I think that free will must exist, especially in the power "...as a
strategy..."
concept. The fact that it is a strategy, implys that there must be someone
to
use it. If all my actions are predetermined as Nietzche proposes there is
no
employment of the strategy; for if I am going to do what I am going to do
and
there is no way to change it, how can I use this "knowlage". Voluntarism
(I'm not sure I completely understand what it is, but my dictionary of
philosophy says it is "...various theories in which the will is a centeral
concept...")
is the only way in which one can theorize about the world for this reason:
If
my actions are determined and I am thinking in this manner, then I am being
forced to think in this manner. If, however, I do have a free will, then I
am engaging in a constructive threorization. Thus I wager (as did Pascal to
the existence of God) to accept my own autonomy.
I hope I got the idea across, I kind of confused myself.
Another question I had is: if theories contain but don't describe the
phenomina
they seek to explain (an Idea I do agree with), how can Foucault claim the
God-
like power to discover the rules of power, even in individual geneologies?
I am also not satisfied with your response to the problem of self
construction.
Even if freedom is simply freedom from domination, if my will is still
determined
by power, how am I creating myself? I am not, I am being created.
I am not sure I understood your explaination of F's theory of freedom,
please
elaborate.
I'm still trying to figure out my philosophical stance. And please excuse me
if
I misunderstood any of your arguments, I'm still 16.
I am interested in becomming a professor of philosophy and I am wondering
what
kinds of things you would suggest to do, what classes to take, what are good
Colleges to attend, etc.
Thank you very much for the email, Bryan.
>From: Stuart Elden <stuart.elden@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>Reply-To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: RE: Power and the Subject
>Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2001 00:52:54 -0000
>
>What you're calling 'agency' is a relation of power. This notion of
>free-will is deeply problematic, as it suggests a) a voluntarism and b) the
>possession of a capacity for action. Foucault is interested in power not as
>a possession, but as a strategy, i.e. he is interested in the way power
>functions in terms of facticity and not ability. Equally he speaks of
>power,
>not will to power (Nietzsche).
>
>His understanding of power must be thought ontologically, as an
>investigation of the conditions of possibility. Instead of resistance being
>understood as freedom, or emancipation from power, it is better thought of
>as empowerment. It is for this reason that Foucault talks of relationships
>of power, of tactics and strategies, of power as a game, with ordered rules
>and exchanges. The existence of power depends on points of resistance,
>which
>are therefore necessarily everywhere there is power. This is why there is
>no
>single focus for resistance, just as there is not a single focus for power.
>
>The freedom that is a necessary condition for relations of power is
>therefore the very thing that allows the possibility of resistance. Freedom
>is of a more fundamental level than resistance; it is what allows it, it is
>its ontological condition. Freedom is the ontological condition for ethics
>(Dits et ecrits IV, 712; Foucault Live 435). Because Foucault is talking of
>power and not domination; because by power he means relations or strategies
>of power; and because power requires the subjects to be free, the problem
>of
>freewill is misconceived: if we understand what Foucault means by power
>then
>there cannot not be the potential for resistance.
>
>If you understand this, then the question of self-construction is not
>nearly
>so problematic.
>
>Stuart
>
_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
strategy..."
concept. The fact that it is a strategy, implys that there must be someone
to
use it. If all my actions are predetermined as Nietzche proposes there is
no
employment of the strategy; for if I am going to do what I am going to do
and
there is no way to change it, how can I use this "knowlage". Voluntarism
(I'm not sure I completely understand what it is, but my dictionary of
philosophy says it is "...various theories in which the will is a centeral
concept...")
is the only way in which one can theorize about the world for this reason:
If
my actions are determined and I am thinking in this manner, then I am being
forced to think in this manner. If, however, I do have a free will, then I
am engaging in a constructive threorization. Thus I wager (as did Pascal to
the existence of God) to accept my own autonomy.
I hope I got the idea across, I kind of confused myself.
Another question I had is: if theories contain but don't describe the
phenomina
they seek to explain (an Idea I do agree with), how can Foucault claim the
God-
like power to discover the rules of power, even in individual geneologies?
I am also not satisfied with your response to the problem of self
construction.
Even if freedom is simply freedom from domination, if my will is still
determined
by power, how am I creating myself? I am not, I am being created.
I am not sure I understood your explaination of F's theory of freedom,
please
elaborate.
I'm still trying to figure out my philosophical stance. And please excuse me
if
I misunderstood any of your arguments, I'm still 16.
I am interested in becomming a professor of philosophy and I am wondering
what
kinds of things you would suggest to do, what classes to take, what are good
Colleges to attend, etc.
Thank you very much for the email, Bryan.
>From: Stuart Elden <stuart.elden@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>Reply-To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: RE: Power and the Subject
>Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2001 00:52:54 -0000
>
>What you're calling 'agency' is a relation of power. This notion of
>free-will is deeply problematic, as it suggests a) a voluntarism and b) the
>possession of a capacity for action. Foucault is interested in power not as
>a possession, but as a strategy, i.e. he is interested in the way power
>functions in terms of facticity and not ability. Equally he speaks of
>power,
>not will to power (Nietzsche).
>
>His understanding of power must be thought ontologically, as an
>investigation of the conditions of possibility. Instead of resistance being
>understood as freedom, or emancipation from power, it is better thought of
>as empowerment. It is for this reason that Foucault talks of relationships
>of power, of tactics and strategies, of power as a game, with ordered rules
>and exchanges. The existence of power depends on points of resistance,
>which
>are therefore necessarily everywhere there is power. This is why there is
>no
>single focus for resistance, just as there is not a single focus for power.
>
>The freedom that is a necessary condition for relations of power is
>therefore the very thing that allows the possibility of resistance. Freedom
>is of a more fundamental level than resistance; it is what allows it, it is
>its ontological condition. Freedom is the ontological condition for ethics
>(Dits et ecrits IV, 712; Foucault Live 435). Because Foucault is talking of
>power and not domination; because by power he means relations or strategies
>of power; and because power requires the subjects to be free, the problem
>of
>freewill is misconceived: if we understand what Foucault means by power
>then
>there cannot not be the potential for resistance.
>
>If you understand this, then the question of self-construction is not
>nearly
>so problematic.
>
>Stuart
>
_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com