structural v. nietzschean genealogy

In his _Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist_, (Harvard, ISBN #
0-674-62442-4) David Berkowitz criticizes Foucault's treatment of
genealogy as follows:

[I]f genealogy consists in the careful gathering of vast source
material and patient attention to detail as Foucault says it does,
then Nietzsche is no genealogist. For N's genealogy is not gray.
Inasmuch as N reduces the whole complex and multifarious
moral past of mankind to two competing moralities, it is closer
to the truth to say that in practice his genealogy is painted
in black and white. Nor is N's genealogy meticulous. Inasmuch
as he names no names, dates no events, and shows scant concern
for details, variations, and anomalies, it would be more
accurate to call his genealogy inspired guesswork, suggestive
speculation, or a likely tale. And N's genealogy, strikingly
devoid of empirical evidence or scholarly apparatus, is anything
but patiently documentary. Foucault's interpretation of N's
genealogy is not gray, meticulous, or patiently documentary,
but rather a tall tale masquerading as a faithful and accurate
restatement. (pp. 68-69)

The possibility Dr. Berkowitz raises, though in a very awkward and
backhanded manner, is that F and N are not the same kinds of
genealogists. Berkowitz assumes that not-being-like-Nietzsche is a bad
thing that Foucault himself would have wanted to avoid, but this
assumption is not the only possibility.

For some crazy reason having to do with how time works, I read Foucault's
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" before I read N's own _Genealogy of
Morals_, and I must admit that Berkowitz is right: Nietzsche is a pretty
lousy genealogist in that book!

I was wondering if perhaps other list members had thoughts on the
relative competence of the two authors to practice "genealogy," which of
course raises the whole question of what "genealogy" is.


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