allow me to step in.
>Malcolm Dunnachie Thompson wrote:
>> By questioning the existence of an "actual past" I don't mean to suggest
>> that, in fact, the Napoleonic Wars never happened, or whatever. I only
>> question the idea that these events have an unproblematic existence
>> vis-a-vis the present (which is, I think, really the object of every
>> historical enquiry - a point I'll return to). Also, to speak of "events
>> in the past" and to speak of "the past" are two very different things. I
>> agree that history becomes controversial as soon as you try to determine
>> (that is, *narrativize*) the meanings of events. But, of course, this
>> means that those events are, in themselves, *meaningless*.
I am not sure that the distinction between meaningful historical narrative and meaningless
events is itself a helpful distinction. The "napoleonic wars" is already a discursive amalgam. It exist
only inside a certain form of history. What is the difference, for that matter, between Caesar's
bodyguard scratching his ear before going to sleep and Caesar crossing the Rubicon? A more useful
distinction is perhaps between material traces, documents, ruins, etc. and historical accounts. In such
a distinction the historical discourse moves between two spaces that are both in the present. The
space of the of trace, the archive, the museum, the archeological site, and the space of writing, the
university, the academic journals etc.
On Fri, 26 Apr 1996 18:26:02 +0000, Nicholas Dronen wrote:
> I ask in earnest, with no intent of disparaging you, are there currently any
>grand, political struggles in the West?
seeing a grand political struggle is the outcome of a certain empowerment that enable even an
opressed group to broadcast its own definition of the political. Granted, that doesn't seem to be the
case today. There exist many competing non-hegemonic definitions of the political, but none of them is
able to recode the others so as to appear as *The non-hegemonic* definition. However, grandeur is
not necessary for a political struggle to exist. Historical discourse is not the key element in such
struggles, in fact, paradoxicaly, its value as political weapon is determined yo a great extent by its
perceived objectivity and political neutrality. I think this should be taken into consideration. one of the
best conservative strategy today is precisely to devaluate this objectivity, just as, in former times,
attacking this objectivity, when it was produced in a much more hegemonic setting, had been the chief
subversive strategy.
>> The past does not exist in the same way that this computer screen exists.
Which computer screen? this one? I have to disagree, "this computer screen" exist in a certain
relation between a virtual discourse related in a complex way to your E-mail address and the
possibility of seeing a material object of a certain kind. I'd say that a historical event apears in a
similar inter-space, though one which is more heavily, and differently, structured. It is for this reason
that being skeptic about the existence of an objective past is not so much different than being skeptic
about the existence of "this" screen. The question should perhaps not be, "is there an actual past?"
but rather "what is the configuration in which a past becomes actual, what are the gains and the
losses in a particular configuration, and what strategic changes could be achieved in relation to this
configuration, in view of these gains and losses?"
>> So how does it exist? Only as a narrative, so the motivations,
>> investments and regularities of its telling are as important if not more
>> important than its correspondence to the "truth" - which is, of course,
>> itself always already narrativized. Which brings me back to my point
>> about the present being the real object of historical enquiry. (well,
>> actually, I'm not sure if it does, but I'd like to return to it anyway.)
>> Foucault's histories are relevant because they help me to explain why it
>> is I find myself in the situation I'm in. I don't actually care about
>> Carl Westphal or Charcot themselves - what I care about is how their
>> activities are worked into a strategy of control that still has effects
>> today. All histories are really about explaining the present, so it is
>> one's perspective on that present that will determine the kind of history
>> you write. This is true for *everybody*. And to turn that proposition on
>> its head: it is possible to infer from someone's written histories what
>> perspective they have on the present. Do they try to account for the
>> faces and modes of oppression with their histories? Or do they to
>> rationalize these oppressions by either ignoring them or resolving them
>> into some other narrative? What is foregrounded in a particular history?
>> Does this narrative gesture help? If so, then good, that's enough. If
>> not, then the history is ideologically specious.
I think I do care for Charcot and Westphal themselves, if only because I see no objective reason I
should care for myself more than I care for them. If I care for the present it is because the present is
part of history just as much as history is part of the present. If you try to argue for a radical
exclusiveness between the present and the past, saying that the past is but an instrument of struggle
fought in the present, you may effectively "desacralize" the past, which has the virtue of undoing the
very possibility of recoding the present in terms of a "great political struggle". Perhaps Walter
Benjamin is the name that should be brough up in discussing the relation between past and present.
> I do find it problematic that you insist that history (as practiced by . .?) is
>little more than an exercize in the maintainance of a dominant regime. Certainly,
>people "in power" usually like to stay "in power," but that doesn't mean that they
>have any more control over me than my best friend does. This is the sort of thought
>that leads left-wingers and conservative ideologues alike to criticze the media for
>being overtly in favor of the positions they oppose. It is also the sort of thought
>that sustains view that the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations
>are conspiring with the U.N. and officials of the governments of the West to establish
>an oppressive global regime. It's Chomskyism.
