Well, I would suggest that power does not flow from 'human rights' but
through the mechanisms that are invoking the concept of 'human rights'.
The powerless are indeed constructed through other mechanisms which
construct them as having no rights! The claim to have human rights
abusers is to invoke and reify the 'human' and 'rights', which is also
to deploy a set of institutions. The abstractions of 'human'
and 'rights' does not force change or action but the mechanisms of
institutions, in the network of causality 'human rights' are not doing
much. 'Human rights' is like a battle cry for an army that has already
assembled and is ready to charge. The battle cry does nothing to the
enemy, it are the bullets, etc. Just calling out the battle cry may be
good for a laugh down at the pub, but you are doing nothing except
annoying people, and you are probably about to be asked to leave.
(Sounds like the last 'global-action' style meeting I went to!) I don't
know, I may be way off with my reading? What do others think?
Ciao,
Glen.
> Glen - but is this not merely to say that rights are mere abstract
> formalities without the power to implement them? But this leads on to
a
> position that the powerless therefore have no rights to begin with.
And
> without rights to break out of their powerlessness what right do they
have
> to break out of it? If rights are not specified as such how then do
we claim
> they have been violated by human rights abusers? Is it not more the
case
> that Deleuze rejects human rights on the grounds that the Foucualdian
> rejection (and his own) of universals militates against developing a
human
> right because it then becomes a totalising metanarrative? Yet without
such a
> totalising concept do humans not abdicate their ethical
responsibility to
> others by ceding grouind to every tin pot dicatorial regime that
wants to
> opt out of systems that protect people from torure, rape, enslavement,
> arbitrary killing etc?
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Glen Fuller" <g.fuller@xxxxxxxxxx>
> To: <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 2:41 AM
> Subject: Re: Human rights
>
>
> > I don't think he was antagonistic towards the concept as much as he
was
> > antagonistic towards its deployment. My reading was that human
rights is
> > only a weapon in those circumstances where it is recognised as such.
> Deleuze
> > is arguing one step before the application or invocation of human
rights,
> he
> > is arguing that groups need to be engaged on the level that can
create and
> > establish justice or rights. It is a 'pure abstraction' unless the
> > juridicial work (to legitimate the authority of the concept) has
already
> > occurred - 'the invention of rights, invention of the law'. Negri
and
> Hardt
> > relate to this in Empire where they discuss the passage from the
virtual
> to
> > the actual (i do not have my copy hear, so no reference!). Justice
first
> has
> > to be actualised, that is, in the situation 'requiring' justice
(creating
> > the 'requirement' of justice is the first step of its
actualisation),
> before
> > the instruments of that justice can be deployed.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Glen.
--
PhD Candidate, Centre for Cultural Research
University of Western Sydney
through the mechanisms that are invoking the concept of 'human rights'.
The powerless are indeed constructed through other mechanisms which
construct them as having no rights! The claim to have human rights
abusers is to invoke and reify the 'human' and 'rights', which is also
to deploy a set of institutions. The abstractions of 'human'
and 'rights' does not force change or action but the mechanisms of
institutions, in the network of causality 'human rights' are not doing
much. 'Human rights' is like a battle cry for an army that has already
assembled and is ready to charge. The battle cry does nothing to the
enemy, it are the bullets, etc. Just calling out the battle cry may be
good for a laugh down at the pub, but you are doing nothing except
annoying people, and you are probably about to be asked to leave.
(Sounds like the last 'global-action' style meeting I went to!) I don't
know, I may be way off with my reading? What do others think?
Ciao,
Glen.
> Glen - but is this not merely to say that rights are mere abstract
> formalities without the power to implement them? But this leads on to
a
> position that the powerless therefore have no rights to begin with.
And
> without rights to break out of their powerlessness what right do they
have
> to break out of it? If rights are not specified as such how then do
we claim
> they have been violated by human rights abusers? Is it not more the
case
> that Deleuze rejects human rights on the grounds that the Foucualdian
> rejection (and his own) of universals militates against developing a
human
> right because it then becomes a totalising metanarrative? Yet without
such a
> totalising concept do humans not abdicate their ethical
responsibility to
> others by ceding grouind to every tin pot dicatorial regime that
wants to
> opt out of systems that protect people from torure, rape, enslavement,
> arbitrary killing etc?
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Glen Fuller" <g.fuller@xxxxxxxxxx>
> To: <foucault@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 2:41 AM
> Subject: Re: Human rights
>
>
> > I don't think he was antagonistic towards the concept as much as he
was
> > antagonistic towards its deployment. My reading was that human
rights is
> > only a weapon in those circumstances where it is recognised as such.
> Deleuze
> > is arguing one step before the application or invocation of human
rights,
> he
> > is arguing that groups need to be engaged on the level that can
create and
> > establish justice or rights. It is a 'pure abstraction' unless the
> > juridicial work (to legitimate the authority of the concept) has
already
> > occurred - 'the invention of rights, invention of the law'. Negri
and
> Hardt
> > relate to this in Empire where they discuss the passage from the
virtual
> to
> > the actual (i do not have my copy hear, so no reference!). Justice
first
> has
> > to be actualised, that is, in the situation 'requiring' justice
(creating
> > the 'requirement' of justice is the first step of its
actualisation),
> before
> > the instruments of that justice can be deployed.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Glen.
--
PhD Candidate, Centre for Cultural Research
University of Western Sydney