<html><DIV>
<P><BR>Stuart</P>
<P>Thanks for your very thoughtful reply. And I am sorry that your detailed mail was lost due to computer error.</P>
<P>I think your post clarify most of the points I had tried to raise in my mail. I am now able to comprhend your views, about issues we are discussing, better.</P>
<P>The only thing I would like to clarify further is your point regarding Heiedegger's question cocnerning Being of being. I think I might have misled you here by my use of the term Being of being which I did not mean to refer to Dasein. To clarify this point further, I consider Foucault and Heidegger as not only doing historical ontology but also relational ontology. In this context I had used Being of beings to refer to the whole web of relations existing at a particular time. As I understand, the difference between Foucault and Heidegger is that while Foucault does not see any conception of Being beyond different web of relations existing through out history Heidegger sees the possibility of the manifestation of Being beyond these existing web of relations. Athough he was increasingly pessimistic about such a possibility at the end of his career. I am not sure how much this understanding is seconded by careful and detailed reading of Heidegger's text but this was in my mind when I said that Heidegger question was not about beings but Being of beings.</P>
<P>Veyenes citation was from Paul Veyne " The Final Foucault and His Ethics" p. 231n as published in Arnold I. Davidson (1997) Foucault and His Interlocutors London Chicago Unviersity Press.</P>
<P>regards</P>
<P>ali</P>
<P><BR> </P></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>----Original Message Follows----
<DIV></DIV>From: Stuart Elden <STUART.ELDEN@xxxxxxxxxxx>
<DIV></DIV>Reply-To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<DIV></DIV>To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<DIV></DIV>Subject: Re: Explaining why he was a philosopher.
<DIV></DIV>Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2001 18:37:21 +0100
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Ali
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>This is my second attempt at a reply. I wrote a very detailed and
<DIV></DIV>careful response which I lost due to a computer error. I hope I can
<DIV></DIV>recapture the main thrust of my response this second time.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>First of all, thank you for some interesting and difficult questions.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>My book sets out to do a number of things, but very early on I suggest
<DIV></DIV>that the affinities - and one could add the divergences - between
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger and Foucault cannot be treated exhaustively. My aim was not a
<DIV></DIV>'compare and contrast' between the two thinkers, but rather to
<DIV></DIV>investigate how a reading of Heidegger could illuminate certain aspects
<DIV></DIV>of Foucault's work.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>The introduction to that book, which I posted to another, much smaller
<DIV></DIV>list, rather than this one, necessarily is even briefer and schematic
<DIV></DIV>in its outline of the project. But that said, I don't spend much time
<DIV></DIV>discussing differences between the thinkers - i mention a few in
<DIV></DIV>passing - because it's not especially my concern or interest. Just as
<DIV></DIV>Foucault rarely mentions Heidegger positively, he rarely mentions
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger negatively, that is, not explicitly. There are coded
<DIV></DIV>critiques of Heidegger in, for instance, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'
<DIV></DIV>and The Order of Things.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>So, therefore, though I think that the question of truth is certainly a
<DIV></DIV>concern for both thinkers, it's not something i treat in the book,
<DIV></DIV>other than briefly and in passing. I appreciate the Veyne quotation,
<DIV></DIV>and if you could provide a citation i'd be grateful. On that point
<DIV></DIV>there's a comment in the L'hermeneutique du sujet lecture course where
<DIV></DIV>Foucault is asked about the influence of Lacan. He replies that one can
<DIV></DIV>hardly avoid Lacan when concerned with the issues of truth and
<DIV></DIV>subjectivity, but that Heidegger is the key person for him in this
<DIV></DIV>inquiry. Alone of course that means little, but it might point the way
<DIV></DIV>for an enquiry.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>That said, i would take issue with you suggestion that
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>>After all Heidegger's question is not just about >being it is
<DIV></DIV>primarily about Being of beings.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>To my mind that's only sustainable, barely, on a reading of the
<DIV></DIV>divisions of Being and Time that were published. Heidegger's question
<DIV></DIV>is always to get to being _as_ being. He investigates the being of a
<DIV></DIV>being in Division 1 as a way into the question, as a mode of access. To
<DIV></DIV>think otherwise is to read Being and Time as an anthropology. Elsewhere
<DIV></DIV>- in the lecture courses prior to Being and Time, and those that follow
<DIV></DIV>he investigates the question of being historically, through a de-
<DIV></DIV>struction of the tradition. (Though I think there are changes in
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger's thought I don't see the notion of the turn [Kehre] as
<DIV></DIV>chronological) That's again a much longer argument than I have time for
<DIV></DIV>here.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>You're right of course that the relationship between Heidegger and Neo-
<DIV></DIV>Kantianism is much more complex and ambivalent than the previous post
<DIV></DIV>suggested, and that between Foucault and Kant(ianism) too. There's a
<DIV></DIV>section in my first chapter called 'Reading Kant Phenomenologically',
<DIV></DIV>which discusses Heidegger's Kant reading in some detail, and relates it
<DIV></DIV>to the dispute with Cassirer and the Marburg school.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>I'm not trying to suggest Foucault had no affinity to Kant - far from
<DIV></DIV>it. I discuss Foucault and Kant, largely around the issues of the
<DIV></DIV>present and Enlightenment. But the distinction as I see it between
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger's historicisation of the Kantian problematic and the neo-
<DIV></DIV>Kantian's is around the reading of the Critique as a work of ontology,
<DIV></DIV>and not as it was for the neo-Kantians, a work of epistemology. I don't
<DIV></DIV>discuss Foucault and the neo-Kantians at all, other than to use
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger's strategy of reading Kant in my reading of Foucault - in the
<DIV></DIV>previous post that was just a shorthand way of making a point about
<DIV></DIV>historical ontology.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>I hope this goes someway to answering your questions. Again, thanks
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Stuart
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>--
<DIV></DIV><br clear=all><hr>Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at <a href="http://www.hotmail.com";>http://www.hotmail.com</a>.<br></p></html>
<P><BR>Stuart</P>
<P>Thanks for your very thoughtful reply. And I am sorry that your detailed mail was lost due to computer error.</P>
<P>I think your post clarify most of the points I had tried to raise in my mail. I am now able to comprhend your views, about issues we are discussing, better.</P>
<P>The only thing I would like to clarify further is your point regarding Heiedegger's question cocnerning Being of being. I think I might have misled you here by my use of the term Being of being which I did not mean to refer to Dasein. To clarify this point further, I consider Foucault and Heidegger as not only doing historical ontology but also relational ontology. In this context I had used Being of beings to refer to the whole web of relations existing at a particular time. As I understand, the difference between Foucault and Heidegger is that while Foucault does not see any conception of Being beyond different web of relations existing through out history Heidegger sees the possibility of the manifestation of Being beyond these existing web of relations. Athough he was increasingly pessimistic about such a possibility at the end of his career. I am not sure how much this understanding is seconded by careful and detailed reading of Heidegger's text but this was in my mind when I said that Heidegger question was not about beings but Being of beings.</P>
<P>Veyenes citation was from Paul Veyne " The Final Foucault and His Ethics" p. 231n as published in Arnold I. Davidson (1997) Foucault and His Interlocutors London Chicago Unviersity Press.</P>
<P>regards</P>
<P>ali</P>
<P><BR> </P></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>----Original Message Follows----
<DIV></DIV>From: Stuart Elden <STUART.ELDEN@xxxxxxxxxxx>
<DIV></DIV>Reply-To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<DIV></DIV>To: foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<DIV></DIV>Subject: Re: Explaining why he was a philosopher.
