Sorry to butt in, but I feel that Mann can't use Foucault - to do so
would totally destroy his own intellectual project. I have made an
argument in my own work, for example, which looks at Martin Shaw's
use of Mann's model of social power in relation to the state - here i
argue that the model of the state that Mann produces, while helpfully
historical (for international relations theorists anyway - I can tell
you as a member of that discipline that IR theorists have a very
unhistorical view of the state), nevertheless reduces the state to a
variation of Weber's classic definition. Recall, Borrowing only
partially from Weber, Mann argues that a social body must satisfy
four criteria if it is to be called a state. It must have:
1). a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
2) embodying a centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover a
3) territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises
4) some degree of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by some organized physical force.
While the last element certainly concedes much to Weber, Mann insists that “states can be recognized by the central location of their differentiated institutions” (1988: 4). In this way, he distances himself from both Marxist and IR Realism, both of which posit the function of the state as a function of the particular types of social power that concern them respectively. Mann’s more multi-modal state is never purely functional. Rather, different interest groups assert themselves over time, manipulating different institutions in order to assert their specific interests. This is a state, therefore, which “Balkanizes” under the microscope – a state which is so messy that it has “no final unity or even consistency” (1988: 53, 56).
However, despite these caveats, what is interesting about both Mann and Shaw is their description of the state, whatever it eventually is, in primarily liberal terms. They share Hobbes's conceit, for example, of state sovereignty as a form of collective agency. Hindess draws from Foucault to offer a good critique of such models. He focuses on how scholars that use this model tend to reduce their normative purview to simple issues to do with the appropriate political constitution of society. That is, a question of the proper relations between the ruler and the ruled. What gets forgotten, as Hindess suggests, is the issue of the role of government in producing these arrangements. In this sense, the critique is that, for Mann, the state is still an actor of sorts - not in any way imminent to the social, as Foucault would have us believe.
Nicholas
On May 15, 2007, at 14:54, Arthur Zinault wrote:
----------------------------------
Nicholas J. Kiersey
- Teaching Fellow, Department of Social Sciences
University of Virginia, Wise
1). a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
2) embodying a centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover a
3) territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises
4) some degree of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by some organized physical force.
While the last element certainly concedes much to Weber, Mann insists that “states can be recognized by the central location of their differentiated institutions” (1988: 4). In this way, he distances himself from both Marxist and IR Realism, both of which posit the function of the state as a function of the particular types of social power that concern them respectively. Mann’s more multi-modal state is never purely functional. Rather, different interest groups assert themselves over time, manipulating different institutions in order to assert their specific interests. This is a state, therefore, which “Balkanizes” under the microscope – a state which is so messy that it has “no final unity or even consistency” (1988: 53, 56).
However, despite these caveats, what is interesting about both Mann and Shaw is their description of the state, whatever it eventually is, in primarily liberal terms. They share Hobbes's conceit, for example, of state sovereignty as a form of collective agency. Hindess draws from Foucault to offer a good critique of such models. He focuses on how scholars that use this model tend to reduce their normative purview to simple issues to do with the appropriate political constitution of society. That is, a question of the proper relations between the ruler and the ruled. What gets forgotten, as Hindess suggests, is the issue of the role of government in producing these arrangements. In this sense, the critique is that, for Mann, the state is still an actor of sorts - not in any way imminent to the social, as Foucault would have us believe.
Nicholas
On May 15, 2007, at 14:54, Arthur Zinault wrote:
Ilgin,
And what's even more ironic is that in a recent interview I saw on the web
with Mann, Mann said that before he wrote a book he went on what he called
"looting and pillaging raids" through other social sciences to marshal
evidence for his stuff. Sounds fun -- also sounds like what Foucault did!
