Jim, Thanks for thaking the time to get back. My apologies if I
misunderstood. The perils of the written word, as opposed to the spoken,
where intentions and meanings gain clarification through body language and
eye contact etc. Derrida would have been proud of us.
>Since we seem to be having trouble with terms, I'd like to know more of
>what you mean by "cultural relativism" (I know you didn't introduce it,
>but I'm not sure how you're unhappy with it).
>However, on purely face value, the above says to me:
>a. you're comfortable with epistemological relativism
>b. you're not happy with cultural relativism
>c. the two are inextricably linked
What do I mean by cultural relativism? At a base line and I accept this is
going to be superficial, I take CR to mean something akin to the position
Winch or Wiggenstein might allude to, insofar as the practices of a
particular cultural community can say nothing to those of another. I think
Wittgenstein gives an example of science being unable to say anything about
magic. Thus, transposed into the cultural realm it might be said that my
objecting about genital mutilation (I apologise in advance for using such an
emotive issue, but lets grasp the nettle) is inappropriate to that community
in which such practices occur. This position however, in actual fact,
although many seem to have read Wittgenstein in this way, was never what his
notion of language games entailed, for even Wittgenstein when talking about
cross-cultural dialogue said:
"Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language
quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people
there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them and
so on? The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means
of which we interpret an unknown language." (Philosphical Investigations
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), para. 206.)
Also, I think to put some flesh on this I would like to draw your attention
to Feyerabends comments on relativism, these are i think very telling.
"I regard the philosophical position of relativism silly because it
assumes that which never happens, namely no exchange. I also
regard the philosophical position of objectivism to be silly. They
are two sides of the same coin. Objectivism means there is one thing
which is closed and must not be interfered with: the truth. The other
side of the coin is relativism: there are many things which are
closed and must not be interfered with. When you go into different
surroundings with different people, you cannot lay down any
ground rules. They must grow out of the situation. To have general
principles in knowledge or anything else is deadly, absolutely
deadly." (P. K. Feyerabend, 1992)
Actually, what both Wiggenstein and Feyerabend are really enunciating is a
denial of the incommensurability thesis. That is, that there could ever be
total and full incommensurability. Certainly therre may be differences but
diffrences can always be negotiated, to a greater or lesser extent, in a
dialogue. What is important is that both participants to the dialogue
recognise the possibility that every position is up for grabs. Still the
deciding of what the resolution will be, will be the result of 'reasoned
argument' based on many factors, some of which will be evidence that certain
practices do not actually fulfil the function they are believed to hold. I
don't deny, BTW, that some cultural practices play a role in that society
although perhapsnot the role the participants believe. Marriage for example,
arguably, is not necessary to ensure that our-off spring get looked after,
although it may well be necessary to ensure the division of labour. It may
be both, but I would require convincing of this. How might this occur,
through discourse, exchange, dialogue, enducements, coersion, power, yes, I
agree, all of these will play a role, but also evidence. Consider Faurrisons
(sp?) arguments about the Holocaust. I wasn't there. I don't have
epistemological certainty, that allows me to say that I KNOW it happened,
still given the evidence available I do "know" it happened.
Given this then there is no 'real' confusion between:
>>a. you're comfortable with epistemological relativism
>>b. you're not happy with cultural relativism
>>c. the two are inextricably linked
Because the acceptance of 2 is not dependent upon the rejection of 1. In
order to say that I do not think a particular practice is (in)appropriate I
do not have to be certain, in the Cartesian sense. In essence, and this is
an issue that seems to have risen on the list vis-a-vis Foucaults
(anti)Humanism, I accept that we all have a 'core-species being' (as I think
Foucault does). Notice however, that this is not the same as human nature. I
accept that this core-species being is always culturally mediated. Still,
and Feyerabend, he of the "anything goes", explicitly says he draws the line
at human suffering. This is also my line. I also deny that I have to
epistemologically ground my claim in any form of foundational certainty. We
can, of course, argue at the margins - when does life begin, for example,
and where we draw the line will to a certain extent be based on conventions
- it might be 20 weeks, it might be 26 - but essentially we are able to
identify a human from say a tree. However, even on the margins, once drawn
room for disagreement will be less due to the fact that we all agree on what
a week is. It's simply not possible to doubt everything at once. Because
then one would have to doubt doubt itself.
>
>2. This is also a bit off relativism, but it does seem a critical point
>about Foucault:
>jim>>I thought that Foucault's main project in the power/knowledge area was to
>>>show how "conspiring to reach agreement" was a simple, inevitable, day to
>>>day activity, which had no element of mysticism.
>colin>
>>Well, he may well have, but that's the point. Put this way, it is mystical,
>>and highly meatphysical too. There is no escaping from metaphysics, only
>>delusions of having done so.
>If the only point you are making is that "there's no escaping from
>metaphysics" then I have to agree, though I would like to know what
>metaphysic you prefer.
There has been a significant move within philosophy within this century. The
positivist orthodoxy has come under sustained attack, both from within and
without the philosophy of science. Yet, although the epistemological lens
has been altered the metaphysical system (philsophy has been undenialbly
anti-realist since its inception and positivism more than most) has remained
intact. Thus we have a set non-positivist epistemological positions
transposed upon a positivist ontology. By metaphysical I mean, at one level,
precisely the underthematised ontology that infects all manner of positions.
Why is this important? I will quote Bhaskar here:
>"To see science as a social ativity, and as structured and discriminating
in its thought, constitutes a significant step in our understanding of
science. But, I shall argue without the support of a revised ontology, and
in particular a conception of the world as stratified and differentiated
too, it is impossible to steer clear of the Scylla of holding the structure
indispensable in the
>long run (back to empiricism) without being pulled into the Charybdis of
jusifying it exclusively in terms of the fixed or changing needs of the
scientific community (a form of neo-Kantian pragmatism exemplified by e.g.
Toulmin and Kuhn).' R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Brighton:
Harvester, 1978), p. 9.
>
>But I don't get the "mystical" bit. Maybe I don't understand what you mean
>by mystical.
How does this conspiracy occur, what are the processes? What metaphysical
system is operating here? Is the ability to conspire and create
autogentically an attribute of Humanity? What is existence on this reading?
Do we all conspire to create the material world? Hegel went mystical by
seeing everything as a manifestation of Geist, Berkeley through God, PLato,
the forms. Foucault I think, although not concerned directly with this
issue, is unable to explain how we are both the originators and possibly
creators, of "our world" and both constiuted by it. This process to me seems
mystical, mysterious, vague, shifting.
>
>(I take "relativism" to mean that I am unable to show that my ethical
>beliefs have a firm foundation, and that I realise that there are lots of
>other people who have opposing ethical beliefs which they believe just as
>strongly as I.)
>
>Why would you then suppose that I was not concerned about the welfare of
>the "other"?
>In fact, the very fact of believing that the other "might have a point"
>seems to me a type of concern.
But is concern enough. Hitler, clearly believed he "had a point" as did Pol
Pot.
Was their point of equal value to Nelson Mandela's? The point is I'm not
concerned, nor is it necessary to have a firm foundation, since as you quite
rightly say:
>(and must - since no choice is a choice) make
>a choice.
>But what does "reasoned choice" mean, if it is not ultimately appealing to
>some foundation?
No, no, it's not apealing to some foundation. It is a process where we
"conspire", if you like, to assess the eveidence, and this will include more
than simple experential evidence, (it will also, i accept, inculde social
power relations, for example), and reach a reasoned judgement on the basis
of the evidence and arguments. We carry out this task every moment of every
day. I had a cup of coffee for breakfast this morning, just as yesterday
morning, and hopefully tommorrow morning. I like coffee, I reasonably choose
to drink it. Still, past experience of enjoying my morning cup of coffee
will not ensure, that is, give me foundational certainty, that tommorrow
when I drink my coffee that my partner hasn't spiked it with poison. Still,
this won't stop from drinking coffee tommorrow. Nor is this decision
mystical, it is based on past experience, my present relationship with my
partner, the availabity of coffee etc.
