In response to confusion about the nature of my question, here goes:
In _Being and Nothingness_, Sartre argues for an ethic of
responsibility whereby we view our actions as ultimately constitutive of our
own ontology. Although Sartre's ethic is derived from the idea of a pregiven
subject, when I encountered Foucault's notion of treating the self as a work
of art, it struck me as similar to the ethic Sartre proposes. This led me to
question the relationship of these philosophers to Nietzsche's work, since
Nietzsche heavily influenced both Sartre and Foucault.
I think the notion of performativity helps to clarify all this. The
alternatives suggested by Foucault and Butler are based on a criticism of
the notion of a pregiven subject. If I remember correctly, McCarthy as
questioned how Foucault can both deny the existence of and advocate the
action of a subject. Jessica Kulynych argues that McCarthy misguidedly views
political participation as being representative, rather than performative.
Here, we need to draw a distinction between the body and the subject. The
BODY is pregiven. There is always a living human being that has the
potentiality to act. It is the subject position from which this living being
is acting that is unstable.
Nietzsche discusses the way the slave morality debases humanity. It
imposes a "mob"-ized subjectivity. Here, Nietzsche's rejection of this slave
morality seems in line with a performative understanding of resistance.
Resisting one's own subjectification brings into being a restive subject.
Ultimately, the resistance that Butler and Kulynych describe seems to be
readily translatable into Nietzschean terms.
Once again, my greatest apologies--I am something of a novice when it
comes to Foucault.
In _Being and Nothingness_, Sartre argues for an ethic of
responsibility whereby we view our actions as ultimately constitutive of our
own ontology. Although Sartre's ethic is derived from the idea of a pregiven
subject, when I encountered Foucault's notion of treating the self as a work
of art, it struck me as similar to the ethic Sartre proposes. This led me to
question the relationship of these philosophers to Nietzsche's work, since
Nietzsche heavily influenced both Sartre and Foucault.
I think the notion of performativity helps to clarify all this. The
alternatives suggested by Foucault and Butler are based on a criticism of
the notion of a pregiven subject. If I remember correctly, McCarthy as
questioned how Foucault can both deny the existence of and advocate the
action of a subject. Jessica Kulynych argues that McCarthy misguidedly views
political participation as being representative, rather than performative.
Here, we need to draw a distinction between the body and the subject. The
BODY is pregiven. There is always a living human being that has the
potentiality to act. It is the subject position from which this living being
is acting that is unstable.
Nietzsche discusses the way the slave morality debases humanity. It
imposes a "mob"-ized subjectivity. Here, Nietzsche's rejection of this slave
morality seems in line with a performative understanding of resistance.
Resisting one's own subjectification brings into being a restive subject.
Ultimately, the resistance that Butler and Kulynych describe seems to be
readily translatable into Nietzschean terms.
Once again, my greatest apologies--I am something of a novice when it
comes to Foucault.