Windsor Leroke writes:
...the aim of ascertaining MF's philosophical project...
I find
myself defining MF's project within a metaphysical framework,
as a project which seeks, in its various genealogical/archaeological
representations, to articulate the determination of the processes of
human subjectivation. That is, and this is crude summary of MF's
work, his work is a materialist critique of humanism....
MF is not confronting the ontological issue of being, but
one form of its formulation in humanist discourses, such as
Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. Thus, MF's critique is not similar to
Nietzsche's overcoming of "man"....
I guess for
me, as Heidegger's analysis provokes me, to provide a critique of
humanism is to begin, at least throough Nietzsche, to find ways of
overcoming being. And only in this sense do I find MF's project unable
to engage in the final act of the critique of humanism, the event of
the critique of being.
[end post]
Foucault in "The Subject and Power" and elsewhere says that he is not
interested in a "final act" of a critique of humanism but instead finds in
philosophers such as the Kant of "What is Enlightenment?" a philosophical
relationship to one's present which would not seek a final overcoming to end
overcomings. He says: "The other aspect of "universal philosophy" didn't
disappear. But the task of philosophy as a critical analysis of our world is
something which is more and more important. Maybe the most certain of all
philosophical problems is the problem of the present time, and of what we are
at this very moment." So F sees a critique of humanism as an ongoing
process, a critique of "what we are today": a question which can be asked of
ourselves and our real conditions or practices (which make us subjects of our
actions) without appeal to universal notions such as what we are "ultimately"
or "finally." Is this what you mean by "materialist critique of humanism"?
So he is not doing metaphysics, though some tend to philsophically interpret
his work as offering some sort of theory of power, which he has rejected. In
general, I think it is possible to view F's work as philosophy since it does
intersect there at many points. However, I don't think it was his interest
to remain there for longer than necessary, as his work tends toward those
limits where philosophy confronts itself reluctanly, uncertain of its own
history, legitimacy, and modes of proceeding.
------------------
...the aim of ascertaining MF's philosophical project...
I find
myself defining MF's project within a metaphysical framework,
as a project which seeks, in its various genealogical/archaeological
representations, to articulate the determination of the processes of
human subjectivation. That is, and this is crude summary of MF's
work, his work is a materialist critique of humanism....
MF is not confronting the ontological issue of being, but
one form of its formulation in humanist discourses, such as
Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. Thus, MF's critique is not similar to
Nietzsche's overcoming of "man"....
I guess for
me, as Heidegger's analysis provokes me, to provide a critique of
humanism is to begin, at least throough Nietzsche, to find ways of
overcoming being. And only in this sense do I find MF's project unable
to engage in the final act of the critique of humanism, the event of
the critique of being.
[end post]
Foucault in "The Subject and Power" and elsewhere says that he is not
interested in a "final act" of a critique of humanism but instead finds in
philosophers such as the Kant of "What is Enlightenment?" a philosophical
relationship to one's present which would not seek a final overcoming to end
overcomings. He says: "The other aspect of "universal philosophy" didn't
disappear. But the task of philosophy as a critical analysis of our world is
something which is more and more important. Maybe the most certain of all
philosophical problems is the problem of the present time, and of what we are
at this very moment." So F sees a critique of humanism as an ongoing
process, a critique of "what we are today": a question which can be asked of
ourselves and our real conditions or practices (which make us subjects of our
actions) without appeal to universal notions such as what we are "ultimately"
or "finally." Is this what you mean by "materialist critique of humanism"?
So he is not doing metaphysics, though some tend to philsophically interpret
his work as offering some sort of theory of power, which he has rejected. In
general, I think it is possible to view F's work as philosophy since it does
intersect there at many points. However, I don't think it was his interest
to remain there for longer than necessary, as his work tends toward those
limits where philosophy confronts itself reluctanly, uncertain of its own
history, legitimacy, and modes of proceeding.
------------------