I alluded to rock-bottom because I could see a situation arising where there
was nowhere left to turn but the place we had started from. The examples
about the Holocaust, Pol Pot and Hitler make the point. If reasoned
arguments are dependent upon epistemic certainty then there are no reasoned
arguments against such positions and we had better just get the bombs etc.
ready. I admit reasoned arguments seemed to have failed in the examples I
gave, but these examples do not disbar the notion of reasoned arguments,
only that we should try harder. If we rely solely on power, whether military
or otherwise, to settle disputes, and make these the only legit tools, the
day may well arrive when the likes of those mentioned have the greater power.
>>
>
>I don't understand the aside, and I'm not an expert on international relations.
>But I do believe that in history many wars have been fought because people
>were sure they were right.
Well absolutely, they were wed to foundationalist notions and in certain
instances they were wrong, but surely in others they were right? But the
mere possibility of being wrong should not lead to political inertia only
humility in the face of one's judgements and actions. As you have said
inaction is a form of action.
And I hope that people may be a bit more willing to settle peacefully if
>they had just the slightest nagging doubt about the justice of their
>position.
To me here it seems that you might just be falling prey to dichtomous
thinking. But surely, even if I accept that the U.S. went into the Gulf War
primarily to safeguard oil supplies, this does nothing to offset the fact
that the invasion and slaughtering of innocent civilians, and environmental
destruction, was realtively speaking 'wrong'. That is to say, the motives of
the U.S. administration were multi-faceted, and just because one facet was
based upon pragmatic self-interest does nothing to offset the good the
operation achieved (although, we'd probably both agree that the Kuwaiti
regime was not the best it could have been.)
>
>Hoping we can get closer to finding where our basic
>misunderstanding/disagreement lies.
Me too.
Thanks,
Colin.
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------
misunderstood. The perils of the written word, as opposed to the spoken,
where intentions and meanings gain clarification through body language and
eye contact etc. Derrida would have been proud of us.
>Since we seem to be having trouble with terms, I'd like to know more of
>what you mean by "cultural relativism" (I know you didn't introduce it,
>but I'm not sure how you're unhappy with it).
>However, on purely face value, the above says to me:
>a. you're comfortable with epistemological relativism
>b. you're not happy with cultural relativism
>c. the two are inextricably linked
What do I mean by cultural relativism? At a base line and I accept this is
going to be superficial, I take CR to mean something akin to the position
Winch or Wiggenstein might allude to, insofar as the practices of a
particular cultural community can say nothing to those of another. I think
Wittgenstein gives an example of science being unable to say anything about
magic. Thus, transposed into the cultural realm it might be said that my
objecting about genital mutilation (I apologise in advance for using such an
emotive issue, but lets grasp the nettle) is inappropriate to that community
in which such practices occur. This position however, in actual fact,
although many seem to have read Wittgenstein in this way, was never what his
notion of language games entailed, for even Wittgenstein when talking about
cross-cultural dialogue said:
"Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language
quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people
there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them and
so on? The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means
of which we interpret an unknown language." (Philosphical Investigations
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), para. 206.)
Also, I think to put some flesh on this I would like to draw your attention
to Feyerabends comments on relativism, these are i think very telling.
