Re: Foucault's biography

I have suggested that the problem in Miller's book was not Foucault's
body, but Miller's writing of Foucault's body. Certainly, Foucault saw the
body as an uncontainable set of the effects (both productive and passive) of
power, as a series of discontinuities and fractured identities, he did not
believe in teleologies or stable identities. So, isn't it possible to
conceive that within in his own private and personal life, he didn't just
leave all of his philosophy on his desk, but actually questioned and
critiqued his private life? Interviews with Rabinow suggest as much.
If we talk about his personal life, or his bodily practices, do we
have to assume a monolithic and teleological narrative of the gay
man? Furthermore, why can't we privilege the body and
the personal now and then as simply another (valid) method of analysis?
Not to essentialize and yet to validate the personal... it's quite a
challenge, but not as strange as we would like to think if we can admit that
maybe something personal has been part of what has driven us all to what we
consider good philosophy. This is not a new idea, Nietzsche suggested it.


Partial thread listing: