On Thu, 16 Dec 1999, Sebastian Gurciullo wrote:
> While John's criticism of those who wish to introduce vitalism and
> agonistic liberation of difference into Foucault's thought seems
> reasonable and to some extent justified
To a large extent, yes.
> his concluding remarks regarding the possiblity of change based purely
> on paying attention to "transcription errors" in the code or
> socio-genetic mutations seems rather reductive.
Well, it was Foucault's remark, not JR's.
> While it may make sense in the context of Foucault's geneaologies and
> his 1970s theory of power, it makes no reference to Foucault's late
> work (apart from the introduction to Canguilhem's <The Normal and the
> Pathological>).
When was that introduction written, anyway?
> Furthermore, the "transcription error" reading seems to miss the
> exploration and articulation of a form of reflexivity or
> performativity in Foucault's late work which it seems to me was
> present in all his very stylishly written early works.
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by reflexivity or performativity ...
seems as if you should mean something like subjective freedom--good old
free will. I agree that "transcription errors" don't come close to doing
justice to the sense of freedom that Foucault seems to have, not only at
the end, but from Madness and Civilization onward ... it seems to put
Foucault on the mechanistic as opposed to vitalistic side of things, which
seems, if anything, even worse. (On only a little bit of a tangent: JR
points out how F. aligns himself with the philosophers of science,
Canguilhem etc., as opposed to the phenomenologists Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty. It seems to me as if he always did so despite himself, that
his real sympathies always lay with the phenomenologist/existentialists.
Again, with Foucault as with Nietzsche, there's always a fine line between
criticism and self-criticism.)
I think Ian Hacking, in his article at the end of Foucault: A Critical
Reader, pretty neatly dispenses with the problem of freedom for Foucault
by pointing out that while Foucault can't account for freedom, neither can
anybody else. It's a mystery. As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever
shall be.
Matthew
---Matthew A. King---Department of Philosophy---York University, Toronto---
dear readers, my apologies.
I'm drifting in and out of sleep.
---------------------------------(R.E.M.)----------------------------------
> While John's criticism of those who wish to introduce vitalism and
> agonistic liberation of difference into Foucault's thought seems
> reasonable and to some extent justified
To a large extent, yes.
> his concluding remarks regarding the possiblity of change based purely
> on paying attention to "transcription errors" in the code or
> socio-genetic mutations seems rather reductive.
Well, it was Foucault's remark, not JR's.
> While it may make sense in the context of Foucault's geneaologies and
> his 1970s theory of power, it makes no reference to Foucault's late
> work (apart from the introduction to Canguilhem's <The Normal and the
> Pathological>).
When was that introduction written, anyway?
> Furthermore, the "transcription error" reading seems to miss the
> exploration and articulation of a form of reflexivity or
> performativity in Foucault's late work which it seems to me was
> present in all his very stylishly written early works.
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by reflexivity or performativity ...
seems as if you should mean something like subjective freedom--good old
free will. I agree that "transcription errors" don't come close to doing
justice to the sense of freedom that Foucault seems to have, not only at
the end, but from Madness and Civilization onward ... it seems to put
Foucault on the mechanistic as opposed to vitalistic side of things, which
seems, if anything, even worse. (On only a little bit of a tangent: JR
points out how F. aligns himself with the philosophers of science,
Canguilhem etc., as opposed to the phenomenologists Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty. It seems to me as if he always did so despite himself, that
his real sympathies always lay with the phenomenologist/existentialists.
Again, with Foucault as with Nietzsche, there's always a fine line between
criticism and self-criticism.)
I think Ian Hacking, in his article at the end of Foucault: A Critical
Reader, pretty neatly dispenses with the problem of freedom for Foucault
by pointing out that while Foucault can't account for freedom, neither can
anybody else. It's a mystery. As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever
shall be.
Matthew
---Matthew A. King---Department of Philosophy---York University, Toronto---
dear readers, my apologies.
I'm drifting in and out of sleep.
---------------------------------(R.E.M.)----------------------------------