Ali
Sorry for the delay. I concur with much of what you said about Kant. It's
not dissimilar to the argument I've made here and in the book. On the
savoir/connaissance claim I think that there are a couple of things going on
that would explain the issue.
First is that Foucault may have retrospectively (i.e. in Truth and Power,
Remarks on Marx, What is Enlightenment?) come up with a divergent attitude
to what he was doing in The Order of Things, but the phrase 'unconscious of
knowledge' as used in the preface to OT, which was written in 1970, to my
mind is certainly intended to refer to savoir.
In the preface, Foucault distinguishes between the "epistemological level of
knowledge (or scientific consciousness) and the archaeological level of
knowledge" (OT xi).
He suggests three levels. Two are covered by the history of science in its
usual form:-
a level that examines theories in their internal economy
a level that looks at the implicit philosophies: the unconscious of science.
The general rules of what constitutes knowledge within a field of study.
But Foucault wants to go still deeper, to look the "positive unconscious of
knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is
part of scientific discourse". "It is these rules of formation which were
never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely
differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to
reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called,
somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological (OT xi).
This is 1970, and this comes two years after the Archaeology of Knowledge
[Savoir].
In that book Foucault suggests that "instead of exploring the
consciousness/knowledge [connaissance]/science axis (which cannot escape
subjectivity), archaeology explores the discursive practice/knowledge
[savoir]/science axis" (AS 239; AK 183).
Foucault adds a note to the English edition: "By connaissance I mean the
relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it.
Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period
for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or
that enunciation to be formulated" (AK 15n).
But the Order of Things itself is explicit:-
Quite obviously, such an analysis does not belong the history of ideas or of
science: it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis
knowledge [connaissance] and theory become possible [emphasis added]; within
what space of order knowledge [savoir] was constituted; on the basis of what
historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could
appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies,
rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon
afterwards. I am not concerned therefore, to describe the progress of
knowledge [connaissances] towards an objectivity in which today's science
can finally be recognised; what I am attempting to bring to light is the
epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge [connaissances],
envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or
to its objective forms, grounds positivity and thereby manifests a history
which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its
conditions of possibility [emphasis added]; in this account what should
appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge [savoir] which
have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science [connaissance
empirique]. Rather than a history in the traditional meaning of the word,
this is an 'archaeology' (M&C 13; OT xxi-xxii).
The second thing is that 'savoir' is a verb which means 'to know'. La
volonte de savoir (the first volume of the History of Sexuality, but this is
also the title of the first College de France lecture course) is both 'the
will to knowledge' and 'the will to know'. In that it plays on both the
knowledge issue - in this period of Foucault's work coupled with power, as
pouvoir/savoir; and the desire to know, i.e. the inquiring mind of
psychoanalysis, Christian confession, etc. I think this is what Foucault is
refering to in the Remarks on Marx piece. I don't have that with me, but
that's my recollection [in any case the English is somewhat dubious as a
translation of an Italian translation of the original French].
I therefore hold to my original claim that the unconscious of knowledge in
The Order of Things preface is concerned with savoir. That's the level
Foucault is investigating with an 'archaeology'.
But I do accept that Foucault modified his view of what was at stake in The
Order of Things later on. But without the texts easily to hand i can't say
much more here.
Hope this clarifies
Stuart
Sorry for the delay. I concur with much of what you said about Kant. It's
not dissimilar to the argument I've made here and in the book. On the
savoir/connaissance claim I think that there are a couple of things going on
that would explain the issue.
First is that Foucault may have retrospectively (i.e. in Truth and Power,
Remarks on Marx, What is Enlightenment?) come up with a divergent attitude
to what he was doing in The Order of Things, but the phrase 'unconscious of
knowledge' as used in the preface to OT, which was written in 1970, to my
mind is certainly intended to refer to savoir.
In the preface, Foucault distinguishes between the "epistemological level of
knowledge (or scientific consciousness) and the archaeological level of
knowledge" (OT xi).
He suggests three levels. Two are covered by the history of science in its
usual form:-
a level that examines theories in their internal economy
a level that looks at the implicit philosophies: the unconscious of science.
The general rules of what constitutes knowledge within a field of study.
But Foucault wants to go still deeper, to look the "positive unconscious of
knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is
part of scientific discourse". "It is these rules of formation which were
never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely
differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to
reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called,
somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological (OT xi).
This is 1970, and this comes two years after the Archaeology of Knowledge
[Savoir].
In that book Foucault suggests that "instead of exploring the
consciousness/knowledge [connaissance]/science axis (which cannot escape
subjectivity), archaeology explores the discursive practice/knowledge
[savoir]/science axis" (AS 239; AK 183).
Foucault adds a note to the English edition: "By connaissance I mean the
relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it.
Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period
for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or
that enunciation to be formulated" (AK 15n).
But the Order of Things itself is explicit:-
Quite obviously, such an analysis does not belong the history of ideas or of
science: it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis
knowledge [connaissance] and theory become possible [emphasis added]; within
what space of order knowledge [savoir] was constituted; on the basis of what
historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could
appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies,
rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon
afterwards. I am not concerned therefore, to describe the progress of
knowledge [connaissances] towards an objectivity in which today's science
can finally be recognised; what I am attempting to bring to light is the
epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge [connaissances],
envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or
to its objective forms, grounds positivity and thereby manifests a history
which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its
conditions of possibility [emphasis added]; in this account what should
appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge [savoir] which
have given rise to the diverse forms of empirical science [connaissance
empirique]. Rather than a history in the traditional meaning of the word,
this is an 'archaeology' (M&C 13; OT xxi-xxii).
The second thing is that 'savoir' is a verb which means 'to know'. La
volonte de savoir (the first volume of the History of Sexuality, but this is
also the title of the first College de France lecture course) is both 'the
will to knowledge' and 'the will to know'. In that it plays on both the
knowledge issue - in this period of Foucault's work coupled with power, as
pouvoir/savoir; and the desire to know, i.e. the inquiring mind of
psychoanalysis, Christian confession, etc. I think this is what Foucault is
refering to in the Remarks on Marx piece. I don't have that with me, but
that's my recollection [in any case the English is somewhat dubious as a
translation of an Italian translation of the original French].
I therefore hold to my original claim that the unconscious of knowledge in
The Order of Things preface is concerned with savoir. That's the level
Foucault is investigating with an 'archaeology'.
But I do accept that Foucault modified his view of what was at stake in The
Order of Things later on. But without the texts easily to hand i can't say
much more here.
Hope this clarifies
Stuart