From: "Ben B. Day" <bday@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 1999 20:51:38 -0500 (EST)
Subject: RE: forgiveness
Far more important for Nietzsche than forgiving is forgetting: to
_forget_ offenses is a sign of strength, both for the individual and
for the State.
In the Genealogy of Morals, I:10, he writes:
>To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even one's
>misdeeds seriously for very long--that is the sign of strong, full
>natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold,
>to recuperate and to forget (a good example of this in modern times
>is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done
>him and was unable to forgive simply because he--forgot). Such a
>man shakes off with a /single/ shrug much vermin that eats deep
>into others...
And for the State:
GM II:10,
>As its power increases, a community ceases to take the individual's
>transgressions so seriously, because they can no longer be
>considered dangerous and destructive to the whole as they were
>formerly...
>The justice which began with, "everything is dischargeable,
>everything must be discharged," ends by winking and letting those
>incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, as does
>every good thing on earth, by /overcoming itself/. This self-
>overcoming of justice: on knows the beautiful name it has given
>itself--/mercy/.
For Nietzsche, the act of sublimating a response into an unconscious
reaction is a necessary progression, and a sign of increased strength.
This sublimation is accomplished through forgetfulness, which he
describes as a sort of gatekeeper that prevents consciousness from
being overwhelmed with decisions. Consciousness is an essentially
problematic faculty, and the vast majority of all we do--even that
which we associate with the "will," i.e. an act of the will--is
carried out through unconscious mechanisms, many of which were
originally conscious, but have been sublimated into automatic
reactions.
Nietzsche describes the cruelty of ancient Greek culture, and seeks
to criticize the argument that modern culture is more tolerant
because it is "more moral," or that morality has progressed and
become more humane. In this early manifestation of punishment,
he argues, it was acted out as an exchange between a creditor and
a debtor. When you performed a wrong against someone, you would
receive a punishment of equal "quantity" to repay the debt you have
incurred. This was not a matter of holding you responsible for doing
something "wrong" because you could have done otherwise--this was
not a punishment of the "will," and whether you intended the wrong
or not was inconsequential. This mode of punishment was necessary to
create a _memory_ for unacceptable actions--that is, it creates
a "bad conscience" for those who would wrong or harm others.
Nietzsche speaks a great deal of punishment's role in creating
memories, and muses over how much blood is necessarily spilt over
all great things.
In the strong, modern state, "bad conscience" has already been
instilled for the most part, and gradually the society moves
from a morality-based punishment system, which posits a will
behind every action ("if person X intended to perform crime Y,
they must be punished," from the previous "if person X performed
crime Y, they must be puhisned"), to an increasingly indifferent
stance towards crime. This is the scale along which the state
becomes powerful enough to ignore isolated acts of insurrection,
individuals' consiences take over the role of regulating adverse
behavior, and by ignoring crimes it further isolates the criminals
from one another.
The same general mechanism operates in the strong individual, as in
the example of Mirabeau above. Nietzsche calls this last stage "mercy,"
and we might call it "forgiveness," but it is not a forgiveness
based on pity (this would be a sign of weakness, since pity is
ultimately ellicited as a mechanism of control by the pitied),
or inability to act (Nietzsche thinks that much of the praise
heaped on the virtue of forgiving-and-forgetting by slave moralities
such as Christianity comes from a legacy of being _unable_ to
extract revenge, even if they wanted to--the slave assuages
his inability to retaliate by determining that mercy is a virtue
and that he is thus more virtuous for not fighting back),
but rather from an indifference.
Hope this is some help,
----Ben
--- from list nietzsche@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 1999 20:51:38 -0500 (EST)
Subject: RE: forgiveness
Far more important for Nietzsche than forgiving is forgetting: to
_forget_ offenses is a sign of strength, both for the individual and
for the State.
In the Genealogy of Morals, I:10, he writes:
>To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even one's
>misdeeds seriously for very long--that is the sign of strong, full
>natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold,
>to recuperate and to forget (a good example of this in modern times
>is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done
>him and was unable to forgive simply because he--forgot). Such a
>man shakes off with a /single/ shrug much vermin that eats deep
>into others...
And for the State:
GM II:10,
>As its power increases, a community ceases to take the individual's
>transgressions so seriously, because they can no longer be
>considered dangerous and destructive to the whole as they were
>formerly...
>The justice which began with, "everything is dischargeable,
>everything must be discharged," ends by winking and letting those
>incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, as does
>every good thing on earth, by /overcoming itself/. This self-
>overcoming of justice: on knows the beautiful name it has given
>itself--/mercy/.
For Nietzsche, the act of sublimating a response into an unconscious
reaction is a necessary progression, and a sign of increased strength.
This sublimation is accomplished through forgetfulness, which he
describes as a sort of gatekeeper that prevents consciousness from
being overwhelmed with decisions. Consciousness is an essentially
problematic faculty, and the vast majority of all we do--even that
which we associate with the "will," i.e. an act of the will--is
carried out through unconscious mechanisms, many of which were
originally conscious, but have been sublimated into automatic
reactions.
Nietzsche describes the cruelty of ancient Greek culture, and seeks
to criticize the argument that modern culture is more tolerant
because it is "more moral," or that morality has progressed and
become more humane. In this early manifestation of punishment,
he argues, it was acted out as an exchange between a creditor and
a debtor. When you performed a wrong against someone, you would
receive a punishment of equal "quantity" to repay the debt you have
incurred. This was not a matter of holding you responsible for doing
something "wrong" because you could have done otherwise--this was
not a punishment of the "will," and whether you intended the wrong
or not was inconsequential. This mode of punishment was necessary to
create a _memory_ for unacceptable actions--that is, it creates
a "bad conscience" for those who would wrong or harm others.
Nietzsche speaks a great deal of punishment's role in creating
memories, and muses over how much blood is necessarily spilt over
all great things.
In the strong, modern state, "bad conscience" has already been
instilled for the most part, and gradually the society moves
from a morality-based punishment system, which posits a will
behind every action ("if person X intended to perform crime Y,
they must be punished," from the previous "if person X performed
crime Y, they must be puhisned"), to an increasingly indifferent
stance towards crime. This is the scale along which the state
becomes powerful enough to ignore isolated acts of insurrection,
individuals' consiences take over the role of regulating adverse
behavior, and by ignoring crimes it further isolates the criminals
from one another.
The same general mechanism operates in the strong individual, as in
the example of Mirabeau above. Nietzsche calls this last stage "mercy,"
and we might call it "forgiveness," but it is not a forgiveness
based on pity (this would be a sign of weakness, since pity is
ultimately ellicited as a mechanism of control by the pitied),
or inability to act (Nietzsche thinks that much of the praise
heaped on the virtue of forgiving-and-forgetting by slave moralities
such as Christianity comes from a legacy of being _unable_ to
extract revenge, even if they wanted to--the slave assuages
his inability to retaliate by determining that mercy is a virtue
and that he is thus more virtuous for not fighting back),
but rather from an indifference.
Hope this is some help,
----Ben
--- from list nietzsche@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp