on 5/19/00 1:25 AM, David Schenk at djschenk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> (6) I am unimpressed by appeals to the fact that the laws of reason do
> not rationally justify themselves. That strikes me as a line of
> argument structurally (and intellectually) akin to the argument
> whereby the proposition "there is no truth" is shown to be
> self-defeating, thus refuting global relativism or social or
> linguistic constructivism or the "Strong Programme" or whatever
> folks choose to call it around here. It is cheaper than a cheap
> stunt.
Such a reading, however, comes from a misinterpretation of what the
statement "there is no truth" means. Rather than saying that "Truth" does
not exist, it points out that "Truth" does not exist independent of its
construction in terms of knowledge.
Saying that "there is no truth" is itself a truth that negates the existence
of universals. Perhaps such a performative contradiction, however, can
actually help us move beyond the restrictions of "rational thought" -- not
to say that we need to abandon rationality, but that we need to understand
it as a project rather than as a way of being.
> On the other hand, I most certainly am impressed by any
> nice clean, tidy, formally valid arguments the conclusions of which
> go something like "the laws of reason are not universally binding,"
> or "the laws of reason cannot be known to be universally binding," or
> even better "the laws of reason can be proven not to be universally
> binding." I mean, even Descartes in Med. I and Hume in his Treatise
> gave us good reasons to worry about that. In connection with this, I
> am very interested in the reply from John Ransom. If it can be made
> to go, it strikes as one of the most promising lines of argument,
> though we will have to evaluate it for formal soundness.
What is "formal soundness?" Who determines whether it is formally sound and
on what grounds? How do we know when we've reached a conclusion that ever is
formally sound, particularly given the constant revisions of philosophical
standpoints?
It seems that you are establishing the standards upon which any post-modern
reading should be based in terms of the structures that are being critiqued.
The point is not that "We have a proof that shows rationality is flawed" but
that rationality establishes itself so that _no proof_ can _ever_ disprove
it -- it is fundamentally impossible, as the very notion of "the proof" is
based on "the" rational framework.
Perhaps one of the most important considerations in this work is the
recognition that we often come up with answers and then trace our way to
them. This seems to be one of Foucault's primary concerns as he focuses on
what we have done rather than what we can/should do.
---
Asher Haig ahaig@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Greenhill Debate Dartmouth 2004
> (6) I am unimpressed by appeals to the fact that the laws of reason do
> not rationally justify themselves. That strikes me as a line of
> argument structurally (and intellectually) akin to the argument
> whereby the proposition "there is no truth" is shown to be
> self-defeating, thus refuting global relativism or social or
> linguistic constructivism or the "Strong Programme" or whatever
> folks choose to call it around here. It is cheaper than a cheap
> stunt.
Such a reading, however, comes from a misinterpretation of what the
statement "there is no truth" means. Rather than saying that "Truth" does
not exist, it points out that "Truth" does not exist independent of its
construction in terms of knowledge.
Saying that "there is no truth" is itself a truth that negates the existence
of universals. Perhaps such a performative contradiction, however, can
actually help us move beyond the restrictions of "rational thought" -- not
to say that we need to abandon rationality, but that we need to understand
it as a project rather than as a way of being.
> On the other hand, I most certainly am impressed by any
> nice clean, tidy, formally valid arguments the conclusions of which
> go something like "the laws of reason are not universally binding,"
> or "the laws of reason cannot be known to be universally binding," or
> even better "the laws of reason can be proven not to be universally
> binding." I mean, even Descartes in Med. I and Hume in his Treatise
> gave us good reasons to worry about that. In connection with this, I
> am very interested in the reply from John Ransom. If it can be made
> to go, it strikes as one of the most promising lines of argument,
> though we will have to evaluate it for formal soundness.
What is "formal soundness?" Who determines whether it is formally sound and
on what grounds? How do we know when we've reached a conclusion that ever is
formally sound, particularly given the constant revisions of philosophical
standpoints?
It seems that you are establishing the standards upon which any post-modern
reading should be based in terms of the structures that are being critiqued.
The point is not that "We have a proof that shows rationality is flawed" but
that rationality establishes itself so that _no proof_ can _ever_ disprove
it -- it is fundamentally impossible, as the very notion of "the proof" is
based on "the" rational framework.
Perhaps one of the most important considerations in this work is the
recognition that we often come up with answers and then trace our way to
them. This seems to be one of Foucault's primary concerns as he focuses on
what we have done rather than what we can/should do.
---
Asher Haig ahaig@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Greenhill Debate Dartmouth 2004