But I guess Mann never "looted and pillaged" Foucault's stuff! Hard to
believe. Maybe Mann is jealous of our fave French power theorist and doesn't
want to acknowledge some competition? ;)
-Arthur Zinault
On 5/15/07, Ilgin Yorukoglu <ilgin_y@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
_______________________________________________
Thanks for this reply, Arthur,
Yes, Foucault's constant failure in citations are pretty well- known, and
he's often criticized (sometimes pretty harshly, too, I must say) for this
reason in many circles. But my concern is, specifically, that I find Mann's
ideas very close to Foucault's, from his different typologies of
power,including the "diffused power" to the "means" of power in order to
construct a sort of an "unconscious" "normalization", and of course, also,
the extension of Durkheim in emphasizing the ways in which normative
discourses create communities and understandings, i.e. knowledges. To me,
there are many other points where they follow extremely similar lines.Also,
of course he's writing right after Foucault had become an important figure,
so it's impossible that Mann was not aware of the latter.
But thanks a lot again for reminding me of Russell's work, that's so true.
Best,
Ilgin
----- Original Message ----
From: Arthur Zinault <arthur.zinault@xxxxxxxxx>
To: Mailing-list <foucault-l@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2007 8:12:52 AM
Subject: Re: [Foucault-L] historical sociology, anyone?
Ilgin,
Yes, Michael Mann is considered by many to be the best living power
theorist
since his _Sources of Social Power_, and you're right,t here's no Foucault
in it. In fact, in a book I have called _Anatomy of Power_, which is a
critical reader of Mann's works on power relations, the index of this 400
page book records only two mentions of Foucault -- not by Mann, but by
other
authors briefly mentioning Foucault in some relation to Mann. Just two
mentions in over 400 pages.
On the other hand, however, Foucault was very picky in who he chose to
quote. For example, Bertrad Russell's _Power_ was never, ever mentioned by
Foucault as far as I'm aware, yet t was one of the pre-eminent studis of
power before the 1950s, an ambitious project in which Russell proposed to
do
for "power" what Marx had done for economics. 9And by most accounts failed
but nonetheless left the world with some enlightening insights anyway.)
As well, much of the classical anarchist tradition dealt EXACTLY with the
distribution of power in socity and its finest was and is a critical
methodology of social power relations, yet Foucault barely refers to it
explicitly, either. German anarchosyndicalist Rudolf Rocker's
_Nationalism_and_Culture_,a prescient anti-racist and anti- nationalist
book
from the 1920s, posits the "will to power" as a primary impetus behind
much
of humanity's current matrix of power relations. ANd you'llf ind other
examples in Emma Goldman,w ho also lectured and wrote often about
Nietzsche.
But these and others were never mentioned by Foucault as far as I'm aware.
Likewise, Giorgio Agamben, after Foucault's death, found it remarkable
that
while Foucault wrote about prisons, mental hospitals, and even war towards
the end of his life, that he never discussed the institution of
concentratin
camps or death camps. Agamben obviously sought to remedy this with
"Remnants
of Auschwitz," et. al.
So, Mann doesn't refer to Foucault, which seems odd, but Foucault also
didn't reference a lot of folks that to me seem a bit odd, too. But then
again, one can't cite everything under the sun all the time. However, I do
agree Mann's almost complete, if not willful, ignorance of Foucault seems
counter-intutitive.
Best,
Arthur Zinault
On 5/9/07, Ilgin Yorukoglu <ilgin_y@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
mind
Greetings everyone,
I believe Foucault has been very influential in such works on state
formation, punishment etc. Yet, many times he is not cited (I have in
Michael Mann's hundreds of pg. work on the source of social power, inwhich
he doesn't cite Foucault even once), or other times, I believe, he'soften
misinterpreted and criticized based on this misinterpretation._______________________________________________
Any suggestion, idea, thought will be very much appreciated.
Many thanks beforehand,
Ilgin
Foucault-L mailing list
_____________________________________________________________________ _______________Luggage?
GPS? Comic books?
Check out fitting gifts for grads at Yahoo! Search
http://search.yahoo.com/search?fr=oni_on_mail&p=graduation +gifts&cs=bz
_______________________________________________
Foucault-L mailing list
Foucault-L mailing list
----------------------------------
Nicholas J. Kiersey
- Teaching Fellow, Department of Social Sciences
University of Virginia, Wise