Colin
Since you've interpreted my message as completely the opposite of what I
intended, and I apparently did the same to you, clearly we are missing
something.
I'll try to answer in three parts. Please note that I seldom ask
rhetorical questions, I really would like to know what you think.
1. I agree with a lot of what you say, eg:
>
>Lets try and grapple with this. I don't have a problem with epistemological
>relativism. Unless we assume that knowledge is produced ex nihilo, which I
>reject, then knowledge must be produced out of antecedant material; other
>bits of knowledge. Go all the way down and all you will find is other bits
>of knowledge and the quest for certain epistemological foundations is one
>one infinte regress. So I'm actually very comfortable with epistemological
>relativism. However, questions possess presuppositions and to ask the question:
>>
>> Dan's comment
>
>Presupposes that the two issues are distinct. But values are not distinct
>and untainted by "facts", and vice versa, hence the two issues are
>inextricably linked. I am also not, by the way, happy with cultural
>relativism, and hence to me the question, in cultural terms, (although
>remember, this implies epistemological complications):
>
Since we seem to be having trouble with terms, I'd like to know more of
what you mean by "cultural relativism" (I know you didn't introduce it,
but I'm not sure how you're unhappy with it).
However, on purely face value, the above says to me:
a. you're comfortable with epistemological relativism
b. you're not happy with cultural relativism
c. the two are inextricably linked
I find this confusing, though personally I'm quite happy to drop the
epistemological bit altogether, if we agree on that. It doesn't seem
crucial.
2. This is also a bit off relativism, but it does seem a critical point
about Foucault:
jim>>I thought that Foucault's main project in the power/knowledge area was to
>>show how "conspiring to reach agreement" was a simple, inevitable, day to
>>day activity, which had no element of mysticism.
colin>
>Well, he may well have, but that's the point. Put this way, it is mystical,
>and highly meatphysical too. There is no escaping from metaphysics, only
>delusions of having done so.
If the only point you are making is that "there's no escaping from
metaphysics" then I have to agree, though I would like to know what
metaphysic you prefer.
But I don't get the "mystical" bit. Maybe I don't understand what you mean
by mystical.
3. But the critical point is:
>>What's wrong with relativism?
>
>Is almost naive.
Not helpful. I can assure I've thought about it a lot.
Again, we may be just arguing over the definition of relativism, but I
suspect not.
(I take "relativism" to mean that I am unable to show that my ethical
beliefs have a firm foundation, and that I realise that there are lots of
other people who have opposing ethical beliefs which they believe just as
strongly as I.)
Why would you then suppose that I was not concerned about the welfare of
the "other"?
In fact, the very fact of believing that the other "might have a point"
seems to me a type of concern.
>
>The issue of choice, however, does not satnd or fall on a foundational
>point, some non-ground from which to choose. This is the positivist fallacy.
>"I need certainty!" But without this certainty, is the only choice no way to
>make reasoned choice?
>
I absolutely agree that I can (and must - since no choice is a choice) make
a choice.
But what does "reasoned choice" mean, if it is not ultimately appealing to
some foundation?
>
>You are heading into a rather big hole here! Onwards and downwards I suppose.
I'm not sure how you're measuring direction here.
>Exactly, we now hit rock-bottom. My discipline (International Relations) has
>an answer to this problem. We just get the biggest sticks, guns, bombs or
>whatever and make SURE that WE win the media war.It's called a power
>politics game and as a species we've been playing it for centuries (it's
>natural its what we do!, or so we're told). ( as an aside, it is curious
>here that, in fact, the media war, is generally won not by appeals to
>philosophical foundations but by appeals to scientific knowledge, reasoned
>arguments etc., but which do all carry philosophical positions - consider
>the role of such knowledge in the BSE scare in Britian today.)
>
I don't understand the aside, and I'm not an expert on international relations.
But I do believe that in history many wars have been fought because people
were sure they were right.
(Even if some argue that the "true" reasons were purely pragmatic, the
"public" reason was often "ethical" - eg Gulf War.)
And I hope that people may be a bit more willing to settle peacefully if
they had just the slightest nagging doubt about the justice of their
position.
Hoping we can get closer to finding where our basic
misunderstanding/disagreement lies.
Jim
Jim Underwood
Department of Information Systems phone +612 330 1831
University of Technology, Sydney fax +612 330 1807
PO Box 123,
BROADWAY 2007 e-mail: jim@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
AUSTRALIA
http://linus.socs.uts.edu.au/~jim/
Since you've interpreted my message as completely the opposite of what I
intended, and I apparently did the same to you, clearly we are missing
something.
