Mitchell,
I've written a paper on Sartre and Foucault on freedom. If you'd like a
copy, I'd be happy to send it to you by regular mail or as an attachment to
your Emal address.
-- John
----- Original Message -----
From: Mitchell D. Wilson <lobster@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: creece <creece@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; greg <aztec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>;
<rstill@xxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, June 04, 1999 7:30 AM
Subject: sartre
> What do you Foucauldians make of this?
>
> "There is no inertia in consciousness" (Sartre 1957:8).
>
> [I'm hoping to get some refs/ideas for my following argument.]
>
> "There is no inertia in consciousness" for Sartre because our actions are
> always being pulled along by our responses to reality, meaning we are
always
> presented with a choice, "always" being a key word here, meaning that we
> always have to respond, that reality presents us with options from which
we
> must always choose, and (the ringer) since we always have a choice then we
> are always free, because freedom is stipulated as "having a choice"--this
is
> Sartre's idea of freedom? This could be circular logic? Sartre stipulates
> freedom as "having a choice" (don't have a ref but I remember it from a
> philosophy class, hope that's good enough) and then reasons that if you
> always have a choice then you must always be free.
>
> Foucault would with some brilliant historical example, which I can't do,
so
> I'll just say that a Foucauldian would counter with criticism on Sartre's
> brand of "choice." What are we free to choose? The answer could be simple.
> It could be that we are only ostensibly free in that the choices
themselves
> from which we "choose" are determined, and so in the end we are not so
free
> as Sartre claims.
>
> Is Sartre perverse or can a philosopher intentionally define freedom as
the
> fact of always having to choose? "Having" is the key word here. If all we
> can ever do is respond to some stimuli, i.e., respond to a situation from
> which we must choose, then how can we be truly free when reality has up
> jumping through one of its hoops?
>
> But the above is assuming--in "reality has us jumping through hoops"--that
> we are puppets jumping through hoops, being led around by the nose with
the
> very constructions of reality hoisted on us by a, possibly Marxist (?),
> social determinism in which there's a one to one correspondence between
> representation and reality, which in a round aboutly sinister way has lead
> us right back to structuralism, not quite Foucauldian theory.
>
> So to avoid this round trip contradiction, we could talk about Foucauldian
> power. Power for Foucault, please someone elaborate for me here, is
> productive and always creates its own resistance due to the fact power
> creates the options from which people choose--are we back at Sartre?
>
> Foucault, as I understand, came along in the 60s and laid waste to
Sartrean
> "freedom"? How?
>
> m
>
I've written a paper on Sartre and Foucault on freedom. If you'd like a
copy, I'd be happy to send it to you by regular mail or as an attachment to
your Emal address.
-- John
----- Original Message -----
From: Mitchell D. Wilson <lobster@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: creece <creece@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; greg <aztec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>;
<rstill@xxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, June 04, 1999 7:30 AM
Subject: sartre
> What do you Foucauldians make of this?
>
> "There is no inertia in consciousness" (Sartre 1957:8).
>
> [I'm hoping to get some refs/ideas for my following argument.]
>
> "There is no inertia in consciousness" for Sartre because our actions are
> always being pulled along by our responses to reality, meaning we are
always
> presented with a choice, "always" being a key word here, meaning that we
> always have to respond, that reality presents us with options from which
we
> must always choose, and (the ringer) since we always have a choice then we
> are always free, because freedom is stipulated as "having a choice"--this
is
> Sartre's idea of freedom? This could be circular logic? Sartre stipulates
> freedom as "having a choice" (don't have a ref but I remember it from a
> philosophy class, hope that's good enough) and then reasons that if you
> always have a choice then you must always be free.
>
> Foucault would with some brilliant historical example, which I can't do,
so
> I'll just say that a Foucauldian would counter with criticism on Sartre's
> brand of "choice." What are we free to choose? The answer could be simple.
> It could be that we are only ostensibly free in that the choices
themselves
> from which we "choose" are determined, and so in the end we are not so
free
> as Sartre claims.
>
> Is Sartre perverse or can a philosopher intentionally define freedom as
the
> fact of always having to choose? "Having" is the key word here. If all we
> can ever do is respond to some stimuli, i.e., respond to a situation from
> which we must choose, then how can we be truly free when reality has up
> jumping through one of its hoops?
>
> But the above is assuming--in "reality has us jumping through hoops"--that
> we are puppets jumping through hoops, being led around by the nose with
the
> very constructions of reality hoisted on us by a, possibly Marxist (?),
> social determinism in which there's a one to one correspondence between
> representation and reality, which in a round aboutly sinister way has lead
> us right back to structuralism, not quite Foucauldian theory.
>
> So to avoid this round trip contradiction, we could talk about Foucauldian
> power. Power for Foucault, please someone elaborate for me here, is
> productive and always creates its own resistance due to the fact power
> creates the options from which people choose--are we back at Sartre?
>
> Foucault, as I understand, came along in the 60s and laid waste to
Sartrean
> "freedom"? How?
>
> m
>