I have just finished reading the short piece by Maurice Florence
(MF), and had to read it alongside the piece, "The Subject and
Power" (SP) with the aim of ascertaining MF's philosophical project,
even when the possibility of that project is within the context
defined by Sartre and Marxism (according to MF). The two pieces are
similar, even when the piece by Maurice Florence is more
philosophical than SP. Within this context, and similar contexts
where I have confronted philosophical questions which MF raise, I find
myself defining MF's project within a metaphysical framework,
as a project which seeks, in its various genealogical/archaeological
representations, to articulate the determination of the processes of
human subjectivation. That is, and this is crude summary of MF's
work, his work is a materialist critique of humanism. The
subjectivation of human beings, for MF, is a material process which
is located within power relations/knowledge. Now this is
metaphysical in the sense that it is not the overcoming of being, of
presence, of existence/ontology itself. Rather, as seen in the
various postcolonial appropriations of
MF, this is an affirmation of the differential character of being, in
the form of subject-positions and fragmentary nature of social
existence. MF is not confronting the ontological issue of being, but
one form of its formulation in humanist discourses, such as
Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. Thus, MF's critique is not similar to
Nietzsche's overcoming of "man". Within these limited thoughts, I
have begun to wonder about the radical nature of MF's anti-humanism.
All along, I have been under the impression that anti-humanism, in
its philosophical sense, would lead one to confront the question
which Heidegger finds to be at the core of
philosophical thought, and this is the question of being. I guess for
me, as Heidegger's analysis provokes me, to provide a critique of
humanism is to begin, at least throough Nietzsche, to find ways of
overcoming being. And only in this sense do I find MF's project unable
to engage in the final act of the critique of humanism, the event of
the critique of being.
Any comments and references on these thoughts would be appreciated.
Windsor Leroke
029lerok@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
------------------
(MF), and had to read it alongside the piece, "The Subject and
Power" (SP) with the aim of ascertaining MF's philosophical project,
even when the possibility of that project is within the context
defined by Sartre and Marxism (according to MF). The two pieces are
similar, even when the piece by Maurice Florence is more
philosophical than SP. Within this context, and similar contexts
where I have confronted philosophical questions which MF raise, I find
myself defining MF's project within a metaphysical framework,
as a project which seeks, in its various genealogical/archaeological
representations, to articulate the determination of the processes of
human subjectivation. That is, and this is crude summary of MF's
work, his work is a materialist critique of humanism. The
subjectivation of human beings, for MF, is a material process which
is located within power relations/knowledge. Now this is
metaphysical in the sense that it is not the overcoming of being, of
presence, of existence/ontology itself. Rather, as seen in the
various postcolonial appropriations of
MF, this is an affirmation of the differential character of being, in
the form of subject-positions and fragmentary nature of social
existence. MF is not confronting the ontological issue of being, but
one form of its formulation in humanist discourses, such as
Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. Thus, MF's critique is not similar to
Nietzsche's overcoming of "man". Within these limited thoughts, I
have begun to wonder about the radical nature of MF's anti-humanism.
All along, I have been under the impression that anti-humanism, in
its philosophical sense, would lead one to confront the question
which Heidegger finds to be at the core of
philosophical thought, and this is the question of being. I guess for
me, as Heidegger's analysis provokes me, to provide a critique of
humanism is to begin, at least throough Nietzsche, to find ways of
overcoming being. And only in this sense do I find MF's project unable
to engage in the final act of the critique of humanism, the event of
the critique of being.
Any comments and references on these thoughts would be appreciated.
Windsor Leroke
029lerok@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
------------------