Dear Richard,
You ask if there is any interest among Foucault scholars in a confrontation
with the rational choice community. My feeling is that there is little
scope for such a confrontation and that the major obstacles lie on the
rational choice side.
I write as someone who has tried to engage in critical debate with rat
choice scholars and found them to be generally unwilling to allow their
fundamental assumptions to be brought into question - especially those
concerning the human individual. (See, for example, my _Choice, Rationality
and Social Theory_, Unwin-Hyman, 1988)
The conceptualisation of the human individual is the basic issue in your
attempt to use Foucault's account of the productivity of power - the claim
that power can affect, among other things, the capacities and attributes of
human individuals. Thus, for those of us who take F's arguments seriously,
it is simply not possible to take the rational actor model - the assumption
of rationality - as a starting point for our analysis. Rather, we would
tend to see the forms of calculation (the forms of 'rationality') available
to an individual as variable, as the products of particular conditions -
that is, as a matter of empirical inquiry, not of definitional fiat.
Thus, when you ask "Are there any fundamental objections to use Foucault's
insights on productive power in a rational choice context?", the answer
would have to be that the use of F's insights would subvert the context in
which you want to use them.
I'll be in Carleton University in July and August this year. We could
debate these issues then.
best wishes,
Barry
>Hello All,
> I am a Ph.D. student in economics/public policy and I am
>currently writing my thesis. My research project seeks to use Foucault's
>concept of productive power to develop a rational model of institutional
>choice.
>
>Economists have for very long been puzzled with respect to why
>hierarchies exist as an economic form of organization. Is there any
>rational that may explain why it is sometimes better for individuals to
>transact within a hierarchy where the actions, the choices of some
>individuals are conducted by others rather than within a market where no
>individuals exercise any power, any (direct) influence on the choices
>and actions made by others?
>
>Thus far, the most popular answer to this question has been provided by
>the transaction cost approach that claims that some market transactions
>are beset by transaction costs. Transaction costs are attributes of the
>goods that are transacted that have the effect of creating opportunistic
>(unwanted) behavior on the part of certain transactors. In this context,
>exercising power over an individual is seen as a means to mitigate
>opportunistic behavior on the part of this individual.
>
>Hence, as one can see, this rational ascribe to the exercise of power a
>negative function. The exercise of power over some individuals part of a
>given transaction serves the function of repressing opportunistic
>behavior from their part. Hence, the exercise of power has clearly a
>negative function in this rational.
>
>For my part, I am trying to develop an alternative model of
>institutional choice that would not see the exercise of power as a way
>to mitigate opportunistic behavior created by transaction costs but as
>way for an individual to use his own knowledge, his own standards, to
>guide the actions of certain individuals with whom he transacts. The
>fundamental reason that explain why power relationships arise in such a
>context would be that a transactor will choose to exercise power over
>another transactor whenever he will feel that it would be better if this
>other transactor would conform to his standards and guidelines rather
>than his own standards and guidelines when he produce the goods and
>services that he seeks to acquire from him. Transactors will be reputed
>to ascribe a certain positive value to their own knowledge -their own
>way of doing things- and exercising power will be a way for them to reap
>the positive value associated with their knowledge since exercising
>power will allow this knowledge not only to inform and mold their
>actions with respect to how to perform certain tasks but the actions of
>others as well.
>
>Therefore, exercising power will allow a transactor to benefit from his
>knowledge on a larger scale than he alone could attain if only he would
>follow his own standards and guidelines to perform certain tasks. More
>generally, we can say that a power relationship is an exchange but,
>unlike a market exchange, a transactor sees his utility rise not when
>others transfer resources in his favor but when he himself is able to
>transfer his knowledge on others through the conduct of their actions.
>In this respect, a fundamental assumption of this model will be that it
>is not always possible to find, on the marketplace, an agent that will
>perform tasks according to standards that will satisfy the requirements
>of a given transactor.