<DIV></DIV>Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2001 18:37:21 +0100
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Ali
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>This is my second attempt at a reply. I wrote a very detailed and
<DIV></DIV>careful response which I lost due to a computer error. I hope I can
<DIV></DIV>recapture the main thrust of my response this second time.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>First of all, thank you for some interesting and difficult questions.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>My book sets out to do a number of things, but very early on I suggest
<DIV></DIV>that the affinities - and one could add the divergences - between
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger and Foucault cannot be treated exhaustively. My aim was not a
<DIV></DIV>'compare and contrast' between the two thinkers, but rather to
<DIV></DIV>investigate how a reading of Heidegger could illuminate certain aspects
<DIV></DIV>of Foucault's work.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>The introduction to that book, which I posted to another, much smaller
<DIV></DIV>list, rather than this one, necessarily is even briefer and schematic
<DIV></DIV>in its outline of the project. But that said, I don't spend much time
<DIV></DIV>discussing differences between the thinkers - i mention a few in
<DIV></DIV>passing - because it's not especially my concern or interest. Just as
<DIV></DIV>Foucault rarely mentions Heidegger positively, he rarely mentions
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger negatively, that is, not explicitly. There are coded
<DIV></DIV>critiques of Heidegger in, for instance, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'
<DIV></DIV>and The Order of Things.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>So, therefore, though I think that the question of truth is certainly a
<DIV></DIV>concern for both thinkers, it's not something i treat in the book,
<DIV></DIV>other than briefly and in passing. I appreciate the Veyne quotation,
<DIV></DIV>and if you could provide a citation i'd be grateful. On that point
<DIV></DIV>there's a comment in the L'hermeneutique du sujet lecture course where
<DIV></DIV>Foucault is asked about the influence of Lacan. He replies that one can
<DIV></DIV>hardly avoid Lacan when concerned with the issues of truth and
<DIV></DIV>subjectivity, but that Heidegger is the key person for him in this
<DIV></DIV>inquiry. Alone of course that means little, but it might point the way
<DIV></DIV>for an enquiry.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>That said, i would take issue with you suggestion that
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>>After all Heidegger's question is not just about >being it is
<DIV></DIV>primarily about Being of beings.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>To my mind that's only sustainable, barely, on a reading of the
<DIV></DIV>divisions of Being and Time that were published. Heidegger's question
<DIV></DIV>is always to get to being _as_ being. He investigates the being of a
<DIV></DIV>being in Division 1 as a way into the question, as a mode of access. To
<DIV></DIV>think otherwise is to read Being and Time as an anthropology. Elsewhere
<DIV></DIV>- in the lecture courses prior to Being and Time, and those that follow
<DIV></DIV>he investigates the question of being historically, through a de-
<DIV></DIV>struction of the tradition. (Though I think there are changes in
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger's thought I don't see the notion of the turn [Kehre] as
<DIV></DIV>chronological) That's again a much longer argument than I have time for
<DIV></DIV>here.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>You're right of course that the relationship between Heidegger and Neo-
<DIV></DIV>Kantianism is much more complex and ambivalent than the previous post
<DIV></DIV>suggested, and that between Foucault and Kant(ianism) too. There's a
<DIV></DIV>section in my first chapter called 'Reading Kant Phenomenologically',
<DIV></DIV>which discusses Heidegger's Kant reading in some detail, and relates it
<DIV></DIV>to the dispute with Cassirer and the Marburg school.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>I'm not trying to suggest Foucault had no affinity to Kant - far from
<DIV></DIV>it. I discuss Foucault and Kant, largely around the issues of the
<DIV></DIV>present and Enlightenment. But the distinction as I see it between
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger's historicisation of the Kantian problematic and the neo-
<DIV></DIV>Kantian's is around the reading of the Critique as a work of ontology,
<DIV></DIV>and not as it was for the neo-Kantians, a work of epistemology. I don't
<DIV></DIV>discuss Foucault and the neo-Kantians at all, other than to use
<DIV></DIV>Heidegger's strategy of reading Kant in my reading of Foucault - in the
<DIV></DIV>previous post that was just a shorthand way of making a point about
<DIV></DIV>historical ontology.
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>I hope this goes someway to answering your questions. Again, thanks
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>Stuart
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>--
<DIV></DIV><br clear=all><hr>Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at <a href="http://www.hotmail.com";>http://www.hotmail.com</a>.<br></p></html>