-------------
Gabriel Ash
Notre-Dame
-------------
>Malcolm Dunnachie Thompson wrote:
>> By questioning the existence of an "actual past" I don't mean to suggest
>> that, in fact, the Napoleonic Wars never happened, or whatever. I only
>> question the idea that these events have an unproblematic existence
>> vis-a-vis the present (which is, I think, really the object of every
>> historical enquiry - a point I'll return to). Also, to speak of "events
>> in the past" and to speak of "the past" are two very different things. I
>> agree that history becomes controversial as soon as you try to determine
>> (that is, *narrativize*) the meanings of events. But, of course, this
>> means that those events are, in themselves, *meaningless*.
I am not sure that the distinction between meaningful historical narrative and meaningless
events is itself a helpful distinction. The "napoleonic wars" is already a discursive amalgam. It exist
only inside a certain form of history. What is the difference, for that matter, between Caesar's
bodyguard scratching his ear before going to sleep and Caesar crossing the Rubicon? A more useful
distinction is perhaps between material traces, documents, ruins, etc. and historical accounts. In such
a distinction the historical discourse moves between two spaces that are both in the present. The
space of the of trace, the archive, the museum, the archeological site, and the space of writing, the
university, the academic journals etc.
On Fri, 26 Apr 1996 18:26:02 +0000, Nicholas Dronen wrote:
> I ask in earnest, with no intent of disparaging you, are there currently any
>grand, political struggles in the West?
seeing a grand political struggle is the outcome of a certain empowerment that enable even an
opressed group to broadcast its own definition of the political. Granted, that doesn't seem to be the
case today. There exist many competing non-hegemonic definitions of the political, but none of them is
able to recode the others so as to appear as *The non-hegemonic* definition. However, grandeur is
not necessary for a political struggle to exist. Historical discourse is not the key element in such
struggles, in fact, paradoxicaly, its value as political weapon is determined yo a great extent by its
perceived objectivity and political neutrality. I think this should be taken into consideration. one of the
best conservative strategy today is precisely to devaluate this objectivity, just as, in former times,
attacking this objectivity, when it was produced in a much more hegemonic setting, had been the chief
subversive strategy.
>> The past does not exist in the same way that this computer screen exists.
Which computer screen? this one? I have to disagree, "this computer screen" exist in a certain
relation between a virtual discourse related in a complex way to your E-mail address and the
possibility of seeing a material object of a certain kind. I'd say that a historical event apears in a
similar inter-space, though one which is more heavily, and differently, structured. It is for this reason
that being skeptic about the existence of an objective past is not so much different than being skeptic
about the existence of "this" screen. The question should perhaps not be, "is there an actual past?"
but rather "what is the configuration in which a past becomes actual, what are the gains and the
losses in a particular configuration, and what strategic changes could be achieved in relation to this
configuration, in view of these gains and losses?"
>> So how does it exist? Only as a narrative, so the motivations,
>> investments and regularities of its telling are as important if not more
>> important than its correspondence to the "truth" - which is, of course,
>> itself always already narrativized. Which brings me back to my point
>> about the present being the real object of historical enquiry. (well,
>> actually, I'm not sure if it does, but I'd like to return to it anyway.)
>> Foucault's histories are relevant because they help me to explain why it
>> is I find myself in the situation I'm in. I don't actually care about
>> Carl Westphal or Charcot themselves - what I care about is how their
>> activities are worked into a strategy of control that still has effects
>> today. All histories are really about explaining the present, so it is
>> one's perspective on that present that will determine the kind of history
>> you write. This is true for *everybody*. And to turn that proposition on
>> its head: it is possible to infer from someone's written histories what
>> perspective they have on the present. Do they try to account for the
>> faces and modes of oppression with their histories? Or do they to
>> rationalize these oppressions by either ignoring them or resolving them
>> into some other narrative? What is foregrounded in a particular history?
>> Does this narrative gesture help? If so, then good, that's enough. If
>> not, then the history is ideologically specious.
I think I do care for Charcot and Westphal themselves, if only because I see no objective reason I
should care for myself more than I care for them. If I care for the present it is because the present is
part of history just as much as history is part of the present. If you try to argue for a radical
exclusiveness between the present and the past, saying that the past is but an instrument of struggle
fought in the present, you may effectively "desacralize" the past, which has the virtue of undoing the
very possibility of recoding the present in terms of a "great political struggle". Perhaps Walter
Benjamin is the name that should be brough up in discussing the relation between past and present.
> I do find it problematic that you insist that history (as practiced by . .?) is
>little more than an exercize in the maintainance of a dominant regime. Certainly,
>people "in power" usually like to stay "in power," but that doesn't mean that they
>have any more control over me than my best friend does. This is the sort of thought
>that leads left-wingers and conservative ideologues alike to criticze the media for
>being overtly in favor of the positions they oppose. It is also the sort of thought
>that sustains view that the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations
>are conspiring with the U.N. and officials of the governments of the West to establish
>an oppressive global regime. It's Chomskyism.
-------------
Gabriel Ash
Notre-Dame
-------------