>
>But to which extent and in which circumstances might we believe that it
>will be possible for a transactor to convince some other transactors to
>let themselves be conducted by him so that he may obtain from them goods
>and services that will be produced according to his own standards? Like
>in all rational choice models, it is the specification of the
>constraints -in this case how can power be acquired- that will heavily
>influence the inferences of the model. From a general standpoint, the
>constraint to the acquisition of the exercise of power is simply that
>one must find someone else upon whom to exercise his power if he wants
>to benefits from the value associated with his knowledge. This
>constraint can be satisfied, I believe, in two different ways in a
>rational choice context. The exercise of authority can be acquired
>either by making better off those who will accept to let their actions
>being conducted by oneself or it can be acquired by making worse off
>those who would refuse to let their actions being conducted by oneself.
>I plan to use game theory to modelize how transactors will be able to
>acquire power over others and hence to predict how power will be
>allocated and how it will shift among transactors. In this respect, I
>define institutions as being particular allocations of power among
>transactors.
>
> The reason why I am exposing the basic idea upon which my research
>project is built to the subscribers of this list is that I have never
>encountered before anyone who tried to use Foucault insights on power to
>inform a rational choice theory of institutional choice. In economics,
>Foucault's work is completely unknown. In Econlit, the major database of
>all academic publications in economics, Foucault is the object of only
>one paper -a brief expos of Foucault's views on disciplinary power-
>that was published in the 1980s. In the same vein, I do not of any
>non-economist who has tried to use Foucault to revisit, to analyze
>rational choice literature on institutions such as transaction cost
>economics.
>
>So what I would want to know is this: Does anybody know about any person
>or any work that has tried to confront rational choice theories of
>institutional choice with Foucault's views on productive power? Are
>there any fundamental objections to use Foucault's insights on
>productive power in a rational choice context? Is there any interest
>among the community of scholars that study and use Foucault's work for
>such a confrontation?
>
>Any comments and advice will be appreciated. Thanks^
>
>Richard Levesque
>
>Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
Barry Hindess <B.Hindess@xxxxxxxxxx>
Political Science Program
The Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University,
Canberra, ACT 0200
Telephone (02) 6249 2120; FAX No (02) 6249 3051
You ask if there is any interest among Foucault scholars in a confrontation
with the rational choice community. My feeling is that there is little
scope for such a confrontation and that the major obstacles lie on the
rational choice side.
I write as someone who has tried to engage in critical debate with rat
choice scholars and found them to be generally unwilling to allow their
fundamental assumptions to be brought into question - especially those
concerning the human individual. (See, for example, my _Choice, Rationality
and Social Theory_, Unwin-Hyman, 1988)
The conceptualisation of the human individual is the basic issue in your
attempt to use Foucault's account of the productivity of power - the claim
that power can affect, among other things, the capacities and attributes of
human individuals. Thus, for those of us who take F's arguments seriously,
it is simply not possible to take the rational actor model - the assumption
of rationality - as a starting point for our analysis. Rather, we would
tend to see the forms of calculation (the forms of 'rationality') available
to an individual as variable, as the products of particular conditions -
that is, as a matter of empirical inquiry, not of definitional fiat.
Thus, when you ask "Are there any fundamental objections to use Foucault's
insights on productive power in a rational choice context?", the answer
would have to be that the use of F's insights would subvert the context in
which you want to use them.
I'll be in Carleton University in July and August this year. We could
debate these issues then.
best wishes,
Barry
>Hello All,
> I am a Ph.D. student in economics/public policy and I am
>currently writing my thesis. My research project seeks to use Foucault's
>concept of productive power to develop a rational model of institutional
>choice.
>
>Economists have for very long been puzzled with respect to why
>hierarchies exist as an economic form of organization. Is there any
>rational that may explain why it is sometimes better for individuals to
>transact within a hierarchy where the actions, the choices of some
>individuals are conducted by others rather than within a market where no
>individuals exercise any power, any (direct) influence on the choices
>and actions made by others?
>
>Thus far, the most popular answer to this question has been provided by
>the transaction cost approach that claims that some market transactions
>are beset by transaction costs. Transaction costs are attributes of the
>goods that are transacted that have the effect of creating opportunistic
>(unwanted) behavior on the part of certain transactors. In this context,
>exercising power over an individual is seen as a means to mitigate
>opportunistic behavior on the part of this individual.