I'll try to answer in three parts. Please note that I seldom ask
rhetorical questions, I really would like to know what you think.
1. I agree with a lot of what you say, eg:
>
>Lets try and grapple with this. I don't have a problem with epistemological
>relativism. Unless we assume that knowledge is produced ex nihilo, which I
>reject, then knowledge must be produced out of antecedant material; other
>bits of knowledge. Go all the way down and all you will find is other bits
>of knowledge and the quest for certain epistemological foundations is one
>one infinte regress. So I'm actually very comfortable with epistemological
>relativism. However, questions possess presuppositions and to ask the question:
>>
>> Dan's comment
>
>Presupposes that the two issues are distinct. But values are not distinct
>and untainted by "facts", and vice versa, hence the two issues are
>inextricably linked. I am also not, by the way, happy with cultural
>relativism, and hence to me the question, in cultural terms, (although
>remember, this implies epistemological complications):
>
Since we seem to be having trouble with terms, I'd like to know more of
what you mean by "cultural relativism" (I know you didn't introduce it,
but I'm not sure how you're unhappy with it).
However, on purely face value, the above says to me:
a. you're comfortable with epistemological relativism
b. you're not happy with cultural relativism
c. the two are inextricably linked
I find this confusing, though personally I'm quite happy to drop the
epistemological bit altogether, if we agree on that. It doesn't seem
crucial.
2. This is also a bit off relativism, but it does seem a critical point
about Foucault:
jim>>I thought that Foucault's main project in the power/knowledge area was to
>>show how "conspiring to reach agreement" was a simple, inevitable, day to
>>day activity, which had no element of mysticism.
colin>
>Well, he may well have, but that's the point. Put this way, it is mystical,
>and highly meatphysical too. There is no escaping from metaphysics, only
>delusions of having done so.
If the only point you are making is that "there's no escaping from
metaphysics" then I have to agree, though I would like to know what
metaphysic you prefer.
But I don't get the "mystical" bit. Maybe I don't understand what you mean
by mystical.
3. But the critical point is:
>>What's wrong with relativism?
>
>Is almost naive.
Not helpful. I can assure I've thought about it a lot.
Again, we may be just arguing over the definition of relativism, but I
suspect not.
(I take "relativism" to mean that I am unable to show that my ethical
beliefs have a firm foundation, and that I realise that there are lots of
other people who have opposing ethical beliefs which they believe just as
strongly as I.)
Why would you then suppose that I was not concerned about the welfare of
the "other"?
In fact, the very fact of believing that the other "might have a point"
seems to me a type of concern.
>
>The issue of choice, however, does not satnd or fall on a foundational
>point, some non-ground from which to choose. This is the positivist fallacy.
>"I need certainty!" But without this certainty, is the only choice no way to
>make reasoned choice?
>
I absolutely agree that I can (and must - since no choice is a choice) make
a choice.
But what does "reasoned choice" mean, if it is not ultimately appealing to
some foundation?
>
>You are heading into a rather big hole here! Onwards and downwards I suppose.
I'm not sure how you're measuring direction here.
>Exactly, we now hit rock-bottom. My discipline (International Relations) has
>an answer to this problem. We just get the biggest sticks, guns, bombs or
>whatever and make SURE that WE win the media war.It's called a power
>politics game and as a species we've been playing it for centuries (it's
>natural its what we do!, or so we're told). ( as an aside, it is curious
>here that, in fact, the media war, is generally won not by appeals to
>philosophical foundations but by appeals to scientific knowledge, reasoned
>arguments etc., but which do all carry philosophical positions - consider
>the role of such knowledge in the BSE scare in Britian today.)
>
I don't understand the aside, and I'm not an expert on international relations.
But I do believe that in history many wars have been fought because people
were sure they were right.
(Even if some argue that the "true" reasons were purely pragmatic, the
"public" reason was often "ethical" - eg Gulf War.)
And I hope that people may be a bit more willing to settle peacefully if
they had just the slightest nagging doubt about the justice of their
position.
Hoping we can get closer to finding where our basic
misunderstanding/disagreement lies.
Jim
Jim Underwood
Department of Information Systems phone +612 330 1831
University of Technology, Sydney fax +612 330 1807
PO Box 123,
BROADWAY 2007 e-mail: jim@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
AUSTRALIA
http://linus.socs.uts.edu.au/~jim/