack, one of the few=20
post-Charter<BR>examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge=20
regime<BR>(Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous attacks=20
against<BR>Vietnam in border areas. The US reaction is instructive. The=20
press<BR>condemned the "Prussians" of Asia for their =
outrageous=20
violation of<BR>international law. They were harshly punished for the =
crime of=20
having<BR>terminated Pol Pot's slaughters, first by a (US-backed)=20
Chinese<BR>invasion, then by US imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. =
The=20
US<BR>recognized the expelled DK as the official government of=20
Cambodia,<BR>because of its "continuity" with the Pol Pot =
regime, the=20
State<BR>Department explained. Not too subtly, the US supported the =
Khmer=20
Rouge<BR>in its continuing attacks in Cambodia.<BR><BR>The example tells =
us more=20
about the "custom and practice" that<BR>underlies "the =
emerging=20
legal norms of humanitarian intervention."<BR><BR>Despite the =
desperate=20
efforts of ideologues to prove that circles are<BR>square, there is no =
serious=20
doubt that the NATO bombings further<BR>undermine what remains of the =
fragile=20
structure of international law.<BR>The US made that entirely clear in =
the=20
discussions leading to the NATO<BR>decision. Apart from the UK (by now, =
about as=20
much of an independent<BR>actor as the Ukraine was in the pre-Gorbachev =
years),=20
NATO countries<BR>were skeptical of US policy, and were particularly =
annoyed=20
by<BR>Secretary of State Albright's "saber-rattling" (Kevin =
Cullen,=20
Boston<BR>Globe, Feb.22). Today, the more closely one approaches the=20
conflicted<BR>region, the greater the opposition to Washington's =
insistence=20
on<BR>force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy). France had called for =
a=20
UN<BR>Security Council resolution to authorize deployment of=20
NATO<BR>peacekeepers. The US flatly refused, insisting on "its =
stand that=20
NATO<BR>should be able to act independently of the United Nations," =
State<BR>Department officials explained. The US refused to permit=20
the<BR>"neuralgic word `authorize'" to appear in the final =
NATO=20
statement,<BR>unwilling to concede any authority to the UN Charter and=20
international<BR>law; only the word "endorse" was permitted =
(Jane=20
Perlez, NYT, Feb.<BR>11).<BR><BR>Similarly the bombing of Iraq was a =
brazen=20
expression of contempt for<BR>the UN, even the specific timing, and was =
so=20
understood. And of course<BR>the same is true of the destruction of half =
the=20
pharmaceutical<BR>production of a small African country a few months =
earlier, an=20
event<BR>that also does not indicate that the "moral compass" =
is=20
straying from<BR>righteousness -- not to speak of a record that would be =
prominently<BR>reviewed right now if facts were considered relevant to=20
determining<BR>"custom and practice."<BR><BR>It could be =
argued,=20
rather plausibly, that further demolition of the<BR>rules of world order =
is=20
irrelevant, just as it had lost its meaning by<BR>the late 1930s. The =
contempt=20
of the world's leading power for the<BR>framework of world order has =
become so=20
extreme that there is nothing<BR>left to discuss. A review of the =
internal=20
documentary record<BR>demonstrates that the stance traces back to the =
earliest=20
days, even to<BR>the first memorandum of the newly-formed National =
Security=20
Council in<BR>1947. During the Kennedy years, the stance began to gain=20
overt<BR>expression. The main innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is=20
that<BR>defiance of international law and the Charter has become=20
entirely<BR>open. It has also been backed with interesting explanations, =
which<BR>would be on the front pages, and prominent in the school=20
and<BR>university curriculum, if truth and honesty were=20
considered<BR>significant values. The highest authorities explained with =
brutal<BR>clarity that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had=20
become<BR>irrelevant because they no longer follow US orders, as they =
did in=20
the<BR>early postwar years.<BR><BR>One might then adopt the official =
position.=20
That would be an honest<BR>stand, at least if it were accompanied by =
refusal to=20
play the cynical<BR>game of self-righteous posturing and wielding of the =
despised<BR>principles of international law as a highly selective weapon =
against<BR>shifting enemies.<BR><BR>While the Reaganites broke new =
ground, under=20
Clinton the defiance of<BR>world order has become so extreme as to be of =
concern=20
even to hawkish<BR>policy analysts. In the current issue of the leading=20
establishment<BR>journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that=20
Washington is<BR>treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the =
world -=20
