Joe,
Once again thanks for taking the time to get back. I'm not familiar with
Baier's stuff although I have come across refs to it now and again. In your
posting there are some things which I find problematic. For example, what is
meant by 'reflection'? I find this troubling because, and as your last
sentence seems to suggest, it seems to be a denial of natural necessity. Is
this what you are advocating? If so the problem arises - that of induction -
as to why or how we all impose our associations in a consistent manner on
the world? This in turn seems to lead us back to Kant in postulating a set
of attributes that are common to all humanity, or those who 'reflect' on
those associations.A kind of pseudo universal/essentialism. Also, whilst I
agree with your comment:
> Additionally, we have to consider the natural tendency we have to
form sets of assocaitions, and develop expectations about the behavior
of our own minds, our theoretical entities, etc.
But we surely also have to ask what these associations are about and whether
such things really do act in such and such a way or not. Because if these
things do not act in such and such a way but only "our" reflection sees
them, or creates the appearance of such associations, then again we must all
be conspiring to reach agreement. This to me seems to be smuggling in a form
of mysticism which would have made even Hegel smile. I agree with your point
about:
But the basic point is
> that we measure validity against both the evidence of our
> senses, our own beliefs, expectations, "revival" sets of
> associations, etc.
But find problematic:
All of these principles are the products
> of descriptions of experience.
What are they descriptions and/or experiences of? And as you say we learn
not simply to take for granted the evidence of our senses, or else we would
still all believe that the sun orbitted the earth, or that the earth is
still flat. Well actually I do experience it as flat, with the odd hill here
and there. Still, and insofar as all "knowledge" is potentially fallible I'm
also fairly sure it is not flat, whatever my associations and reflections
seem to indicate. Is my belief in an unflat earth meatphysical?
Again, I agree with the sentiment of the following:
We can only say that in making a judgment
> about anything we reflect on out won past, and so on, and we
> ahve a natural tendency to form sets of assocaitions,
But disagree with the move:
soem of which are held so strongly that we hold them as
> "necessary".
Once again, and given the potential fallibility of all knowledge claims, I
am going to push the point that some associations will hold - apples falling
>from trees will tend to hit the ground, the tides will tend to flow, the sun
and moon will rise and fall, copper will conduct electricity whereas rubber
will not, etc. - irrespective of whether "we" are aware of these or not.
> The other side of this kind of naturalism is that it is not,
> contra Kripke and contra many of Hume's contemporaries, a
> formula for necessary individualism. when Hume speaks of
> habit and custom, he often does so interchangeably - as
> though the habits of thought we form are social in nature.
> we perhaps do dablle in some kind of Rousseauian metaphysics
> when we go this route, but it is also the route that Marx
> takes in the Paris manuscripts.
Again I think we come back to my original point about there being no
escaping from metaphysics here. Even if not made explicit I would argue that
all action, thought, reflection whatever, secretes a metaphysics.
The way things are produced, valued,
> conceptiualized, etc. are all "essentially" social; but we
> can get at these social phenomena with empirical
> descriptions. We can get at the logic, functioning, and
> "nature" of capitalism without refernce to occult
> metaphyscial entities.
But isn't reference to the "logic", "funtioning" and "nature" of capitalism
a set of metaphysical propositions. I mean, I personally have never actually
seen capitalism but I don't doubt its existence, because I can observe its
insidious effects.
> Foucault, it seems to me, is clearly one who just leaves
> philosophy alone in many ways. In the Preface to the
> English edition of The Order of Things, he claims that his
> work is a description of histrocial tranformations ( not an
> explanation of such): "In this work, then, I left the
> problem of causes to one side; I chose to conficne myself to
> describing the transformations themselves, thinking that
> this would be an indispensible step if, one day, a theory of
> scientific change and epistemological causality was to be
> constructed."(xiii)
On this I don't think he is able to leave philosophy or the 'problem of
cause' to one side, just as he has his own "repressive hypothesis" despite
his valiant attempts to avoid these. Foucault builds causal stories based on
an unproblematised metaphysical system. That is, and in common with much
contemporary social thought, the epistemological lens has been changed but
the positivist (I'm using this word in its technical sense, not its over
used pejorative one) ontology remains intact. And it's for this reason I
believe that many "postmodernists", as you put it, fail to grasp that an
essential element of Foucaults later work was to redress the balance of his
earlier work, and thematise the material dimensions of power and
subjectivity. So I suppose I am saying that there is not an early and a late
Foucault but only a better balanced one Foucault.
Thanks,
Colin.