>
>Hence, as one can see, this rational ascribe to the exercise of power a
>negative function. The exercise of power over some individuals part of a
>given transaction serves the function of repressing opportunistic
>behavior from their part. Hence, the exercise of power has clearly a
>negative function in this rational.
>
>For my part, I am trying to develop an alternative model of
>institutional choice that would not see the exercise of power as a way
>to mitigate opportunistic behavior created by transaction costs but as
>way for an individual to use his own knowledge, his own standards, to
>guide the actions of certain individuals with whom he transacts. The
>fundamental reason that explain why power relationships arise in such a
>context would be that a transactor will choose to exercise power over
>another transactor whenever he will feel that it would be better if this
>other transactor would conform to his standards and guidelines rather
>than his own standards and guidelines when he produce the goods and
>services that he seeks to acquire from him. Transactors will be reputed
>to ascribe a certain positive value to their own knowledge -their own
>way of doing things- and exercising power will be a way for them to reap
>the positive value associated with their knowledge since exercising
>power will allow this knowledge not only to inform and mold their
>actions with respect to how to perform certain tasks but the actions of
>others as well.
>
>Therefore, exercising power will allow a transactor to benefit from his
>knowledge on a larger scale than he alone could attain if only he would
>follow his own standards and guidelines to perform certain tasks. More
>generally, we can say that a power relationship is an exchange but,
>unlike a market exchange, a transactor sees his utility rise not when
>others transfer resources in his favor but when he himself is able to
>transfer his knowledge on others through the conduct of their actions.
>In this respect, a fundamental assumption of this model will be that it
>is not always possible to find, on the marketplace, an agent that will
>perform tasks according to standards that will satisfy the requirements
>of a given transactor.
>
>But to which extent and in which circumstances might we believe that it
>will be possible for a transactor to convince some other transactors to
>let themselves be conducted by him so that he may obtain from them goods
>and services that will be produced according to his own standards? Like
>in all rational choice models, it is the specification of the
>constraints -in this case how can power be acquired- that will heavily
>influence the inferences of the model. From a general standpoint, the
>constraint to the acquisition of the exercise of power is simply that
>one must find someone else upon whom to exercise his power if he wants
>to benefits from the value associated with his knowledge. This
>constraint can be satisfied, I believe, in two different ways in a
>rational choice context. The exercise of authority can be acquired
>either by making better off those who will accept to let their actions
>being conducted by oneself or it can be acquired by making worse off
>those who would refuse to let their actions being conducted by oneself.
>I plan to use game theory to modelize how transactors will be able to
>acquire power over others and hence to predict how power will be
>allocated and how it will shift among transactors. In this respect, I
>define institutions as being particular allocations of power among
>transactors.
>
> The reason why I am exposing the basic idea upon which my research
>project is built to the subscribers of this list is that I have never
>encountered before anyone who tried to use Foucault insights on power to
>inform a rational choice theory of institutional choice. In economics,
>Foucault's work is completely unknown. In Econlit, the major database of
>all academic publications in economics, Foucault is the object of only
>one paper -a brief expos of Foucault's views on disciplinary power-
>that was published in the 1980s. In the same vein, I do not of any
>non-economist who has tried to use Foucault to revisit, to analyze
>rational choice literature on institutions such as transaction cost
>economics.
>
>So what I would want to know is this: Does anybody know about any person
>or any work that has tried to confront rational choice theories of
>institutional choice with Foucault's views on productive power? Are
>there any fundamental objections to use Foucault's insights on
>productive power in a rational choice context? Is there any interest
>among the community of scholars that study and use Foucault's work for
>such a confrontation?
>
>Any comments and advice will be appreciated. Thanks^
>
>Richard Levesque
>
>Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
Barry Hindess <B.Hindess@xxxxxxxxxx>
Political Science Program
The Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University,
Canberra, ACT 0200
Telephone (02) 6249 2120; FAX No (02) 6249 3051