_____________________
Roberto wrote:
"It seems to me that the above concept is not relativistic at all.
Gestalt's psychologists were anything but relativistic. Relativity means
the assumption that the whole is a provisory construction and always
open and (paradoxically) not completed. Concepts as 'rizoma' and
'machine' take it into account."
_________________________
Well, I'm loosely relating some extrinsic notions here. But in Foucault's
early writings, it was not unusual to find allusions to the "fusion" of
words, sense perceptions, forms of "reason," what might be best summed up
by the phrase "the violence that words do to things." I think it is a
tacit assumption that discourse presents a fused (and confused) "event,"
not a classical gestalt, certainly, but, as you say, "a provisory
construction, always open and (paradoxically) not completed." Yet, let's
be honest, we do not usually experience our own discourse as an
historical accident, a blurring of coincidental effects, that somehow
constructs self-awareness, as a useful, if disposable fiction.
Take an odd example. When Roger Penrose was walking across the street one
day, and had an "ah hah" moment. For hours he felt elated and didn't know
why. Later in the day, he realized that he had solved a problem and
discovered the proof for black holes. (Then he called Stephen Hawking and
spoiled his birthday dinner).
Now, one can certainly do a crude Foucaultian analysis of what happened
to Penrose. This "gut reaction" that he had hit upon a mathematically
transcendent, astrophysical truth, was simply another permutation,
perhaps even a novel mutation, within his scientific episteme. It might
even have made possible the formation of a new object of knowledge-- one
that, as it turned out, happened to have demonstrable correlations with
observed phenomena. And one could certainly take into account, the
probability that many physicists have had similar "ah ha" moments that
turned out to be nothing, and Penrose, like all of us, has selective
memory. The fact that this "ah ha" was the lucky one, caused him to
interpret the event, afterwards, as particularly significant. (On these
points, the crude Foucaultian and good old Humean skeptic agree. These
are, in fact, good questions).
My point is that "ah hah" events, like the one Penrose experienced, or,
perhaps, that envisioned by Artaud (the effect of his Theatre of Cruelty
on an audience) while exhibiting all of the characteristics of the
"violence that words do to things" exceed summation as mere historical
constructs. This does not mean that there is a stable formulation of the
"ah hah" event that transcends history; in fact, it is a sense of
complexity that goes beyond the present formula or rules, a complexity
that somehow "sticks" together in a surprising manner, but which fails to
be completely encapsulated by each new formula or rule-structure. And
this, for most of us, is experienced as something more complicated, and,
actually, more meaningful, the "ah ha" we sometimes get about the
"universe." Kant called it the Sublime.
This might be a projection based on prenatal life, a foot hold for
mystical and religious exploitation, etc. But it is difficult to shake
the idea that some of these moments have a tentative, if never complete,
validity. And isn't this sense of "the violence of words," the power of
symbolic behavior to exceed the present, to point to an "other" picture,
an example of how Foucault's writings might qualify as relativistic (as
opposed to examples of "mere relativism.")
I guess what I'm getting at here is that relativism, as an "ism," is all
about taking the "ah hah" moment and dissecting it into its constituent
atoms. And this implies a crude Foucaultian analysis that is little more
than structuralism meets nihilism. Relativity, as I use the term, is all
about creating possibilities for new "ah hah" moments, re-differentiated
perceptions, that might have a tentative (always contestable) validity.
________________
Roberto also wrote:
"That 'universe' makes sense or has a meaning says nothing about
relativity or relativism. Relativity doesn't deny meaning. On the
contrary it is based upon the 'existence' not of meaning but meanings,
being meaning and sense constructions. But, not any construction can
make its way to existence. This has to do with Foucault's concept of
'exclusion'.
BTW, what does 'universe' mean?"
_____________________
Right, which seems consistent with what I'm saying. I'm just
differentiating "relativity" from "relativism" as an "ism."
Roberto wrote:
"It seems to me that the above concept is not relativistic at all.
Gestalt's psychologists were anything but relativistic. Relativity means
the assumption that the whole is a provisory construction and always
open and (paradoxically) not completed. Concepts as 'rizoma' and
'machine' take it into account."
_________________________
Well, I'm loosely relating some extrinsic notions here. But in Foucault's
early writings, it was not unusual to find allusions to the "fusion" of
words, sense perceptions, forms of "reason," what might be best summed up
by the phrase "the violence that words do to things." I think it is a
tacit assumption that discourse presents a fused (and confused) "event,"
not a classical gestalt, certainly, but, as you say, "a provisory
construction, always open and (paradoxically) not completed." Yet, let's
be honest, we do not usually experience our own discourse as an
historical accident, a blurring of coincidental effects, that somehow
constructs self-awareness, as a useful, if disposable fiction.
Take an odd example. When Roger Penrose was walking across the street one
day, and had an "ah hah" moment. For hours he felt elated and didn't know
why. Later in the day, he realized that he had solved a problem and
discovered the proof for black holes. (Then he called Stephen Hawking and
spoiled his birthday dinner).
Now, one can certainly do a crude Foucaultian analysis of what happened
to Penrose. This "gut reaction" that he had hit upon a mathematically
transcendent, astrophysical truth, was simply another permutation,
perhaps even a novel mutation, within his scientific episteme. It might
even have made possible the formation of a new object of knowledge-- one
that, as it turned out, happened to have demonstrable correlations with
observed phenomena. And one could certainly take into account, the
probability that many physicists have had similar "ah ha" moments that
turned out to be nothing, and Penrose, like all of us, has selective
memory. The fact that this "ah ha" was the lucky one, caused him to
interpret the event, afterwards, as particularly significant. (On these
points, the crude Foucaultian and good old Humean skeptic agree. These
are, in fact, good questions).
My point is that "ah hah" events, like the one Penrose experienced, or,
perhaps, that envisioned by Artaud (the effect of his Theatre of Cruelty
on an audience) while exhibiting all of the characteristics of the
"violence that words do to things" exceed summation as mere historical
constructs. This does not mean that there is a stable formulation of the
"ah hah" event that transcends history; in fact, it is a sense of
complexity that goes beyond the present formula or rules, a complexity
that somehow "sticks" together in a surprising manner, but which fails to
be completely encapsulated by each new formula or rule-structure. And
this, for most of us, is experienced as something more complicated, and,
actually, more meaningful, the "ah ha" we sometimes get about the
"universe." Kant called it the Sublime.
This might be a projection based on prenatal life, a foot hold for
mystical and religious exploitation, etc. But it is difficult to shake
the idea that some of these moments have a tentative, if never complete,
validity. And isn't this sense of "the violence of words," the power of
symbolic behavior to exceed the present, to point to an "other" picture,
an example of how Foucault's writings might qualify as relativistic (as
opposed to examples of "mere relativism.")
I guess what I'm getting at here is that relativism, as an "ism," is all
about taking the "ah hah" moment and dissecting it into its constituent
atoms. And this implies a crude Foucaultian analysis that is little more
than structuralism meets nihilism. Relativity, as I use the term, is all
about creating possibilities for new "ah hah" moments, re-differentiated
perceptions, that might have a tentative (always contestable) validity.
________________
Roberto also wrote:
"That 'universe' makes sense or has a meaning says nothing about
relativity or relativism. Relativity doesn't deny meaning. On the
contrary it is based upon the 'existence' not of meaning but meanings,
being meaning and sense constructions. But, not any construction can
make its way to existence. This has to do with Foucault's concept of
'exclusion'.
BTW, what does 'universe' mean?"
_____________________
Right, which seems consistent with what I'm saying. I'm just
differentiating "relativity" from "relativism" as an "ism."