"I regard the philosophical position of relativism silly because it
assumes that which never happens, namely no exchange. I also
regard the philosophical position of objectivism to be silly. They
are two sides of the same coin. Objectivism means there is one thing
which is closed and must not be interfered with: the truth. The other
side of the coin is relativism: there are many things which are
closed and must not be interfered with. When you go into different
surroundings with different people, you cannot lay down any
ground rules. They must grow out of the situation. To have general
principles in knowledge or anything else is deadly, absolutely
deadly." (P. K. Feyerabend, 1992)
Actually, what both Wiggenstein and Feyerabend are really enunciating is a
denial of the incommensurability thesis. That is, that there could ever be
total and full incommensurability. Certainly therre may be differences but
diffrences can always be negotiated, to a greater or lesser extent, in a
dialogue. What is important is that both participants to the dialogue
recognise the possibility that every position is up for grabs. Still the
deciding of what the resolution will be, will be the result of 'reasoned
argument' based on many factors, some of which will be evidence that certain
practices do not actually fulfil the function they are believed to hold. I
don't deny, BTW, that some cultural practices play a role in that society
although perhapsnot the role the participants believe. Marriage for example,
arguably, is not necessary to ensure that our-off spring get looked after,
although it may well be necessary to ensure the division of labour. It may
be both, but I would require convincing of this. How might this occur,
through discourse, exchange, dialogue, enducements, coersion, power, yes, I
agree, all of these will play a role, but also evidence. Consider Faurrisons
(sp?) arguments about the Holocaust. I wasn't there. I don't have
epistemological certainty, that allows me to say that I KNOW it happened,
still given the evidence available I do "know" it happened.
Given this then there is no 'real' confusion between:
>>a. you're comfortable with epistemological relativism
>>b. you're not happy with cultural relativism
>>c. the two are inextricably linked
Because the acceptance of 2 is not dependent upon the rejection of 1. In
order to say that I do not think a particular practice is (in)appropriate I
do not have to be certain, in the Cartesian sense. In essence, and this is
an issue that seems to have risen on the list vis-a-vis Foucaults
(anti)Humanism, I accept that we all have a 'core-species being' (as I think
Foucault does). Notice however, that this is not the same as human nature. I
accept that this core-species being is always culturally mediated. Still,
and Feyerabend, he of the "anything goes", explicitly says he draws the line
at human suffering. This is also my line. I also deny that I have to
epistemologically ground my claim in any form of foundational certainty. We
can, of course, argue at the margins - when does life begin, for example,
and where we draw the line will to a certain extent be based on conventions
- it might be 20 weeks, it might be 26 - but essentially we are able to
identify a human from say a tree. However, even on the margins, once drawn
room for disagreement will be less due to the fact that we all agree on what
a week is. It's simply not possible to doubt everything at once. Because
then one would have to doubt doubt itself.
>
>2. This is also a bit off relativism, but it does seem a critical point
>about Foucault:
>jim>>I thought that Foucault's main project in the power/knowledge area was to
>>>show how "conspiring to reach agreement" was a simple, inevitable, day to
>>>day activity, which had no element of mysticism.
>colin>
>>Well, he may well have, but that's the point. Put this way, it is mystical,
>>and highly meatphysical too. There is no escaping from metaphysics, only
>>delusions of having done so.
>If the only point you are making is that "there's no escaping from
>metaphysics" then I have to agree, though I would like to know what
>metaphysic you prefer.
There has been a significant move within philosophy within this century. The
positivist orthodoxy has come under sustained attack, both from within and
without the philosophy of science. Yet, although the epistemological lens
has been altered the metaphysical system (philsophy has been undenialbly
anti-realist since its inception and positivism more than most) has remained
intact. Thus we have a set non-positivist epistemological positions
transposed upon a positivist ontology. By metaphysical I mean, at one level,
precisely the underthematised ontology that infects all manner of positions.
Why is this important? I will quote Bhaskar here:
>"To see science as a social ativity, and as structured and discriminating
in its thought, constitutes a significant step in our understanding of
science. But, I shall argue without the support of a revised ontology, and
in particular a conception of the world as stratified and differentiated
too, it is impossible to steer clear of the Scylla of holding the structure
indispensable in the
>long run (back to empiricism) without being pulled into the Charybdis of
jusifying it exclusively in terms of the fixed or changing needs of the
scientific community (a form of neo-Kantian pragmatism exemplified by e.g.
Toulmin and Kuhn).' R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Brighton:
Harvester, 1978), p. 9.