--<BR>probably most of the world, he suggests -- the US is =
"becoming=20
the<BR>rogue superpower," considered "the single greatest =
external=20
threat to<BR>their societies." Realist "international =
relations=20
theory," he argues,<BR>predicts that coalitions may arise to =
counterbalance=20
the rogue<BR>superpower. On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should=20
be<BR>reconsidered. Americans who prefer a different image of their=20
society<BR>might call for a reconsideration on other than pragmatic=20
grounds.<BR><BR>Where does that leave the question of what to do in =
Kosovo? It=20
leaves<BR>it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action which, as=20
it<BR>explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and violence=20
--<BR>"predictably"; a course of action that also strikes yet =
another=20
blow<BR>against the regime of international order, which does offer the=20
weak<BR>at least some limited protection from predatory states. As for=20
the<BR>longer term, consequences are unpredictable. One plausible=20
observation<BR>is that "every bomb that falls on Serbia and every =
ethnic=20
killing in<BR>Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be possible for =
Serbs=20
and<BR>Albanians to live beside each other in some sort of peace"=20
(Financial<BR>Times, March 27). Some of the longer-term possible =
outcomes=20
are<BR>extremely ugly, as has not gone without notice.<BR><BR>A standard =
argument is that we had to do something: we could not<BR>simply stand by =
as=20
atrocities continue. That is never true. One<BR>choice, always, is to =
follow the=20
Hippocratic principle: "First, do no<BR>harm." If you can =
think of no=20
way to adhere to that elementary<BR>principle, then do nothing. There =
are always=20
ways that can be<BR>considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at =
an=20
end.<BR><BR>The right of "humanitarian intervention" is likely =
to be=20
more<BR>frequently invoked in coming years -- maybe with justification,=20
maybe<BR>not -- now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy. In =
such=20
an<BR>era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of=20
highly<BR>respected commentators -- not to speak of the World Court,=20
which<BR>explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision rejected by the=20
United<BR>States, its essentials not even reported.<BR><BR>In the =
scholarly=20
disciplines of international affairs and<BR>international law it would =
be hard=20
to find more respected voices than<BR>Hedley Bull or Leon Henkin. Bull =
warned 15=20
years ago that "Particular<BR>states or groups of states that set=20
themselves up as the authoritative<BR>judges of the world common good, =
in=20
disregard of the views of others,<BR>are in fact a menace to =
international=20
order, and thus to effective<BR>action in this field." Henkin, in a =
standard work on world order,<BR>writes that the "pressures eroding =
the=20
prohibition on the use of force<BR>are deplorable, and the arguments to=20
legitimize the use of force in<BR>those circumstances are unpersuasive =
and=20
dangerous... Violations of<BR>human rights are indeed all too common, =
and if it=20
were permissible to<BR>remedy them by external use of force, there would =
be no=20
law to forbid<BR>the use of force by almost any state against almost any =
other.=20
Human<BR>rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other=20
injustices<BR>remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the =
door=20
to<BR>aggression and destroying the principle advance in international=20
law,<BR>the outlawing of war and the prohibition of=20
force."<BR><BR>Recognized principles of international law and world =
order,=20
solemn<BR>treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court,=20
considered<BR>pronouncements by the most respected commentators -- these =
do=20
not<BR>automatically solve particular problems. Each issue has to=20
be<BR>considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt the standards =
of<BR>Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof to meet =
in<BR>undertaking=20
the threat or use of force in violation of the principles<BR>of =
international=20
order. Perhaps the burden can be met, but that has to<BR>be shown, not =
merely=20
proclaimed with passionate rhetoric. The<BR>consequences of such =
violations have=20
to be assessed carefully -- in<BR>particular, what we understand to be=20
"predictable." And for those who<BR>are minimally serious, the =
reasons=20
for the actions also have to be<BR>assessed -- again, not simply by =
adulation of=20
our leaders and their<BR>"moral compass."=20
_<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR> --- from =
list=20
postcolonial@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---<BR></DIV></BODY></HTML>
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