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
Once again thanks for taking the time to get back. I'm not familiar with
Baier's stuff although I have come across refs to it now and again. In your
posting there are some things which I find problematic. For example, what is
meant by 'reflection'? I find this troubling because, and as your last
sentence seems to suggest, it seems to be a denial of natural necessity. Is
this what you are advocating? If so the problem arises - that of induction -
as to why or how we all impose our associations in a consistent manner on
the world? This in turn seems to lead us back to Kant in postulating a set
of attributes that are common to all humanity, or those who 'reflect' on
those associations.A kind of pseudo universal/essentialism. Also, whilst I
agree with your comment:
> Additionally, we have to consider the natural tendency we have to
form sets of assocaitions, and develop expectations about the behavior
of our own minds, our theoretical entities, etc.
But we surely also have to ask what these associations are about and whether
such things really do act in such and such a way or not. Because if these
things do not act in such and such a way but only "our" reflection sees
them, or creates the appearance of such associations, then again we must all
be conspiring to reach agreement. This to me seems to be smuggling in a form
of mysticism which would have made even Hegel smile. I agree with your point
about:
But the basic point is
> that we measure validity against both the evidence of our
> senses, our own beliefs, expectations, "revival" sets of
> associations, etc.
But find problematic:
All of these principles are the products
> of descriptions of experience.
What are they descriptions and/or experiences of? And as you say we learn
not simply to take for granted the evidence of our senses, or else we would
still all believe that the sun orbitted the earth, or that the earth is
still flat. Well actually I do experience it as flat, with the odd hill here
and there. Still, and insofar as all "knowledge" is potentially fallible I'm
also fairly sure it is not flat, whatever my associations and reflections
seem to indicate. Is my belief in an unflat earth meatphysical?
Again, I agree with the sentiment of the following:
We can only say that in making a judgment
> about anything we reflect on out won past, and so on, and we
> ahve a natural tendency to form sets of assocaitions,
But disagree with the move:
soem of which are held so strongly that we hold them as
> "necessary".
Once again, and given the potential fallibility of all knowledge claims, I
am going to push the point that some associations will hold - apples falling
>from trees will tend to hit the ground, the tides will tend to flow, the sun
and moon will rise and fall, copper will conduct electricity whereas rubber
will not, etc. - irrespective of whether "we" are aware of these or not.
> The other side of this kind of naturalism is that it is not,
> contra Kripke and contra many of Hume's contemporaries, a
> formula for necessary individualism. when Hume speaks of
> habit and custom, he often does so interchangeably - as
> though the habits of thought we form are social in nature.
> we perhaps do dablle in some kind of Rousseauian metaphysics
> when we go this route, but it is also the route that Marx
> takes in the Paris manuscripts.
Again I think we come back to my original point about there being no
escaping from metaphysics here. Even if not made explicit I would argue that
all action, thought, reflection whatever, secretes a metaphysics.
The way things are produced, valued,
> conceptiualized, etc. are all "essentially" social; but we
> can get at these social phenomena with empirical
> descriptions. We can get at the logic, functioning, and
> "nature" of capitalism without refernce to occult
> metaphyscial entities.
But isn't reference to the "logic", "funtioning" and "nature" of capitalism
a set of metaphysical propositions. I mean, I personally have never actually
seen capitalism but I don't doubt its existence, because I can observe its
insidious effects.
> Foucault, it seems to me, is clearly one who just leaves
> philosophy alone in many ways. In the Preface to the
> English edition of The Order of Things, he claims that his
> work is a description of histrocial tranformations ( not an
> explanation of such): "In this work, then, I left the
> problem of causes to one side; I chose to conficne myself to
> describing the transformations themselves, thinking that
> this would be an indispensible step if, one day, a theory of
> scientific change and epistemological causality was to be
> constructed."(xiii)
On this I don't think he is able to leave philosophy or the 'problem of
cause' to one side, just as he has his own "repressive hypothesis" despite
his valiant attempts to avoid these. Foucault builds causal stories based on
an unproblematised metaphysical system. That is, and in common with much
contemporary social thought, the epistemological lens has been changed but
the positivist (I'm using this word in its technical sense, not its over
used pejorative one) ontology remains intact. And it's for this reason I
believe that many "postmodernists", as you put it, fail to grasp that an
essential element of Foucaults later work was to redress the balance of his
earlier work, and thematise the material dimensions of power and
subjectivity. So I suppose I am saying that there is not an early and a late
Foucault but only a better balanced one Foucault.
Thanks,
Colin.
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------