>
>But I don't get the "mystical" bit. Maybe I don't understand what you mean
>by mystical.
How does this conspiracy occur, what are the processes? What metaphysical
system is operating here? Is the ability to conspire and create
autogentically an attribute of Humanity? What is existence on this reading?
Do we all conspire to create the material world? Hegel went mystical by
seeing everything as a manifestation of Geist, Berkeley through God, PLato,
the forms. Foucault I think, although not concerned directly with this
issue, is unable to explain how we are both the originators and possibly
creators, of "our world" and both constiuted by it. This process to me seems
mystical, mysterious, vague, shifting.
>
>(I take "relativism" to mean that I am unable to show that my ethical
>beliefs have a firm foundation, and that I realise that there are lots of
>other people who have opposing ethical beliefs which they believe just as
>strongly as I.)
>
>Why would you then suppose that I was not concerned about the welfare of
>the "other"?
>In fact, the very fact of believing that the other "might have a point"
>seems to me a type of concern.
But is concern enough. Hitler, clearly believed he "had a point" as did Pol
Pot.
Was their point of equal value to Nelson Mandela's? The point is I'm not
concerned, nor is it necessary to have a firm foundation, since as you quite
rightly say:
>(and must - since no choice is a choice) make
>a choice.
>But what does "reasoned choice" mean, if it is not ultimately appealing to
>some foundation?
No, no, it's not apealing to some foundation. It is a process where we
"conspire", if you like, to assess the eveidence, and this will include more
than simple experential evidence, (it will also, i accept, inculde social
power relations, for example), and reach a reasoned judgement on the basis
of the evidence and arguments. We carry out this task every moment of every
day. I had a cup of coffee for breakfast this morning, just as yesterday
morning, and hopefully tommorrow morning. I like coffee, I reasonably choose
to drink it. Still, past experience of enjoying my morning cup of coffee
will not ensure, that is, give me foundational certainty, that tommorrow
when I drink my coffee that my partner hasn't spiked it with poison. Still,
this won't stop from drinking coffee tommorrow. Nor is this decision
mystical, it is based on past experience, my present relationship with my
partner, the availabity of coffee etc.
I alluded to rock-bottom because I could see a situation arising where there
was nowhere left to turn but the place we had started from. The examples
about the Holocaust, Pol Pot and Hitler make the point. If reasoned
arguments are dependent upon epistemic certainty then there are no reasoned
arguments against such positions and we had better just get the bombs etc.
ready. I admit reasoned arguments seemed to have failed in the examples I
gave, but these examples do not disbar the notion of reasoned arguments,
only that we should try harder. If we rely solely on power, whether military
or otherwise, to settle disputes, and make these the only legit tools, the
day may well arrive when the likes of those mentioned have the greater power.
>>
>
>I don't understand the aside, and I'm not an expert on international relations.
>But I do believe that in history many wars have been fought because people
>were sure they were right.
Well absolutely, they were wed to foundationalist notions and in certain
instances they were wrong, but surely in others they were right? But the
mere possibility of being wrong should not lead to political inertia only
humility in the face of one's judgements and actions. As you have said
inaction is a form of action.
And I hope that people may be a bit more willing to settle peacefully if
>they had just the slightest nagging doubt about the justice of their
>position.
To me here it seems that you might just be falling prey to dichtomous
thinking. But surely, even if I accept that the U.S. went into the Gulf War
primarily to safeguard oil supplies, this does nothing to offset the fact
that the invasion and slaughtering of innocent civilians, and environmental
destruction, was realtively speaking 'wrong'. That is to say, the motives of
the U.S. administration were multi-faceted, and just because one facet was
based upon pragmatic self-interest does nothing to offset the good the
operation achieved (although, we'd probably both agree that the Kuwaiti
regime was not the best it could have been.)
>
>Hoping we can get closer to finding where our basic
>misunderstanding/disagreement lies.
Me too.
Thanks,
Colin.
--------------------------------------------------------
Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Aberystwyth
SY23 3DA
--------------------------------------------------------