John Ransom tells us that according to F., the legacy of Husserl can be
divided into two camps, one organized around the thematic of the knowing
subject, and the other around formalism and intuitionism. (I'm
paraphrasing, sorry if I botch the details, and ignore if it's the
substance). With respect to the second option, he then suggests that this
has todowith a tendency in the philosophy and history of science to
relate truth and meaning structures back to the intuitions of their
founders. That may, at bottom be what he is referring to. A more obvious
gloss on formalism and intuitionism is that this refers to two of the
three positions into which those people interested in the philosphy of
mathematics divided themselves into following the "crisis" in the
foundaitons ofmathematics following the "discovery" of the semantic and
syntactic paradoxes, associated with Russell, Cantor etc. Opposed to
formalism and intuitionism was the logicism of Russell, Frege and Quine.
Antoine Goulem
goua@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
divided into two camps, one organized around the thematic of the knowing
subject, and the other around formalism and intuitionism. (I'm
paraphrasing, sorry if I botch the details, and ignore if it's the
substance). With respect to the second option, he then suggests that this
has todowith a tendency in the philosophy and history of science to
relate truth and meaning structures back to the intuitions of their
founders. That may, at bottom be what he is referring to. A more obvious
gloss on formalism and intuitionism is that this refers to two of the
three positions into which those people interested in the philosphy of
mathematics divided themselves into following the "crisis" in the
foundaitons ofmathematics following the "discovery" of the semantic and
syntactic paradoxes, associated with Russell, Cantor etc. Opposed to
formalism and intuitionism was the logicism of Russell, Frege and Quine.
Antoine Goulem
goua@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------